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This thesis demonstrates the utility of the strategic culture concept in understanding 
threat-perception and strategic behaviour, insofar as the KSA is concerned.  Many of the 
KSA’s critical junctures originate from sub-state actors and factors, supra-state 
ideologies, and non-state actors. The threat perception at these critical junctures required 
behavioural responses that balanced the often-competing demands (upon the state) or 
requirements (of these actors) by the ruling elite within the KSA. Indeed, the strategic 
culture concept has allowed this thesis to explore the linkage between cultural aspects 
internal to the KSA against its strategic choices and behaviours in relation to its foreign 
and security policies, primarily by analysing the construction of the KSA’s different 
identities. Specifically, the norms associated with being the Custodians of the Two Holy 
Mosques, the de-facto head of the Wahhabi school of Sunnism, and its doctrinal hostility 
to Political Islam and pan-Arabism, have demonstrated behavioural trends, or a strategic 
approach which is highly centralized in order to omni-balance against these (often) 
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 4 
DEFINITIONS AND GLOSSARY 
 
Umma – Muslim population. 
Wahhabism – Wahhabism is a living theological tradition and the only permissible 
Sunni doctrine within the KSA. It is names after the eighteenth-century scholar, 
Mohammed ibn’ Abd al Wahab. 
Tawhid – Monotheism. 
Takfir – Excommunication (from Islam). 
Al Saud – The House of Saud; the ruling family of the KSA. 
Jahiliya – Ignorance.  
Jihad – Religious struggle. 
Fatwa – religious declarations. 
Al-wala wa-l-bara – loyalty to God and the disavowal of all else. 
Fard Ayn – Collective, defensive duty, often cited in terms of defensive Jihad. 
Al-tadamun al-Islami – Islamic jointery. 
Fitna – Unresolvable chaos or distress. 
Ikhwan – Brothers. 
Dar al-khufr – the land of the heretics (non-Muslim lands). 
DAESH – The Islamic State, or ISIL. 
Khawarij – Excessive deviation and therefore ‘expelled’. 
Shi’at Ali – Party of Ali, the Fourth Righteously Guided Caliph. The spiritual leader of 
Shia muslims. 
Omq-e rahbordi – Strategic depth, achieved by ‘offensive realism’. 
Ulama – Influential Islamic clerics. 
Velayat e-feqhi – Guardians of the Jurists. 
Maslaha – Expediency (the Ayatollah’s ability to over-rule religious doctrine in order to 
avoid a political impasse). 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
This thesis examines the nature of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia’s (KSA) strategic culture 
and how the KSA wields power to achieve its strategic objectives. It argues that KSA has 
faced and continues to face complex and specific challenges that influence its foreign and 
security policy behaviour. The thesis will determine whether or not the KSA has enduring 
strategic culture traits. This thesis will examine the KSA’s strategic behaviour by drawing 
on the concept of strategic culture. This concept may provide a useful explanatory 
framework for what can often be seen as ‘irrational’ Saudi strategic decision making, for 
example that KSA is a state-sponsor of extremist organisations. The thesis will attempt 
to ascertain the extent to which strategic culture is a useful concept for academics and 
policy makers to understand why KSA behaves the way it does, whether it has a strategic 
culture rooted in history, one that is stable and consistent, or one that is susceptible to 
evolution, revolution, or other strategic shocks. Special emphasis will be placed on its 
hard power, specifically identifying cultural factors that either inhibit, promote or 
constrain the use of its conventional military capabilities and its apparent preference for 
wielding its hard power through non-state actors and supranational institutions. Realists 
may suggest that the KSA’s foreign and security policy behaviour should be analysed in 
terms of military, financial, materiel, and geostrategic power. Yet such an approach is 
probably unable to provide an explanation for seemingly irrational strategic behaviour by 
the KSA, whereas the concept of strategic culture might help explain why it behaves in 
ways that are, by Realist standards, irrational. 
 
In discussing individual threats to the KSA, each variously and individually appear as a 
range of cross-cutting factors.  It becomes difficult to isolate any of these threats without 
 6 
acknowledging their political, cultural and religious connectedness.  Furthermore, the 
Middle East will continue to provide challenges to the stability of international order that 
will most probably elicit Western responses. For example, this thesis will attempt to 
demonstrate that in 2011, despite decades of involvement in the region, Western actors 
suspended their better judgement in assessing the Arab Spring, and the apparent breakout 
of democracy across the region, by not anticipating the scale of response by counter-
revolutionary regimes such as the KSA.   
 
Indeed, “democracy and liberalism have generally gone hand in hand in the Western 
experience”.1 Conversely in the Middle East, democracy may be regarded as a dangerous 
means of consolidating power in favour of a particular confessional group or 
accompanied by the associated destabilising progress of neo-liberalism.  Democracy 
could therefore be regarded as a threat to existing political constructs, including the norms 
associated within, and around the country, such as family, tribe, Arabism and Islamism.2  
The extent to which this particularly applies to the KSA will be examined when we 
analyse its identity within the context of a country beset by a range of significant security 
threats, such as: Iran, extremist Shi’ism, Sunni Islamism in the guise of the Muslim 
Brotherhood, and violent Islamist nihilists (such as al-Qaeda or other Salafi-Jihadist 
groupings). The general lack of contextual understanding or misjudgement by Western 
policymakers of the KSA’s strategic behaviour has primarily featured in the security 
domain leading to the mostly predictable evolutionary pattern of some events, for 
example, the evolution and subsequent disaggregation of Islamic extremism and its 
splintering into different groupings across the wider Middle East, and the KSA’s 
 
1 Shadi Hamid, Islamic Exceptionalism, (Griffin, June 2017), pp. 3-10. 
2 Ibid, p. 11. 
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behavioural choices within this disaggregation.3 Using a strategic culture framework may 
assist in understanding the extent and context of such disaggregation, and why the KSA 




Culture has become a common explanatory variable in international relations scholarship 
particularly in the post-Cold War era. One of the most surprising aspects of this scholarly 
interest has been the emerging consensus that national security policy can be significantly 
affected by culture and norms.4 During the Cold War, scholars attempted to develop a 
concept of political culture, and the term ‘strategic culture’ was eventually coined in the 
1970s by Snyder, who offered the basic framework of strategic culture in devising a 
framework upon which different cultural factors can be analysed. 5 Snyder argued that 
Soviet strategic culture provided the context for understanding why the Soviet Union 
behaved the way it did. He argued that the development of Soviet nuclear doctrine was 
the product of organizational and historical contexts, and crucially that these two contexts 
shaped Soviet patterns of behaviour.6 Snyder described strategic culture as a socialised 
set of values and ideas which shape the behaviour of strategic actors over time.7 His 
 
3 Patrick Coburn, The Age of Jihad, (Verso, October 2017). 
4 Bahgat Korany, The Many Faces of National Security in the Arab World, (Palgrave Macmillan) 
p. 15. 
5  Jack Snyder, ‘The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for Limited Nuclear Operations’, 
RAND, 1977. pp. 3-11. 
6 Norbert Eitelhuber, ‘The Russian Bear: Russian Strategic Culture and What it Implies for the 
West’, Connections, Vol.9, No.1, Winter 2009, pp. 1-28. 
7 Snyder, ‘Soviet Strategic Culture’. pp. 3-11. 
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concept of strategic culture largely failed to make significant scholarly progress as a 
unified theory that might rival Realism, and as such it remained largely unused. 8 
Following shortly behind Snyder, the idea of strategic culture as an ethnocentric approach 
to strategy was developed by Booth. He built upon Snyder’s Soviet-specific analysis and 
argued that scholars should think in terms of “cultural relativism”.9  This relativism 
requires scholars to consider why Americans think and behave like Americans, why 
Russians think and behave like Russians, and for the purpose of this thesis, why Saudis 
think and act like Saudis. Successive scholars have revitalised the theory as a means to 
explain strategic studies with some very notable contributions.10 There have also been 
broader scholarly theories around ‘civilisational culture’, as expounded for example by 
Samuel Huntington who used aspects of culturalism to predict international conflict 
drivers such as the conflicts caused by religious extremism.11 These contributions will be 
analysed in detail in chapter 2. 
 
Using a strategic culture framework to examine the KSA’s strategic behaviour seems 
particularly appropriate. The KSA is replete with powerful and possibly dominant 
 
8 Lucian W. Pye, Culture and Foreign Policy, (Boulder, Colorado, 1997), p. 2. 
9 Ken Booth, Strategy and Ethnocentrism, (New York: Holmes and Meier), 1979, p. 1. 
10 For example, Peter Katzenstein, The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World 
Politics, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996); Colin Gray, Nuclear Strategy and 
National Style, (Hamilton Press, 1986); Alastair Iain Johnston, ‘Thinking About Strategic 
Culture’, International Security 19, No.4, 1995; Ethan Kapstein, ‘Is Realism Dead? The Domestic 
Sources of International Politics’, International Organization 49, No.4, 1995; John Glen, 
‘Realism versus Strategic Culture: Competition and Collaboration’, International Studies Review, 
Vol.11, No.3, 2009; Colin Gray, The Geopolitics of Super Power, (University Press Kentucky, 
1988). 
11 Samuel P Huntington, The Clash of Civilisations and the Remaking of World Order, (New 
York: Simon and Schuster), 1996. 
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cultural factors that influence its desired strategic outcomes: the all-pervasive role of 
religion, its state-creation and concomitant leadership role within the broader Arab world, 
and the existence of several autocratic neighbours whose legitimacy – like that of the 
KSA – is not defined by democratic principles of responsibility, accountability and 
authority.12 The former point is a particularly important aspect of the KSA’s culture and 
its desire to maintain its legitimacy and its role as the self-appointed custodian of Mecca 
and Medina, and by extension Islam. For example, since the 2011 Arab Spring we have 
witnessed the rise and demise of new political actors, the proliferation of non-state actors, 
Gulf Arab regional assertion and in particular, the KSA’s move towards a more proactive 
foreign policy amidst internal problems of generational succession, and its continued 
preoccupation with Iran.13  
 
By focussing on the determinants of the state’s foreign and security policy provides the 
opportunity to explore the roles that – what we might call - intra-state identity norms 
shape the KSA’s strategic behaviour.14 A good example of this is the post-Nasser era 
perception of the gradually less dominant pan-Arab political particularities and the idea 
of a unified umma – Muslim population – in favour of an increased trend towards 
favouring the nation-state system and its concomitant Realist behavioural qualities as 
explanatory variables.15  Yet a close look at the focus on the KSA’s hard power in 
 
12 Gilles Kepel, Jihad, (IB Tauris & Co Ltd), July 2009. 
13 Toby Matthiesen, Sectarian Gulf: Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and the Arab Spring that Wasn’t, 
(Standford Briefs), July 2013. 
14 Gerd Nonneman, Analyzing Middle East Foreign Policies and the Relationship with Europe, 
(Routledge, July 2005), p. 1. 
15  Anthony Cordesman, The Gulf and the West, Routledge, (September 1998); Nonneman, 
Analyzing Middle East Foreign Policies; Anthony Cordesman, Saudi Arabia: Guarding the 
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subsequent chapters might demonstrate that its political system and the requirement to 
balance, either coercively or defensively, against non-state actors remains significant.16 
Or in other words, other states are not necessarily the KSA’s key security challenge.       
 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND METHODOLOGY 
 
This thesis’s primary research question is: To what extent can strategic culture help us 
understand the KSA’s strategic decision-making and behaviour with regard to its security 
policy? 
 
The thesis will follow a chronological method, examining the dominant cultural factors 
and critical junctures and the KSA’s decision making over the following key periods of 
its history: the KSA’s state-creation in 1932; the period colloquially known as Nasserism 
during the 1950/60s; the period following the 1979 Iranian Revolution; and concluding 
with case studies into the KSA’s behaviour during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan 
during the 1980s, and during the civil and proxy war carried out in Syria following the 
events of the Arab Spring in 2011. These chronological events will allow me to examine 
some specific secondary research questions which will support the elucidation of the 
KSA’s strategic decision-making behaviours.  
 
 
Desert Kingdom, (Perseus, January 1997); and Courtney Freer, Rentier Islam, (Oxford University 
Press USA, May 2018). 
16 Barnett, Dialogues in Arab Politics; Stephen Walt, The Origin of Alliances, (Cornell University 
Press, September 1990); and F Gregory Gause III, ‘Systemic Approaches to Middle East 
International Relations’, International Studies Association,1999.  
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Before examining these chronological periods, chapter 2 will examine the scholarly 
literature surrounding the concept of strategic culture in order to better understand its 
utility and appropriateness in compared to other concepts. Chapter 2 will also briefly 
examine scholarly literature surrounding Middle East area studies in order to assist in 
situating the KSA within the Arabian Peninsula and wider Middle East. Chapter 3 will 
examine those dominant cultural factors influencing the KSA’s decision making 
behaviours in response to Nasserism, specifically by enhancing our understanding of the 
intra-Sunni competition over identity and leadership. This chapter will help achieve a 
better understanding of the following secondary research question relating to the KSA’s 
strategic culture: To what extent does intra-Sunni religious doctrine – specifically 
Wahhabism – influence the KSA’s strategic decision-making behaviours in relation to its 
critical junctures?  
 
Chapter 4 will follow a similar process by examining the events of the 1979 Iranian 
Revolution, and the resulting intra-Islamic competition over identity and leadership over 
the Muslim world. This analysis will develop and discover an enhanced understanding of 
an additional secondary research question: Does this intra-Islamic competition constrain 
in any way the KSA’s strategic behaviour – insofar as the Wahhabi doctrine of tawhid 
(monotheism) and takfir (excommunication) are concerned – and does the KSA’s 
apparent requirement to evolve and refine its identity provide an additional paradox to 
the KSA’s security policy?   
 
The case studies in chapter 5 will help to discover, or otherwise, our understanding of the 
KSA’s foreign and security policy behaviour by identifying any behavioural patterns or 
trends that can be attributed to the KSA’s strategic culture.  
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Finally, chapter 6 will offer conclusions and suggest any possible areas for further 
scholarly research. 
 
THE KSA’S STATE FORMATION AND ITS REGIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY.  
The KSA’s regional security strategy has remained stable since it was established as an 
autonomous state in 1932. It lies at the confluence of history, ethnicity and religion, and 
on the post-World War One fault lines of the McMahon letter, 17  the Sykes-Picot 
Agreement, 18  the Balfour declaration, 19  the treaties of Lausanne and Sevres. 20  It is 
ultimately the result of the Saud’s’ ability to eject the Hashemites, who were the previous 
rulers of the Hejaz, from the western Arabian Peninsula. Each of above factors impacted 
the KSA and the other member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC),21 and all 
provide historical and contextual understanding to the contemporary foreign and security 
policies of the KSA.  
 
The KSA’s overriding goal has been to maintain the security of the regime in the face of 
conventional military threats, transnational ideological challenges such as pan-Arabism, 
 
17 McMahon letters are actually a series of letters exchanged during World War I in which the 
British government agreed to recognize Arab independence after the war in exchange for the 
Sharif of Mecca launching the Arab Revolt against the Ottoman Turks. 
18 The Sykes-Picot Agreement was a secret agreement, by which most of the Arab lands under 
the rule of the Ottoman Turks would be divided between Britain and France. 
19 The Balfour declaration was a public statement issued by the British government during World 
War I, announcing support for the establishment of a national home for the Jewish people. 
20 The Treaty of Sevres was imposed on the Ottoman Empire after World War I. 
21 The Gulf Cooperation Council was created in 1981, primarily as a response to the Iranian 
revolution and Iran’s subsequent attempts to export revolutionary Islam in Arabia.  Its founding 
members were Saudi Arabia, UAE, Oman, Qatar, Kuwait and Bahrain.  
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Political Islamism and extremist religious challenges to its domestic political stability and 
legitimacy.22 These challenges are compounded by their requirement to maintain strategic 
alliances with superpowers, regional powers, and non-state actors. Typically, the means 
used by the KSA to secure its interests in the region have involved the wielding of 
financial power, diplomatic balancing, and its carefully balanced transnational 
ideological network.23  
 
Like any regional power, the KSA’s security policy seeks to prevent actors becoming 
regional hegemons. However, the KSA’s security policy cannot be understood solely 
from the Realist perspective of maintaining the balance of power over neighbouring 
states. Perhaps uniquely in the Arab world, and with the KSA at the centre of Sunni’ism, 
security challenges most often materialise by transnational ideologies and movements 
that can mobilise populations – the umma – against incumbent rulers. Indeed, in the 
broader Middle East there are powerful transnational identities grounded in Islam and 
Arabism that attract political loyalty across national boundaries.24 
 
The Saudi regime has historically been particularly vulnerable to such transnational 
ideologies as a result of its own nation building experience. The Saudi state emerged from 
the Arabian Peninsula that had been characterised by political fragmentation for 
centuries. It is less than 100 years old and was united by military power, unassisted 
 
22  Bahgat Korany, The Foreign Policies of Arab States: The Challenge of Globalisation, 
(American University in Cairo Press, 2008). 
23 F Gregory Gause, The International Politics of the Persian Gulf, (Syracuse University Press, 
2011). 
24 See for example, Mohammed Ayoob, ‘Third World in the System of States’, International 
Studies Quarterly 33, no.1, 1989. 
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initially by any unifying nationalist ideology. Rather, Abd al-Aziz ibn Abd al-Rahman Al 
Saud (the founder of the KSA and referred to as Ibn Saud) justified his rule on the basis 
of a specific strand of Islam called Wahhabism. Ibn Saud rejected those that were not 
Wahhabist. Indeed, the modern institutions of the state such as defence, economy, foreign 
affairs and internal security, which have been established since the state’s establishment 
have been adapted from the traditional form of tribal patronage - appointments to such 
institutions now, reflect the importance of Wahhabism.25  
 
The KSA’s regional security strategy has primarily been one of power balancing, seeking 
out regional and international allies against other state and non-state powers that threaten 
the regime or its regional interests.26  In a multipolar regional environment, where a 
number of state-sponsored and non-state threats exist, deciding whom to balance against, 
and when, characterises the KSA’s strategic decision making.27 We will examine why 
historically it has balanced within the Middle East region by blocking any attempts by 
other states at gaining regional hegemony, and of more relevance to this thesis, how it 
has balanced primarily against ideological challenges to the Saudi regime. 28  This 
dominant aspect of its foreign and security policy is extremely interesting. This thesis 
will aim to generate a better understanding of what determines this behaviour whenever 
the KSA has dealt with challenges “coming from below” in pursuit of what Barnett calls 
 
25 Korany, The Many Faces of National Security, pp.12-13. 
26 Nonneman, Analyzing Middle East Foreign Policies, p. 251. 
27 F. Gregory Gause, ‘Balancing What? Threat Perception and Alliance Choice in the Gulf’, 
Security Studies 13, no.2, 2004. 
28  Hinnebusch and Ehteshami, The Foreign Policies of Middle East States, (Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, Boulder, London, 2002). 
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“identity hegemony”, that is, securing its ontological security by reframing its identity in 
response to events, via its discursive power.29 
 
The predominant method used by the KSA for advancing its regional security policy has 
been the weaponisation of identity.30 The KSA has established robust regional ideological 
networks, whose various aims have been to disseminate the KSA’s interpretations of 
Wahhabism and its claim to be the protector of the Islamic faith.31 Chapter 3 will analyse 
these aspects of its strategic culture in more detail in order to demonstrate why the KSA 
has positioned itself ideologically as the centre-ground of Islam, in particular, Sunni Islam 
within the region. This central tool of Saudi statecraft has allowed the KSA to intervene 
in the politics of other regional states in order to advance its own interests in the name of 
Islam. For such purposes, the KSA has established and maintained alliances with non-
state actors, especially Islamist organisations. An intriguing aspect of this thesis is that 
the level of support for such groupings, although generally consistent in a relationship 
sense, is variably dependent on the KSA’s understanding and analysis of the ideological 
threats it is balancing against at a particular time.32 Understanding why the KSA behaves 
this way appears curious and contradictory. Chapters 3 and 4 will provide several 
 
29 Barnett, Dialogues in Arab Politics, pp. 22 – 25.  
30 Noting that KSA’s most preeminent tool of statecraft is its financial power, which allows it to 
support its regional allies directly or indirectly as part of its omni-balancing. The examination of 
its fiscal policy in support of its security strategy, as a behavioural tool, is outside the scope of 
this thesis. Indeed, it would almost certainly require a standalone thesis.  
31 See for example, Simon Ross, Force and Fanatacism, (Hurst and Company, London, 2015), 
Keppel, Jihad. 
32 See for example, F Gregory Gause, ‘Saudi Arabia in the New Middle East’, (Council on Foreign 
Relations, December 23, 2011); James Piscatori, Islamic Fundamentalism and the Gulf Crisis, 
(Boston: American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1991). 
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examples of the undulation of these relationships, including the determinants on the 
KSA’s behaviour, thereby demonstrating the difficulty associated with maintaining the 
appropriate control over these behavioural relationships. It will also demonstrate what 
happens when these strategies go wrong, and the resulting unintended consequences. The 
literature highlights a predominant tension with balancing ideological stakeholders when 
the KSA’s strategic behaviour runs contrary to these ideologies.33  
 
In conclusion, since its formation, the KSA’s rulers have confronted a number of 
challenges to their domestic stability. The thesis will note that none of these challenges 
has involved the prospect of direct military invasion by a neighbouring power.34 Rather, 
challenges to its domestic stability have come from further afield. Efforts at 
destabilization have sought to mobilise opposition to the Saud’s rule through ideational 
ways. We will examine the extent to which these challenges were socially constructed 
involving a combination of identity politics in order provide, or otherwise, legitimacy of 
behaviour. The extent to which the KSA’s strategic culture provides behavioural 
legitimacy – the justification of foreign and security policy behaviours in accordance with 
historical norms - is the centre of gravity of this thesis.  Chapter 2 will now examine the 
literature surrounding strategic culture in general, and specifically as it relates to the KSA. 
It will also examine the KSA’s regional security context which will help situate 





33 Gause, Saudi Arabia in the New Middle East. 
34 Ken Pollack, Armies of Sand, (Oxford University Press, 2019). 
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW  
 
INTRODUCTION  
 This chapter will examine the scholarly literature of strategic culture and will apply the 
concept to examining the KSA’s behaviour according to critical junctures throughout its 
history.  It will examine the different generations of scholarly literature that has employed 
the concept of strategic culture in its analysis of international relations. It will begin with 
Cold War explanations as to its utility for explaining or understanding strategy, before 
examining subsequent scholarly works that have prioritised cultural aspects as important 
or decisive determinants of strategic behaviour in their own right. Critical to this analysis 
is the recognition of the importance of identity, identity security, and the perception of 
threat in and how the KSA pre-emptively or reactively responds to these threats. It is 
applied to analyse the KSA’s decision-making behaviours for several reasons: the KSA 
leads a relatively stable alliance and sub-region within the wider Middle East; the KSA 
experiences a seemingly complex regional security dilemma, yet it has not been 
significantly – visibly at least – impacted by the Arab Spring; the KSA has religious 
legitimacy amongst Sunni Muslims, albeit such legitimacy has been increasingly 
challenged by various non-state and state actors; and it has been the West’s principal 
regional Arab ally since the Second World War.35 The KSA has also been involved in the 
majority of unconventional conflicts within the region, and along the region’s frontiers, 
as subsequent chapters will demonstrate.36  
 
 
35 Bernard Haykel et al, Saudi Arabia in Transition, (Cambridge University Press, January 2015). 
36 Thomas Hegghammer, Jihadi Culture, (Cambridge University Press, June 2017). 
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Indeed, throughout its near 100-year history, the KSA had not – up until its intervention 
in Yemen in 2015 – waged a conventional, military intervention, anywhere. This is 
despite its geographic proximity and its ideological connectedness to every regional 
conflict since the pan-Arab war against Israel in 1948.37 Yet this thesis will demonstrate 
its involvement in the majority of flashpoints around the Middle East, which might imply 
a preference for unconventional interventionist behaviour.  Before turning specifically to 
strategic culture, we will now briefly discuss each of those regional security challenges 
that the KSA’s faces in turn below.  
 
The Nasserist challenge.  Gamal Abd al-Nasser, Egypt’s leader from 1954 until his death 
in 1970, asserted his leadership of the Arab world by mobilising the Arab umma into a 
Pan-Arab (trans-nationalist) movement in order to challenge Israel, Western influence in 
the Middle East and the broader leadership role of pan-Arab unity. Chapter 3 will analyse 
Nasser’s ability to destabilise several monarchies in the region, helping to topple the 
regimes in Iraq, Syria, Libya and Yemen, whilst simultaneously threatening the survival 
of the rulers of Lebanon and Jordan. The Saudi leadership – King Feisal in particular – 
feared Nasser’s ability to mobilise support for pan-Arabism and also topple it from 
power.38 An unintended consequence of Nasser’s pan-Arabism was the dramatic rise of 
the Muslim Brotherhood from an organisation conceived to purify Egypt of jahiliya – 
ignorance – following its colonial rule by Great Britain. The Muslim Brotherhood posed 
as a pan-Islamic challenge to Nasser’s pan-Arabist project. Despite being financed and 
supported by the KSA, the Muslim Brotherhood’s rise became an identity tool of the pan-
Arabists and Political Islamists, which in turn created identity anxiety for the KSA. The 
 
37 Vali Nasr, The Shia Revival, (WW Norton & Company, October 2016).  
38 Alexi Vassiliev, The Life and Times of King Feisal, (Saqi Books, 2016). 
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impact of these cultural factors on KSA’s strategic behaviour will be analysed in chapter 
3. Chapter 5 will go on to focus on events since 2011 surrounding the Arab Spring, itself 
partly an offshoot of Nasserism four decades prior, and the KSA’s reaction to the Arab 
Spring, which helped foment a series of counterrevolutions.  
 
The challenge from Revolutionary Iran after 1979.  Post-Revolutionary Iran challenged 
the KSA’s leaders in a number of ways. This Islamic Revolution demonstrated that it was 
possible for an Islamist idea to overthrow a powerful monarchy, even one allied to the 
US. The Islamic credentials of the Ayatollah’s narrative challenged the KSA leaders’ 
legitimacy as de-facto Guardians of the Two Holy places (i.e., of Mecca and Medina), 
and criticised the un-Islamic credentials of the Saudi royals. Additionally, the Ayatollah’s 
emphasis on anti-Americanism challenged the KSA’s pre-eminent international security 
relationship, which involved the USA. And finally, the Ayatollah sought to unite the 
broader Shia community across the Middle East and within the KSA, under his leadership 
and religious influence. This thesis examines this particular challenge in chapters 4 and 
5, specifically the degree to which the KSA’s strategic behaviour is heavily influenced 
by ontological security, in particular the sectarianisation of identity politics, in order to 
protect or enhance the regime’s interests.  
 
The Salafi-Jihadism challenge represented by Al-Qaeda and other nihilist 
organisations. This challenge to the KSA’s security became fully-fledged by the early 
1990s, with roots planted during the Afghanistan Jihad - religious struggle - during the 
1980s. The early aspects of this threat emerged during the 1990s, but it exploded to 
prominence from 2003, following the US-led invasion of Iraq. This moment signified a 
specific security challenge to the survival of the Saudi regime, as it questioned the 
sincerity of the KSA’s adherence to its own Wahhabist doctrine, and its paradoxical 
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alliance with the US. Chapter 3 will examine this intra-Sunni doctrinal challenge in detail 
in order to understand the impact of these dominant cultural factors on the KSA’s 
behaviour. Chapters 3, 4 and 5 will look at the wider strategic paradox confronting the 
KSA’s omni-balancing efforts.  
 
The Arab Spring and its counterrevolutions. The 2011 Arab Spring and its aftermath is 
the latest challenge confronting the KSA. Yet intriguingly, its constituent parts could be 
described as a contemporary continuation of the challenges already described. 
Nevertheless, the events of the Arab Spring and in particular their aftermath are 
informative in analysing the KSA’s strategic behaviour, when confronted by a plethora 
of normative and cultural factors, including pan-Arabism, Political Islam, Salafi-
Jihadism, increasingly malign Iranian activity inspired by Shi’ite revolutionary zeal, all 
the while maintaining its vital strategic relationship with the US. Chapter 5 of this thesis 
will examine this in some detail by focusing on events within Syria. 
 
International Alliances. Germane to each of the challenges listed above is the KSA’s 
strategic alliance with the US. There exists a persistent tension in the KSA’s grand 
strategy, between the maintenance of ties with the US as the ultimate guarantor of its 
security status and its desire to prevent this alliance usurping its foreign policy in Arab 
and wider Middle Eastern affairs.39 According to Gause, the KSA has been successful at 
balancing the contradictions between its regional and international strategies. When faced 
with contrary pressures from the US vis-à-vis the KSA’s regional and domestic demands 
the KSA has often balanced the contradictions successfully and managed to successfully 
 
39 Matteo Legrenzi, The GCC and the International Relations of the Gulf, (IB Tauris, August 
2015). 
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hedge their position.40 How the KSA balances contradictory pressures and interests will 
be discussed later in this chapter and throughout this thesis.  
 
Regional Alliances – the GCC.  A shared identity is what motivated the Saudis, along 
with other Gulf Arab states to form a regional intergovernmental political and economic 
union, alongside economic factors, and in part a response to the Iranian revolution of 
1979. 41  The Gulf Arab states are considered to be natural allies, sharing common 
historical experiences. By creating the GCC they aspired to construct a “psychologically 
satisfying political community” at ease with each other, and ostensibly with a shared 
identity and a shared perception of the threat they faced, by non-GCC Otherness.42 The 
GCC’s shared identity allowed it to identify the boundaries of their non-discretionary 
norms and behaviour – seeking to establish behavioural rules in their collective or 
individual power politics insofar as these behaviours related to Others - and also to frame 
and define their perception of regional threats within the context of a collective alliance.43 
This thesis will return to examine alliance-building and identity in greater detail later in 
this chapter and throughout the thesis as it is a recurring feature in the literature of the 
KSA’s strategic behaviour. Alliances are an important element of Saudi foreign and 
security policy. Saudi leaders seek to operate as a fulcrum against those who oppose their 
own conservative/status quo norms, in respect of the region’s international relations’ 
 
40 F. Gregory Gause, ‘Saudi Arabia’s Regional Security Strategy’, in Mehran Kamrava (ed.), 
International Politics of the Persian Gulf, (Syracuse University Press, 2011), p. 173. 
41 Marina Calculli, ‘The Securitization of Identities’, International Relations of the Middle East, 
4th edn, pp. 8-25. 
42 Peter Katzenstein, Culture of National Security, (Columbia University Press, September 1996), 
p. 423. 
43 Malcolm Kerr, The Arab Cold War, (Oxford University Press), 1971. 
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radical actors, such as political Islamists, violent extremists, and revolutionary Shia state 
of Iran.44 
 
Variation in the foreign policies of GCC states results from a complex interaction of 
identity and material factors within each constituent state. Status quo foreign policies are 
most likely to be pursued when identity is shared, while identity that is subject to sectarian 
fault-lines is most likely to be a source of tension.45 Membership of the exclusively Sunni 
GCC “…requires that the state proclaim itself as a member of the community, and express 
and uphold those values and norms that constitute it.  To do so, the state must have a 
stable identity”.46  Understanding the KSA’s perspective on the constitution of these 
cultural norms seems to be vital if we are to better understand its effects on strategic 
behaviour relating to the intricacies of alliance formation that take shape in order to deal 
with the threats that arise against the KSA.47 
 
Whilst not all states with a shared identity will define threats in the same way, scholars 
note the extent to which there is an important connection between identity and threat that 
is of interest to understanding certain behaviours.48  In other words, Arabism might affect 
 
44 Legrenzi, The GCC and the International Relations of the Gulf, pp. 27-45. 
45 Fawcett, International Relations Middle East, p. 168. 
46 Katzenstein, Culture of National Security, p. 411. 
47 According to Christopher Davidson, Marc Lynch, Gerges, Fawcett, Hegghammer et al. 
48 Fred Halliday, The Middle East in International Relations, (Cambridge University Press), 
October 2011, p82; Fawcett, International Relations Middle East; Fawaz Gerges, The New 
Middle East, (Cambridge University Press), December 2013. 
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the identity and interests of, and the socially acceptable policies available to the KSA’s 
leaders in ways that fundamentally shape their desired and available security policies.49  
 
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY 
My research exists at the nexus of two national security scholarly subfields: security 
studies and Arab studies. According to Realists, threats to national security are external 
and implicitly militaristic, rather than associated with intra-state protracted social 
conflict.50  However, according to Gause, there is a deficit in combining international 
relations theory and Middle East studies.51 Many international relations scholars retain a 
tight focus on the state as the primary object of analysis, Middle Eastern scholars have 
had a different focus: one that places material interests alongside identity and domestic 
concerns at the centre of their analysis.52 
 
Despite Realism’s popularity as an IR theory, it is incomplete and even misleading.53  It 
is misleading because its simplicity can provide only a partial understanding of the way 
 
49 Katzenstein, Culture of National Security, p. 408. 
50 For example, Hassan Hamdan al-Alkim, The GCC States in an Unstable World, (Saqi Books, 
February 2001),p4-15;  Nonneman, Analyzing Middle East Foreign Policies, p123-160; Zalmay 
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April 2018; Mohammed Ayoob, Security in the Third World, (Lynne Rienner), January 1995; P 
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51 F Gregory Gause III, Systemic Approaches to Middle East International Relations, p. 11. 
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February 2010; Joseph Nye and Robert Keohanne, Power and Interdependence: World Politics 
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the KSA has dealt/deals with the challenges listed earlier in this chapter, in that it 
prioritizes the nation-state and transposes the Western experience as a universal model 
onto the specific experiences of the KSA.54  Indeed, this thesis is less interested in “the 
state” per se, but rather how domestic and regional characteristics, and norms, highlighted 
earlier, create unconventional threats to the KSA’s national security. 55 The majority of 
these threat characteristics have been described as “protracted social conflict”.56  Of 
interest to this thesis is how the prevalent patterns of protracted social conflict in the 
Middle East manifest at the intra-state level, and largely as a result of “becoming 
exploited by inter-state relations, religious animosities, tribal divisions, or other social 
factions”.57  
 
The cultural factors underpinning Ayoob’s assessment of the Middle East are prevalent. 
They include Arabism, Sunni’ism, Shi’ism, Political Islamism, and religious extremism. 
What Hudson describes as the cultural characteristics of the contemporary Saudi state 
which creates a “multidimensionality of its security concerns”.58 If, as we noted in chapter 
1, Snyder contended that the concept of strategic culture was comprised of “semi-
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permanent beliefs…and behaviour patterns”, 59  later, Duffield’s work on Germany’s 
security policy on unification noted that a state’s strategic culture defines the foreign and 
security policy goals that influence that state’s behaviour. That is, the state relies on 
cultural and social factors to shape public perceptions of the context surrounding the 
state’s international environment. He went on to suggest that state security policies 
encompass emotional attachments, patterns of identity and of affinity. 60  
 
Duffield’s explanation suggests that the concept of strategic culture is a highly applicable 
theory for examining the KSA’s strategic behaviour. However, Snyder and Duffield both 
suggest that strategic culture is static or resistant to change, which would imply that a 
region beset by coups, civil-strife and revolutions is less suited to analysis using a 
strategic culture framework. However, newer literature does concede that strategic shocks 
may lead to more rapid changes in foreign and security policy behaviour, and that if there 
exists a high correlation between strategic preferences and strategic behaviour, then the 
strategic culture concept becomes more applicable, regardless of misperceptions of being 
static or resistant to change.61 Therefore, understanding the KSA’s ‘strategic preferences’ 
and analysing those preferences against actual behaviour are necessary. Although 
scholars hitherto have disagreed on the relative strengths and weaknesses of strategic 
 
59 Jack Snyder, ‘The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for Nuclear Options’, Santa Monica: 
RAND Corporation, 1977, p. 8. 
60  John Duffield, World Power Forsaken: Political Culture, International Institutions, and 
German Security Policy after Unification, (Stanford University Press), 1999, p. 23. 
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culture as a primary IR concept for understanding state and sub-state actors’ behaviour, 
it has still remained a secondary concept when compared to Realism.62  
 
Nowadays, however, with more than three decades of post-Cold War experiences behind 
us, critics charge that Realism fell short in predicting major events - the ideas-behaviour 
nexus - and does not adequately describe behaviour and decision making. Whilst this 
thesis does not intend to examine in detail the scholarly debate over the utility of Realism 
in examining international relations, it is necessary to briefly examine certain elements 
of it, particularly insofar as Realism focuses on examining security threats and how these 
bring about alliances. For Realists, culture and identity are, at best, derivative of the 
distribution of capabilities and have no independent explanatory power.63 That is, actors 
deploy culture and identity strategically, like any other resource, simply to further their 
own self-interests. Neo-Realism, for example, insists that shifts in the balance of relative 
capabilities/power are the main determinants of states’ behaviour in international politics. 
Generally speaking, Neo-Realists treat culture and identity as secondary, as a 
“superstructure” determined in the last instance by the “material base”.64 That is, they are 
factors that contribute and influence strategic behaviour by states but are not the primary 
determinants of it. This is arguably the dominant view of state environments in security 
studies. Indeed, this view is so pervasive that even its critics, such as Neo-Liberal 
 
62  Michael Desch, ‘Culture Clash: Assessing the Importance of Ideas in Security Studies’, 
International Security Studies, International Security 23, No.1, 1999, pp.156-180. 
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institutionalists, typically refer to structure in material terms and then treat norms, rules, 
and institutions as mere ‘process’.65 
 
Competing Conceptions of Strategic Culture 
The concept of linkage between cultural/normative factors and national security 
behaviour exists in classic works, including that of Carl Von Clausewitz. Clausewitz’s 
trinity of government, the army, and the people were the three most important aspects in 
any given war, thereby recognising the link between the cultural and anthropological 
aspects and government.66 Snyder brought the political culture argument to the fore by 
developing a link between strategic culture and strategic behaviour, with bottom-up 
influences that are dependent on historical societal norms, to interpret Soviet strategy.67 
Lantis interprets this as a landmark work that suggested that elites articulate a concept of 
strategic culture related to a wider manifestation of public opinion. This wider 
manifestation serves as an independent determinant of national strategy.68 Conversely, 
Gray claimed that a national style should be an enduring explanation of state behaviour.69 
Gray criticised strategic culture as a preeminent theory, primarily because of the unique 
cultural aspects that make up each state. Supporters and detractors of the concept of 
strategic culture, he argues, agree that it is often too static and focused on enduring 
 
65 Katzenstein, Culture National Security, p.17-38 
66 Michael Howard, ‘Clausewitz, Man of the Year’, New York Times, January 28, 1991. 
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historical orientations.70 In the context of this thesis however – if Gray is accurate - they 
are of use. That is, enduring historical orientations might allow for strong predictive 
capability in ways that Realism does not have. In terms of the KSA, examining its 
strategic culture allows us to try and identify patterns within its ‘cultural thought-ways’.71  
 
Debates regarding strategic culture have primarily concentrated on the ‘first and third 
generations of scholars’.72 The first generation was led by Gray and used the concept in 
order to understand the ‘why’ different cultures used different IR theories – which we 
will elaborate on shortly - in different ways. 73  The third generation, largely led by 
Johnson, criticised the first generation as being largely unproven and instead focused on 
falsifiable theories. These two scholars have staked out opposite positions that have 
largely shaped the existing thinking on the usefulness of applying the concept of strategic 
culture in helping researchers understand state behaviour. In general terms, their body of 
literature advanced two theses. Firstly, due to cultural differences among different 
nations, nations will make different choices when faced with identical security challenges 
based on such cultural differences. Secondly, some nations are likely to exhibit 
 
70 Colin Gray, ‘The Geopolitics of Superpower’, Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, (1988), 
p. 42-43. 
71 Jeffrey Lantis, ‘Strategic Culture and National Security Policy’, International Studies Review, 
Vol.4. No.3 (Autumn 2002), p. 95. 
72 Alaistair Johnston, ‘Strategic Cultures Revisited: Reply to Colin Gray’, Review of International 
Studies, 25:3, (1999); Colin Gray, ‘Strategic Culture as Context: The First Generation of Theory 
Strikes Back’, Review of International Studies, 25:1, (1999); Stuart Poore, ‘What is the Context? 
A Reply to the Gray-Johnston Debate on Strategic Culture’, Review of International Studies, 29:2, 
(2003). 
73 For example, Colin Gray, ‘National Styles in Strategy: The American Example’, International 
Security 6, No.2, (1981); Colin Gray, ‘Nuclear Strategy and National Styles’, Hamilton Press, 
(1986). 
 29 
consistency of choice and behaviour over time because of cultural norms associated with 
their identity, and the constraints or rules inferred by these cultural norms. 74  
 
Both theses are of interest in trying to identify an observable pattern of behaviour when 
dealing with different stakeholders. For Johnston, strategic culture affects state behaviour 
by presenting policy makers with a “limited set of grand strategic preferences” with which 
to interact with within the security environment.75 This approach isolates strategic culture 
as an independent variable and then assesses its impact on state behaviour.  It also implies 
an emphasis on the importance of cultural norms when examining state behaviour.  Gray, 
on the other hand, argued that strategic behaviour cannot be separated from strategic 
culture as both are linked to our understanding of “the wrap of context”.76 The implication 
of this approach means that one ought to only understand rather than explain strategic 
behaviour, which implies an interpretation of past events, rather than a more positivist 
goal of understanding the causes of that strategic behaviour.77 The important area that 
distinguishes Johnston and Gray is the extent to which strategic culture should be 
conceptually distinguished from strategic behaviour. We will return to this question 
shortly. The ‘second generation’78 of scholarly work examined the utility of strategic 
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culture in determining and understanding behaviour. Yosef Lapid and Ted Hopf, for 
example, brought about a resurgence in studies focusing on organisational processes, 
history, traditions, culture and their impact on identity.79 They argued that the role of 
Constructivism allowed a new wave of strategic culture research in that the Constructivist 
approach pays particular attention to the role of identity and identity formation.80 This 
Constructivist work allows us to focus specifically on this area of disagreement between 
Johnson and Gray, and to draw conclusions as to the disputed connectedness of strategic 
culture with strategic behaviour. 
 
No generalisable conclusion can be drawn from the ‘three generations’ of scholarly work 
on strategic culture that have proliferated since the end of the Cold War. Most scholars, 
as Lock notes, have self-defined strategic culture, which means that the conceptual 
foundation for advancing a theory is lacking.81 For example, in addition to the ‘three 
generations’ of strategic culture’ scholars, Glenn advances a slightly different perspective 
of strategic culture, suggesting that competitive collaboration should exist between 
Realism and strategic culture.82 Specifically Glenn posits that there are four conceptions 
of strategic culture which can aid our understanding of strategic behaviour and that an 
overlap exists between each ontological and epistemological position regarding the 
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concept. Glenn describes these as Epiphenomenal, Constructivist, Post-Structuralist, and 
Interpretivist. Glenn’s analysis of strategic culture is rooted however in efforts by Realists 
to explain the actual policies adopted by states in a particular period of time. Glenn 
distinguishes that Epiphenomenal strategic culture is merely a short-term deviation of 
state behaviour away from Realist norms. He regards Constructivist strategic culturists as 
viewing shared beliefs and norms as influencing deviations away from Realist norms. 
That Post-Structuralists strategic culturalists are users of discursive strategies to explain 
deviations from Realist norms, and finally Interpretivists who would suggest that sub-
state ideals and norms influence the state’s unique perspective of the international social 
environment and the state’s role within it.83 Epiphenomenal strategic culture is generally 
sought to identify preferred military strategies adopted by states in the pursuit of foreign 
and security policies. To accomplish these ends, scholars of the Epiphenomenal 
perspective use cultural aspects that are limited to those concerned with military strategy 
only.84 The absence of a significant or effective military capability has contributed, but 
not been the strategic driver for how the KSA wields hard-power.85In addition, scholars 
of the Epiphenomenal perspective, like Johnston’s ‘first generation scholars’, were not 
advocating strategic culture as a dominant theory over Realism, but rather, they generally 
considered it to be temporary or specific variable or deviation from Realism. 
 
Nevertheless, some notable scholars of the Constructivist school, such as Katzenstein 
have argued the “sociological perspective on the politics of national security… [in] that 
 
83 Glenn, Realism versus Strategic Culture, pp. 530-531. 
84 Glenn, Realism versus Strategic Culture, p. 531. 
85 Pollack, Armies of Sand. 
 32 
security interests are defined by actors who respond to cultural factors.”86 Recently, some 
Constructivists have attempted to explain these ‘deviations’ away from Realist 
explanations, whereby they have sought with partial success to understate the factors of 
materialism in favour of other factors such as regional identities.87 They have particularly 
advanced our understanding of two region-specific normative factors – pan-Arabism and 
Islamic identity – which carry powerful credibility and influence within the umma.   
 
Reversing the hitherto predominant Realist view, Constructivism has allowed us to 
reframe how states view their identities as shaping their strategic interests, and therefore 
how they execute strategic behaviour, or strategy, based also on ideational and normative 
factors.  Specifically, insofar as our understanding of the KSA’s strategic behaviour is 
concerned, the Constructivist method of examining strategic culture allows us to examine 
the KSA’s strategic behaviour from a cultural perspective that is not totally Western 
dominated. That is, it allows the analytical freedom to examine cultural factors that may 
be particularly significant in our understanding of intra-state dynamics specific to the 
KSA. 88    
 
The Constructivist literature does not suggest that material gain is not sought by Arab 
elites, just that identity requires it to be balanced, or constrained, by the norms of Arabism 
and Islam.  In other words, Saudi leaders may seem to behave on the surface according 
to anarchic and purely materialistic rationales as Realists would argue, but their ways for 
achieving their strategic ends may be more heavily constrained by ideational and 
 
86 Katzenstein, Culture National Security, p. 3. 
87 Nonneman, Analyzing Middle East Foreign Policies; Katzenstein, Culture of National Security. 
88 Gause, Systemic Approaches to Middle East International Relations, p. 13. 
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normative factors that are more easily recognisable by advocates of the Constructivist 
method. 89  Despite these very welcome advances in understanding the challenges 
confronting Arab regimes in general, until we specifically analyse these cultural pressures 
on a state by state basis, the available literature generally wraps all Arab states as precisely 
that: Arab.  This thesis will hope to demonstrate the limitations of such a broad-brush 
approach, and that being Arab or being a Muslim nation does not necessarily bind these 
nations into a collective lump. Our analysis of the KSA’s strategic culture, and the way 
the KSA constructs identity, how it identifies the norms associated with this identity, and 
how it defines threats to this identity, allows us to understand its behavioural choices 
around things like alliance construction. 
 
Generally speaking, the perspective of post-Structuralist strategic culture scholars, like 
Constructivists, recognise the importance of cultural and identity norms that actors 
identify with. These scholars identify actors’ most prized or valuable relationships as 
being with other actors. Often these relationships will specifically include actors with 
different identities and interests that can pull strategic behaviour in different directions.90  
Therefore, a ‘natural’ condition of anarchy is but one possible behavioural output as a 
result of a specific context.91 Determining the behavioural output will require knowing 
more about the internal situation within a nation state than about the distribution of 
material power or the structure of authority within the international system.  That is, one 
will need to know about the culture, norms, institutions, procedures, rules, and social 
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practices that constitute the actors and the ‘ideas-behaviour’ decision-making structure, 
alike.92  In other words, Post-Structuralists, like Constructivists claim that material power 
must be combined with “discursive power”,93 in order to understand why some countries 
prevail while others do not.94  This discursive power suggests a premium on engagement 
with stakeholders, in a constant attempt to influence behaviour in order to retain or regain 
an element of control over outcomes.  What is perhaps unique insofar as how this 
discursive power is exercised by the KSA is the extent of the potential or actual power of 
many of these stakeholders – specifically those stakeholders that are able to confer 
legitimacy or illegitimacy such as religious leaders - the majority of whom are intra and 
inter-state in tandem.95   
 
Alistair Johnston’s definition of strategic culture – which we will discuss shortly – fits 
neatly with the notion of discursive power and bodes well for more analysis of the way 
the KSA employs its discursive power. Generally speaking, the available literature 
suggests that Arabs employ discursive power as a social process as a means of identifying 
or conferring state-level capabilities or power.96  That is, there may be a direct link 
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between the audience of the KSA’s discursive power, that is with those sub-state or non-
state actors that can impact the perception of legitimacy of the KSA’s strategic behaviour, 
and its national security behaviour. 
 
Indeed, as Glenn discusses in more generic terms, the KSA’s leaders could be viewed as 
behaving in a Neo-Realist fashion with regards to their diplomatic approach to the West, 
with an emphasis on their analysis on factors such as statehood, state creation, and the 
state’s alignment with superpowers. Yet in contrast, internally within the state, thresholds 
of acceptable cultural behaviour will require the KSA’s leaders as behaving in a 
Constructivist fashion.97 This method would emphasise factors such as Arab identity, 
shaping their discursive power and their strategic behaviour as they seek to balance 
internal factors (such as identity competition) and external factors.98 Nonneman describes 
this as Arab states not resembling as monoliths acting under the mere influence of 
systemic factors, but rather as entities involving distinct groups with a wide variety of 
interests and linkages that may or may not influence the state’s behaviour in the 
international arena.99 This is a very interesting observation that requires further attention. 
For example, the relationship between the Wahhabi clerics and the political leadership 
may be in lockstep on some but not all issues regarding the KSA government’s foreign 
relations.   
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The KSA’s strategic alliance with the US is a clear example of tensions originating from 
such relations. Similarly, the KSA’s use of Arabism as a means of creating alliances and 
projecting a united Arab front against Iran was not possible during the period known as 
Nasserism. Subsequent chapters will examine these paradoxes in much greater detail in 
order to ascertain the extent to which Nonneman is accurate, but more so to understand 
the wide variety of interests and linkages that determines how the KSA’s strategic leaders 
employ their discursive power. 
 
THE FRAMEWORK OF THE KSA’S STRATEGIC CULTURE 
As we have already briefly noted, the ‘first generation’ scholars of strategic culture placed 
emphasis on military culture. However, unlike the concept outlined by Snyder, Duffield, 
Gray and other ‘first generation’ scholars, the KSA’s strategic culture is not necessarily 
a product of its military culture. Rather, the extent to which it has primarily been 
influenced by other cultural factors such as religion and Arabism, and the extent to which 
both are a dominant influence on the KSA’s strategic behaviour, will largely determine 
the usefulness of a particular concept of strategic culture theory. Firstly, we must 
understand the constitutive elements that constitute and frame the KSA’s strategic 
culture: 
 
Identity and Threat 
The specific difference between the ‘first generation’ – of strategic culture - and the 
second and third generations is the explicit connection between the politics of identity 
and the politics of strategy.100 Of interest to this thesis is the evolution of these concepts 
and in particular the utilisation of identity as a strategic tool of statecraft. By this I mean 
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the ability to predict behaviour, and not primarily or solely as a concept for understanding 
what happened in the past, and why. Indeed, inspired by Constructivism and Post-
Structuralism, the ‘second generation’ of strategic culture scholars began to explore how 
strategic culture is shaped and may evolve, even allowing us to better predict events, 
rather than merely being an “explanation of last resort”.101  The ‘second generation’ 
literature questions basic assumptions such as the state as being a natural, stable and 
unitary security actor that possesses a unique yet given identity and culture.102 Such 
assumptions ignore the often-constructed relationships between these identities, and the 
contingency – especially from the KSA’s perspective – of these relationships.103  
 
Thus, the ‘second generation’ suggests a greater focus on analysing how a particular 
strategic culture shapes the content and meaning of strategic behaviour as well as the 
implications that follow from that particular behaviour. Understanding the consequences 
that flow from understanding the identity of different Saudi stakeholders, and that of the 
relationships and dependencies between them is an exciting prospect. Or put another way, 
within strategic culture theory, the ‘ends’ are likely to be constructed socially and involve 
identity factors.104 This thesis aims to build upon such a conceptualisation, adding more 
emphasis and discovering the primacy of sub-state factors, the nature of power at the 
intra-state and trans-state levels than purely at the national level. It also aims to highlight 
the ‘juxtaposition of the features of cooperation alongside persistent conflict’ within the 
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KSA.105  Understanding this source of power, and the impact non-state identities has upon 
its strategic behaviour, allows us to interpret patterns of strategic behaviour and therefore 
trends in the conduct of conflict or coercion during times of war and peace. These areas 
of strategic culture are of significant importance in the context of understanding the 
factors that determine strategic behaviour in the KSA’s sphere of influence.  
 
There is also a contrary view, an intriguing characteristic of some of the scholarly 
literature that suggests the possibility of strategic cultural change over time.  Berger and 
Glenn assume that politico-military strategy is directly linked to domestic cultural factors, 
and therefore are relatively fixed and resistant to change, principally because 
“disconfirmable cognitive elements are buffered by the psychological phenomenon of 
consistency seeking. Information that reinforces existing images and beliefs is readily 
assimilated, while inconsistent data tend to be ignored, rejected, or distorted in order to 
make them compatible with prevailing cognitive structures”.106  
 
This body of work generally emphasises that historical memory and factors such as 
multilateral commitments – such as, alliances with the US, and with the GCC – shape 
strategic culture, and that therefore they undergo gradual change only over long periods 
of time.107 These scholars acknowledge that strategic cultural models are not necessarily 
static and unresponsive, yet they do require a catalyst for change. Such catalysts – or 
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critical junctures – can come from external events such as civil-wars or revolutions.108 
Such change then requires a reorientation process, involving participation by the society, 
the leadership, and the other stakeholders involved. Insofar as this thesis is concerned, 
this is again a very valuable area of research which will feature prominently in subsequent 
chapters.  
 
For example, chapter 4 will examine how the KSA responded to the Iranian Revolution, 
and how the leadership responded by crafting a compromise on its traditional foreign 
policy orientation. In this sense, the chapter will argue that culture and behaviour may be 
understood as a consensus-building exercise for the Saudi leadership. Chapters 4 (the 
KSA’s response to the Iranian Revolution) and 5 (the KSA’s response to the Arab Spring) 
will analyse the parameters of acceptable change for the Saudi leadership, and the extent 
to which ideologies – for example Pan-Arabism and religion – feature prominently in 
influencing the KSA’s behaviour. It will also analyse the evolution of the KSA’s identity 
over time and its behaviour in response to regional events.  
 
Alliances and Identity 
As we noted earlier in this chapter, alliances and identity are common factors that affect 
the KSA’s regional security challenges. International Relations theorists are nearly 
unanimous in their conclusion that alliances are driven by expediency in the face of an 
immediate threat.109  Resting on a foundation of need, alliances are formed either to 
bandwagon or balance against a specific threat, the form of the alliance being determined 
 
108 Duffield, World Power Forsaken, p. 11. 
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 40 
by the nature of the threat.110 The key Realist theorist regarding alliances and threat 
perception is Stephen Walt. His work puts emphasis on the construction of alliances based 
on perceived threats. Walt suggests that threat is derived from a combination of powerful 
intentions and other geostrategic factors.111 Furthermore, a majority of scholars – Realist 
and Constructivist – respectively depict alliance formation as balancing against a 
collective materiel threat, or as an alliance designed as a means of preserving or 
enhancing state or collective identity. 112  Constructivists like Barnett and Wendt 113 
suggest that the intention of pan-Arabism specifically, as an ideological force and as a 
challenge to state legitimacy, sovereignty and internal stability do advance the scholarly 
debate around Arab security policies. Specifically, insofar as cultural and sociological 
factors like identity are concerned. Yet still, even this ideological threat was framed as a 
potential threat to Arab governments “as it challenged the very territorial basis of their 
existence”.114 This implies that countries almost always engage in balancing behaviour 
when they confront actual or potential aggressors, and that balancing among states plays 
a key role in preserving the stability of the system as a whole.115  
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In other words, ideologies like Islamism and (Pan-) Arabism, and the architects and actors 
associated with them, might affect the identity and interests of - and the socially 
acceptable policies available to - the KSA’s leaders in ways that fundamentally shape its 
desired alliance partners and available security policies.116  Insofar as the Constructivist 
framework of strategic culture is concerned, Barnett, Katzenstein, Nonneman and Wendt 
have undertaken much relevant analysis. They recognise that (Pan-) Arabism and religion 
have a direct link between identity and threat, and that Arabism or religion might affect 
the identity of strategic alliances and the strategic behaviour of these alliances. They also 
advance the debate on alliance-formation in areas germane to the KSA’s sphere of 
influence moving beyond theories of balance of power and balance of threat, towards a 
recognition of the norms associated with state behaviour when operating as a member of 
an alliance with a shared identity. And they go further by signposting the risk of conflict 
between these states when these norms are flouted by another state. 117  These are 
important considerations in understanding the KSA’s foreign and security policy 
behaviour and suggest the usefulness of the Constructivist concept of strategic culture.118   
 
These patterns of behaviour – the execution of strategy via influencing predominantly 
non-state actors, such as the custodians of particular identities – are becoming more rather 
than less complicated and chaotic given the evolution of radical and extremist groups 
across the region.119 What is also an interesting aspect of the Constructivist method of 
strategic culture is the relative lack of significant academic research on the conduct or 
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execution of the KSA’s’ ‘discursive power’, via its partnerships with other non-state 
alliances in pursuit of this end and what this can tell us a lot about the ways in which the 
KSA utilises its hard power.120 This is an intriguing area worthy of greater examination 
that we will undertake in subsequent chapters, for example, we will look at the attempts 
by King Faisal of the KSA to mobilise non-state actors in an alliance against Nasser. 
Indeed, employing the conceptual construct of strategic culture, allows us to better 
understand the KSA’s strategic decision-making behaviour relating to identity, threat 
identification, and alliance creation. This will be helpful in better understanding the 
existing literature surrounding the concept of “omni-balancing”,121 whereby their threat-
perception of different stakeholders is a trade-off, at the domestic, transnational, regional 
and/or international levels.  
 
The domestic aspect of this omni-balancing is described by Steven David as the contract 
between the leadership and citizenry, which we will explore in Chapter 3. Conversely, 
balancing obligations with the US may require a difference in approach by the two 
nations, for example through supporting completely non-aligned or un-unified 
stakeholders. And conversely again, at the regional and transnational levels, there may be 
a requirement to hedge, in concert with the GCC, against a “balance of threat”.122 These 
paradoxes are intriguing and seem to demonstrate the appropriateness of the 
Constructivist and Post-Structural concepts of strategic culture.  
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The absence of a unifying concept of strategic culture does mean, however, that it is 
possible to advance an aspect of a particular generation, insofar as it advances our 
understanding and knowledge of the KSA’s strategic behaviour. For the purposes of this 
thesis, I have used Johnston’s definition of strategic culture as “an ideational milieu which 
limits behaviour choices”,123 as it neatly bridges all possible idea-behaviour domains – 
domestic, regional, international, ideological, etc – and it avoids the pitfall of linking 
strategic culture specifically with politico-military culture, and therefore affords me 
greater freedom of action in my analysis.  
 
The avoidance of politico-military-focused concept of strategic culture is profoundly 
important in the construct of this thesis. As we have noted, epiphenomenal strategic 
culture is generally sought to identify preferred military strategies adopted by states in 
the pursuit of foreign and security policies. To accomplish these ends, scholars of the 
epiphenomenal method use cultural aspects that are limited to those concerned with 
military strategy only.124 The absence of a significant or effective military capability has 
contributed to – but not been the strategic driver for how the KSA wields hard power – 
successive KSA leaders’ pursuit of a security policy style that has substantial roots in 
Arab tribal culture.125  
The principal features of this Arab tribal style include: a tendency to appease, compromise 
or discreetly concede, and to avoid irreparable or decisive military conflict if military 
conflict becomes inevitable; a tendency to wait for events to unfold and to hedge a 
position, rather than trying to shape these events in a particularly decisive way; and a 
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propensity to prioritise the immediate over longer-term strategic planning when the two 
come into conflict.126 Johnston’s definition goes on to explain that the ideational milieu 
consists of “shared assumptions that impose a degree of order on individual and group 
conceptions…whose dominant culture emphasises preserving the status quo”.127  
 
Johnston’s conceptual approach to strategic culture as a set of assumptions, shared by 
domestic society, national leaders, and other stakeholders, allows us to examine the extent 
to which these assumptions are indeed shared in order to better understand and therefore 
signpost the behaviour of a strategically vital nation. The extent to which it holds true 
will be judged throughout the thesis. For example, contemporary scholarship contends 
that leaders’ behaviour may be more appropriately described as strategic “users of 
culture”128 as opposed to the generally accepted ‘guardians of identity and culture’ which 
is synonymous with identity politics.129 That is not to imply a failure to uphold historical 
responsibilities. Rather the thesis will examine the past behaviour of many Saudi leaders 
in order to demonstrate their choice of when and how they have staked those historical 
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There exists a significant amount of scholarly literature regarding anarchy, identity, 
alliances, and threats, the majority of which is framed around Arab states conceived as 
collective/monolithic entities. 130  Using a strategic culture framework allows us to 
recognise that insofar as the KSA is concerned, the significant challenges it faces that 
originate from sub-state factors, supra-state ideologies, and non-state actors, 
Consequently, a different understanding of threat-perception and strategic behaviour, 
than that typically employed by scholars of the Realist school, is required. These threats 
may require behavioural responses that balance the often-competing demands (upon the 
state) or requirements (of these actors) by the ruling elite within the KSA. Indeed, the 
strategic culture method will allow this thesis to critically assess and understand the link 
between a shared identity at the Saudi state level as well as the linkage between cultural 
aspects internal to the KSA and its strategic choices and behaviours in relation to its 
foreign and security policies and choices.  
By analysing the construction of the KSA’s different identities this thesis will 
demonstrate the utility of the strategic cultural method in helping us understand in the 
KSA’s strategic behaviour vis-à-vis the national security challenges it has faced both 
historically and more recently. Specifically, the norms associated with being the 
Custodians of the Two Holy Mosques, the de-facto head of the Wahhabi school of 
Sunnism, and its doctrinal hostility to Political Islam and pan-Arabism, may demonstrate 
behavioural trends, or a strategic approach which is highly centralized in order to omni-
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Therefore, examining the KSA’s strategic culture will provide us context for 
understanding Saudi state behaviour. I hope to demonstrate that it can also be a useful 
scholarly method in interpreting and possibly predicting events rather than a method of 
last resort for explaining historical events. Studying the KSA’s strategic culture allows us 
to understand its cultural thought-ways, and therefore allow us to ascertain a set of shared 
assumptions and decision-rules which allow us to separate the constants and the 
constraints of its strategic behaviour and enable us to predict the KSA’s strategic 
decision-making patterns of behaviour.  
 
Indeed, a central aim of this thesis is to examine how trans-alliances and sub-state 
alliances compete over the ideological question of ‘which identity norms’ define them. 
For example, Arabism and Islamism have norms associated with them. These norms 
provide instruction or guidance on how the Saudi leaders ought to behave. And yet, even 
with regard to norms, much (but not all) of the existing literature frames these norms as 
having consequences between Arab states when they are ideologically non-aligned 
whereby even the smallest ideological intricacies can carry exponentially great levels of 
importance.  
 
Rather, this thesis will examine the extent to which these consequences constrain or shape 
the KSA’s behaviour. Indeed, as Walt notes: “A different form of balancing has occurred 
in inter-Arab relations. In the Arab world, the most important source of power has been 
the ability to manipulate one’s own image and the image of one’s rivals in the minds of 
other Arab elites”131. This is a powerful indicator of how cultural factors, such as norms, 
as opposed to military capabilities have greater primacy in inter-Arab politics. Strategic 
 
131 Walt, The Origins of Alliances, p.149. 
 47 
culture provides a framework for analysing the consequences of violating norms through 
different lenses, especially those that have a direct bearing on the legitimacy of the state.   
 
These challenges are often identified by the state’s strategic ends or behavioural ways - 
discursive power - which is not necessarily an end in itself, but more a way of identifying 
or perceiving threats from other actors.  Each of these actors will have their own agency, 
and this agency in turn will place challenges and constraints on statecraft because of an 
inevitable competing interest or ideational constraint.132  Therefore the KSA’s leaders 
must operate first and foremost in what Gerges describes as “a sub-environment”, that is 
beneath a recognisable – yet changeable and different according to the specific contexts 
of these critical junctures - international political threshold that doesn’t trigger outside 
interference, unless that interference is actually desired.133  
 
Chapter 3 will now explore Wahhabism 134 , Political Islam, pan-Arabism, Islamic 
extremism, and the subsequent impact of these contradictory cultural tensions on KSA’s 
strategic behaviour. This will assist in determining the extent that intra-Sunni religious 
doctrine – specifically Wahhabism – has instrumentality and utility beyond broader 
geopolitical factors in determining KSA’s strategic decision making. 
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     CHAPTER 3  
 
INTRODUCTION 
Chapter 2 discussed how the KSA’s pursuit of a unique identity exacerbates the breadth 
of challenges confronting the KSA. Using Johnston’s ‘ideational milieu’ framework of 
strategic culture, which emphasizes the notion that strategic preferences constrain or aid 
strategic choices, this chapter examines in detail the religious dimension to the challenges 
confronting the KSA. Specifically, this chapter will explore Wahhabism,135  Political 
Islam, Islamic extremism, and the subsequent impact of these contradictory cultural value 
systems have had on the KSA’s strategic behaviour. The examination of relevant 
scholarly literature will assist in discovering the extent to which intra-Sunni religious 
doctrine – specifically Wahhabism – has instrumentality and utility beyond broader 
geopolitical factors in determining the KSA’s strategic decision making. This 
examination will help me answer one of my secondary research questions, namely the 
extent that intra-Sunni religious doctrine – specifically Wahhabism – influence the KSA’s 
strategic decision-making behaviours in relation to its critical junctures? 
STATE FORMATION AND IDENTITY 
The KSA was not formed on the basis of a single national identity. Indeed, its society, 
composed of diverse tribes, did not allow for the development of a collective identity 
despite the mutually strict adherence to Islam by most of such tribes. However, it is 
widely accepted that the Arabian Peninsula was never unified until the emergence of 
 
135 Wahhabism (named after the eighteenth-century scholar Mohammad ibn’ Abd al Wahab) is 
not a political doctrine, but a living theological tradition, interpreted and contested by generations 
of scholars, including some of the militant variety like Maqdissi, Azzam and others. Wahhabism 
and Salafism will be more fully explained throughout this chapter. 
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modern-day Saudi Arabia in 1932.136 The modern KSA is the result of the Al-Saud 
family’s alliance with Mohammed ibn’ Abd al-Wahhab. The resulting alliance led to the 
development of an identity that was thus unique to surrounding nation states – all of which 
were emerging from colonialism – with its Wahhabi interpretation of Islam, and its focus 
on upholding custody of two of the three holy cities within its borders – Mecca and 
Medina.  
The distinctiveness of the KSA’s early identity is reflected by its behaviour. Acquiring 
identity security entails reproducing and routinising the sense of self versus the others. 
As Darwich notes, “states’ ability to uphold a continuous distinctive identity vis-à-vis 
others influences the stability of state identity at the domestic level”.137 Hence, once 
identity is consolidated over time by narrative and discourse, critical junctures alter this 
normative behaviour posing risk to the state’s strategic leadership.  
Scholars have differentiated strategic behaviour differently, dividing them into two 
categories: 1) the perception of threat to a nation’s distinctiveness which triggers anxiety; 
and 2) threats with perceived specific objectives that will generate fear.138 From this 
perspective, according to Darwich, “anxiety causes a state of ontological insecurity that 
is not based on a material threat”.139 In other words, there could be a different behavioural 
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response to threats perceived as being enduring and ideological, and therefore challenging 
the KSA’s Sunni, religious leadership credentials, as opposed to material threats, such as 
the geographic encroachment of Iranian proxies within the KSA’s sphere of interests (we 
will explore the KSA’s threat perception of Iran in Chapter 4).  
The KSA’s leaders rely on the promotion of Sunni Islam.  The KSA hierarchy is aware 
of the ability of rejectionists – such as Islamists or more radical Salafi-Jihadists - to also 
use religion as a critique against them. Islam has periodically been used by some Saudi 
Islamists to delegitimise the KSA’s leadership.140 Therefore, this chapter will examine 
how the KSA mobilises its distinct culture, specifically its Sunni-leadership credentials, 
against other states and non-state actors, in order to strengthen its ideological leverage 
over them. Specifically, this chapter will examine the role of the central pillars of Jihad 
within Sunni Islam, and more specifically the impact these pillars have on the KSA’s 
strategic behaviour.  Examining the KSA’s behavioural response to intra-Sunni 
challenges provides a useful opportunity to assess the validity of strategic culture in 
helping researchers understand and identify instances of identity competition, and its 
impact on strategic behaviour - principally by demonstrating that identity similarity 
across the Arabian Gulf and wider Middle East has been a source of fear and anxiety. 
These identity challenges present the KSA with a foreign and security policy paradox. 
The Saudi monarchy bridges between two opposing political communities: a pro-Western 
element, and a Wahhabi religious establishment, whilst KSA’s rulers attempt to pursue 
policies that balance both camps. 141  The debate rests on the central role of tawhid (the 
Oneness of God, or monotheism). Tawhid is closely connected to Jihad (the struggle) 
against jahilya (ignorance). The doctrine of tawhid ensures a unique political status for 
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the religious establishment of the KSA in that it claims that it alone has the religious 
training to “safeguard [the] KSA’s religious purity”. 142  And yet the KSA’s most 
important international ally is the United States. The religious establishment believes in 
purifying the nation from political secularism, whilst encouraging the eviction of inflidels 
(non-believers) from Muslim lands. The contradiction inherent between these two 
communities is a microcosm of the contradiction that informs the KSA’s foreign and 
security policy, in that the KSA utilises tawhid as a unifying and legitimising factor in its 
quest for regime stability. This approach engenders the KSA’s first foreign and security 
paradox.143  
Pan-Islamism and pan-Arabism have overtly attempted to overcome national entities in 
the wider Middle East region, which chapter 2 noted has produced security dilemmas, 
particularly regarding alliance formation, for the KSA’s leaders. This second paradox is 
also highly relevant in examining the KSA’s strategic culture, demonstrating how cultural 
factors, in this instance the intra-Sunni competition, can produce a security dilemma by 
causing anxieties over identity.  
 
Throughout this chapter we will examine critical junctures such as the evolution and rise 
of pan-Arabism, Islamism and Salafi-Jihadism in order to understand how these 
paradoxes have influenced or provided shape to the KSA’s behavior, whether it has been 
constrained by these religious doctrines and concepts, or whether it has weaponized them. 
Indeed, this chapter will demonstrate that it is possible to identify a chain of causation, 
amongst Islamist narratives that then can metastasize into more radical and extreme forms 
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of ideological doctrine. This is useful in that it helps chart the severity of consequences, 
intended and unintended, to strategic choices and strategic behaviour.144 
Identity and Behaviour 
The KSA has relied upon Islam to provide its unique identity within the region, insofar 
as regional challenges have been concerned.145 Given the centrality of religion in Saudi 
political discourse, has Saudi statecraft and its foreign policy actually been equated with 
an Islamic foreign policy?  This question becomes a factor of high relevance whenever 
issues of identity or regime legitimacy feature in the KSA’s geo-politics.146 For example, 
when challenged by Nasser’s vision of pan-Arabism in the 1950s and 1960s, King Faisal 
(the ruler of the KSA between 1964-1975) drew on the pan-Islamic vision of a united 
umma to strengthen the KSA’s regional influence and counter that of Egypt. Faisal used 
Islamic tenets to forge alliances against political opponents who were portrayed as 
enemies of Islam.147 As a consequence of these challenges, the KSA reinforced the role 
of Islam as an instrument of foreign and domestic policy.148 
This pan-Islamic narrative was mobilised as a primary method, adapted as it became 
necessary, by the Saudi state, utilising discourse that included the KSA being the sole 
state to be governed by the shari’a (the Islamic laws derived from God), at least until the 
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Taliban came to power in Afghanistan in 1988.149 In the years following the demise of 
pan-Arabism and the KSA’s move for developing its pan-Islamic leadership pretensions 
of the Middle East, it faced a new and acute challenge following the rise in prominence 
of the Muslim Brotherhood’s pan-Islamic appeal.150 The Muslim Brotherhood adopted a 
pan-Sunni approach similar to that of the KSA. This overlap was of significant concern 
to the KSA as its self-designated role as leader of the Sunni Islamic community was now 
being challenged.151 The KSA’s behavioural responses to the rise of Political Islamists 
was noteworthy, and included: 1) the discrediting and denial of the Muslim Brotherhood’s 
claim to be of Salafi  origin; and 2) the portrayal of itself (KSA) as the guardian of the 
purest version of moderate Islam as opposed to the “politically pragmatic Muslim 
Brotherhood”,152 with such a connotation of the Brotherhood implying its faithlessness. 
In this way, the KSA was able to reclaim a coherent and distinct national identity that 
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once more relied on cultural factors – religion in this instance - to confer greater 
legitimacy to itself. 
Islamism and Strategic Preferences  
Islamists argue that Muslims ‘have become uncoupled from their cultural mores in 
modern societies where people live increasingly atomised lives, prompting them to seek 
supra-cultural, transnational identities within an imagined umma’.153 It was precisely this 
shift towards a unified transnational umma, away from its original purpose that secured 
“the social and moral purity of Egypt”.154  The Brotherhood’s idea of Jihad oscillates 
between the foundational orientation of its founder, Banna, and a more universalist 
orientation associated with Qutb.155  In other words, something that is locally-focused 
versus something that is more utopian and internationalist with a vision of a supranational 
pan-Islamic community.156  This tension within the Muslim Brotherhood community 
proliferated amongst other Islamist movements which led to the creation of different 
concepts of Jihad, such as ‘Civil Jihad’ and eventually the concept of ‘Global Jihad’.157 
This poses an important dilemma to Saudi strategists: to what extent should organisations 
(in this instance the Muslim Brotherhood) that contain nationally, and regionally oriented 
aspirations of power, be disenfranchised, thereby limiting their ability to affect change of 
the status-quo, or, aligned with as means of pursuing a specific mutual interest.   
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On the specific case of the Muslim Brotherhood this is reflected in the movement’s 
oscillation between violence and politics, although whether or not this oscillation is due 
to the appeal of Qutb’s ideology or due to a wider systemic or structural deficit within the 
Muslim Brotherhood remains a subject of much debate, and unfortunately is beyond the 
scope of this thesis.158  What is clearer however, within the context of the KSA’s strategic 
culture, is that regardless of ideological oscillation or structural deficits, both are 
perceived as a threat to the KSA’s leadership.159 Under Qutb’s ideology, which was 
initially framed against Nasser’s leadership of Egypt, the KSA’s opposition to regimes 
regarded as takfir or infidel now became a priority.  This approach by Qutb’s followers 
both within and outside the modern Muslim Brotherhood frames perfectly why the KSA 
remains deeply skeptical of its desired ‘ends’.  As Kendall notes that: 
the Brotherhood’s practical stance towards armed violence and Jihad was, 
like the regime’s foreign policy, pulled in two directions: internally toward 
reform and consolidation within the state and externally toward 
[safeguarding] the concept of the umma.  These two tendencies were 
encapsulated in the thought of Banna and Qutb respectively.160  
 
Even at a relatively early juncture of analysis, the analysis concludes that the KSA’s 
ability to influence the religious establishment’s fatwas (religious declarations) becomes 
demonstrably important.  Johnston’s definition of strategic culture fits neatly with the 
notion of discursive power and bodes well for more analysis of the way the KSA employs 
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its discursive power. That is, the extent it employs it as a social process as a means of 
identifying or conferring state-level capabilities or power.161 That is, there may be a direct 
link between the audience of the KSA’s discursive power, that is with those sub-state or 
non-state actors that can impact the perception of legitimacy of the KSA’s strategic 
behaviour, and its national security behaviour. This influence is a direct consequence of 
the strategic partnership between the KSA’s familial, political leaders, and the religious 
Wahhabi leaders. This partnership provides the Al-Saud considerable influence  and it is 
enabled in a doctrinal sense by the KSA’s appropriation of al-wala wa-l-bara (loyalty to 
Islam, Muslims, and God and disavowal of everything else), which we will discuss later 
in this chapter.162  
 
ISLAMISM AND SALAFI-JIHADISM  
As already noted, Political Islamism is associated with the ideas of Banna and Qutb and 
refers to what starts out as activism necessary to topple a Muslim government through a 
military coup. Violent pan-Islamists on the other hand refer to orthodox concepts of 
defensive Jihad and offensive Jihad, such as those articulated by Abdallah Azzam, the 
cofounder of al-Qaeda. 163  Azzam argued that infringement by non-Muslims of Muslim 
territory demands an immediate response in defence of such territory.  Violent pan-
Islamism (or Classical Jihadism to give it its pure title) evolved to also include ‘offensive 
 
161  Thierry Balzacq, ‘The Three Faces of Securitization Theory’, European Journal of 
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Jihad’, that is, taking the fight to the enemy, conceived as a form of pre-emptive defensive 
intervention.  This has been dubbed Global Jihadism in contemporary vernacular.  Azzam 
advocated guerrilla warfare within defined conflict zones in defence of Muslim territory.  
This set the Classical and Global Jihadists together in a strategic alliance, against the 
‘Near’ – regional  - and ‘Far’ apostates – the US – enemies.164  Jihadism in Saudi Arabia 
by contrast has generally been more ‘Islamist’ than ‘revolutionary’ in that the KSA’s 
Islamists do not necessarily seek to overthrow their ruling regime – a contested Wahhabist 
doctrinal concept called la-wala-wa-l-bara, a distinction unique to the KSA which we 
will discuss later in this chapter.165  That said, Saudi Islamists were crucial in influencing 
the doctrinal evolution of Jihad from a defensive concept to an offensive one.  
This evolution started with Azzam’s entrepreneurship during the ‘defensive’ Jihad 
against the Soviets in Afghanistan. Such a defensive concept spread amongst many of 
these Jihadists who eventually returned with their understanding of defensive Jihad to 
Saudi Arabia and subsequently to Bosnia, Chechnya and other countries. 166  This 
development is extremely significant to the Saudi strategist.  It marked the moment in 
history that the export of fighters in the name of defensive Jihad as a tool of foreign and 
security policy evolved into an existential threat against the former masters of such 
fighters.  Nevertheless, later case studies will demonstrate that the prosecution of what 
Abdo calls “perpetual conflict”, often along ideological, religious or sectarian lines, in 
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pursuit of defensive Jihad remains the Saudis’ preferred way of achieving security 
policies or securing military objectives.167 
The non-revolutionary Islamist position, adopted by Saudi Islamists, is at odds with the 
Islamism that emerged from Arab republics that emerged during Nasserism.168  The 
KSA’s pan-Islamism was revived by Saudi King Faisal as a means of coordinating the 
foreign policies of Muslim countries and was called the ‘al-tadamun al-Islami – Islamic 
Jointery.169   It was actually designed as a counter-weight to Nasser’s pan-Arabism, 
seeking to boost the religious legitimacy of the ruling Sauds. To underscore the 
importance of buttressing this legitimacy, ‘foreign policy’ institutions such as the Muslim 
World League (MWL) and the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC) were 
founded by the KSA and still exist today as a means of coordinating pan-Islamic solidarity 
and support in accordance with Saudi foreign policy.  The creation of these institutions, 
although established very much as a soft power tool had a subconscious impact which 
was the fostering of support to Muslims in need around the world, almost a soft power 
defensive Jihad.  More significantly regarding the evolution of Classical Jihadism toward 
Global Jihadism, these institutions were symbols of Saudi influence internationally, not 
just within the Arabian Peninsula.170 Many of these institutions mobilised in response to 
the suffering of Muslims in places like Afghanistan, Bosnia, Chechnya, Palestine and 
southern Lebanon.  Pulling on these ideological levers of influence was a crucial 
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requirement for King Faisal in his response to counter Nasserism in the 1950/60s.  Yet, 
this chapter will go on to show that they are levers that cannot be easily manipulated.   
The promotion of pan-Islamism, including as a tool of Saudi’s external security policy, 
was now a defining feature of its strategic behaviour in response to threats to its 
ideological political model and to the survival of the Saudi regime. Pan-Islamism, a 
political act initially mobilised to contain Nasser’s ambition in post-revolutionary Egypt 
- and later to contain the challenge of post-revolutionary Iran which chapter 4 will analyse 
- had acquired a militant dimension.  Whether a link in the chain of causation or not, the 
increasingly militant dimension of pan-Islamism ensued in tandem with increasingly 
violent conflicts such as the Intifadas in Palestine and the war against the Soviets.  
Religiously oriented ‘proxy warfare’ along pan-Islamist lines now became entrenched 
along religious lines.171   
 
‘Controlled’ or ‘Uncontrolled’ Extremism – creating or avoiding Fitna 172 
The term Jihad has come to be used as a byword for fanaticism and Islam’s allegedly 
implacable hostility towards the West. 173   Yet, Jihad has multiple resonances and 
associations, its meaning shifting depending on the context.  Understanding the context 
 
171 Proxy warfare is generally understood to mean a war (or conflict) that is instigated by a more 
significant power which does not itself become involved. For an excellent insight into proxy 
warfare see, Andrew Mumford, Proxy Warfare, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2013, p. 141. 
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in which it sits is a fundamental requirement to modern strategists within the KSA.174 
This section will try to demonstrate that it is possible to employ Jihad as a strategic 
behavioural lever in certain contexts. 175  Since policy responses to local and Global 
Jihadism should be distinct and contextually relevant, this is an important distinction to 
draw. Yet, this section will also demonstrate how exceedingly difficult it, Jihad, is to 
control, subsequently.  At its extreme, uncontrolled extremism can create a situation of 
fitna – a situation that is regarded as unsolvable.176  As such, fitna is a hugely important 
concept to understand.  For the KSA, avoiding unintended consequences that spiral and 
create fitna is evidently important.  However, it can also have its advantages in 
demonstrating a possible state of affairs should citizens prioritise liberalism or Islamism 
over authoritarianism, as for example, in Syria during 2011-2016. (This thesis will 
explore contemporary Syria in chapter 5, in particular the extent to which fitna there is 
indeed unintended).  
 
Thus, this section will now examine the causation of fitna, its risk to status quo powers 
across the region, and its utility as a tool of the KSA’s strategic behaviour. It will 
demonstrate how Islamist doctrines can evolve and eventually achieve self-perpetuating 
radicalism.177   It will describe the evolution of groups like al-Qaeda from the early 
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Muslim Brotherhood (Qutb’s) ideology and then go on to describe how militant groups, 
devoid of ‘controlling influences’ of the state can mutate. Examples of these mutations 
include al-Qaeda in Iraq during the period 2003-2006, and its evolution to becoming 
DAESH, an intra-stakeholder rupture where different interpretations of radical ideology 
are pursued causing a mutation within the formerly unified stakeholder. 178   
 
It is sometimes assumed that Jihad is a cultural tool, used at the whim of Muslim leaders 
against those portrayed as infidels.179  According to Bale, this view is now commonplace 
among uninformed Western commentators.180  That is that Jihad is both a ‘way’ or a tool 
of statecraft, but it can also be an ‘end’ in itself, as in a state of permanent being.181  For 
example, defensive Jihad is a fard ‘ayn (collective duty) to protect Muslim lands from 
external aggression.  Still the ideological forces which underpin Jihad are so strong that, 
despite it being used as an ideology of imperial expansion throughout periods of Islamic 
history, the dominant trend has been for Islamic states to seek to dampen expansionist 
Jihadi thought in favour of Realpolitik once the limits or ambitions of state or stakeholder 
power have been reached. 182   As Kendall notes, the idea that Jihad is naturally 
expansionary is deeply problematic, and that there is some kind of tipping point, beyond 
which the ideologies that legitimise Jihad evolve thereby pushing the boundaries or limits 
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of religious acceptability.  It is the speed of this evolution and its causes that can 
significantly contribute to a situation of ‘undesired fitna’.183  
 
Of equal importance to the KSA’s strategic culture, however, was the role played by the 
Saudi Ikhwan in the early 1900s. Their expansionist Jihads across parts of Arabia led by 
Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab against largely nomadic tribes ended with a vastly greater land mass 
controlled by Ibn Saud in what eventually became modern Saudi Arabia.  Converting 
those within the territories acquired to Wahhabism would welcome them from the Dar 
al-khufr (the land of the heretics).  The Ikhwan unleashed to conquer the Dar al-khufr had 
now become increasingly controlled and constrained by Ibn Saud. Thus, by 1926, they 
eventually turned on him.  Their main grievance was that Ibn Saud, in deference to 
Christian patrons, such as Great Britain who controlled modern day Kuwait and Iraq in 
the early 20th Century, stopped their Jihad and prevented the spread of Allah’s word.184  
Indeed, the role played by these Saudi Ikhwan in the much later creation of groups like 
al-Qaeda and DAESH is profound.  This evolution from the Saudi Ikhwan of the early 
1900s to modern day global Salafi-Jihadism is very instructive in understanding a number 
of features of the KSA’s strategic culture, in particular the role that sectarianism occupies 
as a significant lever of statecraft, specifically insofar as it relates to the KSA’s use of 
norms and narrative as behavioural tools.  Indeed, the evolution and transformation of the 
Saudi state since the eighteenth century has been a process in which Jihad – ostensibly 
state-sponsored - has occupied centre-stage.185 
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The contemporary re-emergence of the Saudi Ikhwan’s ideology - the use of offensive 
Jihad by Ibn Saud’s followers - and the insurrectionary stance adopted by Qutb’s doctrine 
for the Muslim Brotherhood (as we noted earlier), both reflect the competition in radical 
Sunni circles.186  Yet, understanding the cultural similarities and differences between the 
two is critically important insofar as the KSA’s behaviour is concerned. This thesis will 
now examine these cultural factors in more detail.   
 
Mutation 
Let us examine this evolution carefully starting at the far end of the nihilist spectrum.   
 
The term Salafism refers to the “righteous predecessors of the first generations of 
Muslims” – the Salaf.187  Viewed this way, Salafism is a philosophy that believes in 
progression through regression, or in other words, they prefer to emulate the original 
“righteous predecessors” as much as possible including their physical appearance and 
shunning modernity.188 Their doctrine is principally concerned with the realisation of 
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God’s unity, tawhid, and maintenance of religious purity.  Salafis believe that only they 
constitute the so-called ‘victorious group’ that comes from a reference in the hadith, 
which states Islam will splinter into various movements of heresy ‘at some point in the 
future’.189  Only one faction will practice Islam as God intended and will consequently 
be ‘saved’.  In this context, the works and legacy of Abd al-Wahhab are of significant 
importance to Salafis.  Yet, Wahhabism remains a contested message, whose real 
meaning is claimed both by ‘quietists’ and ‘radicals’ alike.  Scholars have divided Salafis 
into three broad categories: conservative (sometimes referred as purists), politicos, and 
Jihadists.  
 
According to Keppel, 190  Roy, 191  and Maher, 192  the term Salafist-Jihadism is an 
ideological strain that has separated from the conservative ‘quietist’ doctrine of Salafism 
historically associated with Salafism and Wahhabism.  They also argue that Salafi-
Jihadism represents a “post-Islamist phase because of the perceived failures of Islamist 
actors.”193 From the KSA’s perspective, they point to the decentralised nature of Salafi-
Jihadism, the totalitarian character of its ideology, and its competitive posture that are the 
greatest risk to the KSA’s leaders. Again, as we saw with Political Islamists earlier in this 
chapter, the Salafi-Jihadists’ challenge to the KSA’s legitimacy is another feature of the 
KSA’s identity anxiety. We will now briefly explore below the defining characteristics 
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of Salafi-Jihadism, each derived from Wahhabism, all of which have a causal link to the 
KSA’s strategic behaviour. 
 
Jihad as an opportunity and a threat 
Jihad is probably the best-known Islamic concept.  Jihad was sanctioned after the first 
thirteen years of Islam when the Prophet Mohammed migrated to Medina for protection 
against the Quraysh – the tribe principally responsible for suppressing Islam during its 
early years.  This history of Jihad is celebrated within Wahhabi circles, particularly by 
two of its famous doctrinal scholars, Imam Ahmad ibn Hanbal and Ibn Taymiyya. The 
latter holds huge significance to contemporary Wahhabists, in particular regarding the 
emphasis on physical struggle in the cause of God as the pinnacle of Islam - many 
Wahhabist scholars describe the ‘defence of Muslim lands’ as their first article of faith.194 
It is generally accepted within Islam that only a rightful authority can sanction offensive 
Jihad.  Defensive Jihad is different in that it is more reactionary to external aggression or 
occupation.  
 
Maher argues that Jihad occupies an important place within Salafi-Jihadism which 
represents Jihadist’s ‘lifeblood’, looking to defend and promote the religion.195  Given 
that Jihad emerged as a response to the Prophet Mohammed’s persecution (from the 
Quraysh tribe), it has enjoyed an elevated position within Islam.  It also represents the 
earliest Islamic concept of conquest, which is reflected by the Battle of Badr in 624AD.  
This battle is significant in that it was offensive rather than defensive Jihad, but perhaps 
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more significant were the assurances and virtues of ‘martyrdom’ that were offered to the 
relatives of those Muslims killed in the battle.  According to Maher, Badr established a 
shift in the notion of martyrdom away from the passive to the active, whereby dying for 
God could be actively sought out.   
 
According to Salafi-Jihadism, Jihad is also, therefore, decentralised as an individual 
responsibility within the Islamic faith and, therefore, a duty for all followers.  Arguments 
about defensive Jihad remained straightforward, especially in places like Afghanistan 
against the Soviets.  However, offensive Jihad against fellow Muslims, requires a specific 
trigger event, a chain of causation.  When considering offensive Jihad against the West, 
this chain of causation more often than not reflected a narrative of ‘continued 
colonialism’.  Yet, offensive Jihad against fellow Muslims remains deeply contentious. 
In Salafi-Jihadist circles, offensive Jihad became permissible, because they regarded the 
Muslim world as being under the West’s control.  Nevertheless, waging war – or offensive 
Jihad – remains a challenge for Salafi-Jihadists requiring the development of 
sophisticated chains of causation, or triggers.196  Having influence or control over the 
religious characteristics of these trigger events, therefore, might be considered a critical 
requirement for the KSA and could be an interesting area of further forensic study. 
 
Takfir and Khawarij as an opportunity and a threat 
The 2003 invasion of Iraq changed the way Islamists could interpret the doctrine of 
offensive Jihad, so too did it provide motivation for them to re-interpret the concept of 
takfir, (the concept of excommunication).  Not only did this present Salafi-Jihadists with 
greater legitimacy in their attacks against the West, but they also used the concept of 
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takfir to justify their attacks against fellow Muslims, and Shia Muslims in particular.  As 
Maher notes, it can seem like an archaic concept, because it “draws a line against those 
deemed to have left the faith”.197   
 
For Salafi-Jihadists the concept of takfir has become hugely valuable, with their rationale 
for attacks against Shia Muslims being justified by their own excommunication from 
Islam, that is, by not being Sunni Muslims.198  As such it has become a potent tool by 
Salafi-Jihadists for legitimising intra-Sunni, intra-Islamic and inter-civilisational conflict 
particularly in regions where sectarian fault lines exist, such as in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, 
Bahrain and Yemen.  Salafi-Jihadist interpretation of takfir calls for “active homogeneity 
with explicit emphasis on active rather than passive struggle”.199  It is not sufficient, thus, 
to be a passive Muslim. This is at odds with normal conservative Islam where rules 
generally place a premium on stability within the community, discouraging rebellion even 
when confronted by oppressive rulers, which we will discuss later in this chapter. It is 
also accepted, however, that to be accused of apostasy a ruler must deviate significantly 
from the Shari’a.  ‘Excessive deviation’ is therefore a label that all Islamic rulers seek to 
avoid and is an exceedingly important requirement in retaining legitimacy. It is a heavily 
contested aspect of doctrine among Wahhabists.200  
 
Historically the precedent for the concept of pronouncing someone takfir was set during 
the fall-out from the assassination of Uthman, the third of the four ‘righteously guided 
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caliphs’ following the Prophet Mohammed’s death.  Uthman was the second successive 
caliph to be assassinated (Osman was the first) and pressure mounted on Ali ibn Abu 
Talib, his successor and the fourth ‘righteously guided caliph’, to bring his killers to 
justice.  Ali’s unwillingness or inability to bring the killers to justice eventually led to an 
Army being raised against his rule, an army led by the Prophet’s widow Aisha, who 
fought Ali’s army at the Battle of Camel in 656.  This battle is more colloquially regarded 
as the First Fitna. It represents the first occasion that Muslims had demonstrated their 
willingness to violently confront one another in response to political events.   
 
However, the First Fitna was not fought on a takfir basis.  The first takfir movement was 
to follow the Battle of Camel (or the First Fitna) at the Battle of Saffin fought by Ali 
against the governor of Damascus, Muawiyah ibn Abu Sufyan.  During this battle, 
Muawiyah’s soldiers hoisted copies of the Quran in the air appealing to Ali to resolve his 
differences with Muawiyah through arbitration rather than fighting.  Ali agreed to the 
overture.  However, many of Ali’s own followers did not.  These followers accused 
Muawiyah and Ali of committing apostasy by threatening the unity of the Islamic umma.  
They then went further and pronounced takfir on Ali arguing that his decision to arbitrate 
had denied God’s right to pick a victor via conflict.  Ali had, therefore, usurped God’s 
rights.  The First Fitna and the Battle of Saffin are therefore regarded as hugely symbolic 
moments in Islamic history, especially in so far as religious responsibility, accountability 
and authority are concerned.  Both events highlight the control held by the custodians of 
religious doctrine and the umma’s interpretation on these exceedingly important religious 
concepts. 201   
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After the battle of Saffin those who broke away from Ali’s leadership became known as 
il khawarij (those who went out).202  The term is today used pejoratively by the KSA 
against violent extremists and nihilists like al-Qaeda and DAESH.  Conversely, they in 
turn, use it against the KSA’s rulers.  It is also often occasionally used by some Sunni 
Muslims to describe Shia Muslims.  Over time it has become a particularly loaded term 
with derisory religious significance.  Although this new movement was militarily 
defeated by Ali at the Battle of Nahrawan in 658, it had nevertheless made its mark and 
argued that ‘legitimacy’ was not derived through the established institutions within Islam, 
such as the Caliphate, but through original Quranic scripture alone.  Protecting its regime 
from these contentious religious doctrines becomes a critical requirement for all Islamic 
leaders, but the KSA in particular by dint of its assumed Islamic leadership role.203 
Viewed in this way, khawarij became a potent threat to the stability of the Islamic 
community.  Ultimately, khawarij were able to regroup after their defeat at Nahrawan 
and they subsequently assassinated Ali, the fourth righteously guided Caliph.  In the 
context of contemporary strategy and conflict in the Middle East it is again important to 
realise that khawarij was a consequence of Ali’s perceived ‘usurping the rights of God’ 
at the Battle of Saffin.  The subsequent labelling of Ali as takfir unleashed a chain of 
events that would see him assassinated and the umma split into Sunni and Shia.204  
 
Today the issue of takfir is inextricably linked with the protection of Islam itself. Takfir 
is, therefore, a hugely significant concept of stability – and instability in terms of those 
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who use it to challenge those in power - within the Arab world.  Perceived religious 
illegitimacy can become politically fatal to the KSA’s rulers and is perhaps the fastest 
way to ‘losing’, strategically. 205   Balancing unintended, unwarranted or uninvited 
accusations of takfir or khawarij is strategically vital. Takfir has always, therefore, 
operated in political environments whenever pronounced, making it an especially useful 
weapon for all religiously framed stakeholders – be they state or non-state - in their 
attempts to de-legitimise the rulers of the KSA.206  In the modern era this has been 
especially evident since the ‘Iraq earthquake’ of 2003.  According to Kazimi, the brutality 
of the Iraqi insurgency stems in large part to its liberal use of the term takfir to stoke a 
sectarian war against the Iraqi Shia, notwithstanding in large part the way Western 
military intervention abetted sectarianism.207  
 
Tawhid as an opportunity and a threat 
Tawhid is the central pillar of Islam – the doctrine of the oneness of God, or monotheism.  
Within Islam this characteristic distinguishes it from the pre-Islamic era known as jahiliya 
– a blend of ignorance and polytheism.  Tawhid is the third central component of 
Wahhabist, and therefore also Salafi-Jihadist doctrine, which the Salafi-Jihadist 
community leverage as a powerful weapon of legitimacy.208   
 
In the formulation of strategic alliances and coalitions, there is considerable scope for the 
KSA to be accused of demonstrating insufficient adherence to tawhid.  Salafi-Jihadists 
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and other Islamists go even further.  They developed an understanding and doctrine that 
calls for fighting for tawhid for the sake of God.  Therefore, it should not just be 
considered a passive act of faith.  In order to fully realise the most important and basic 
article of faith – demonstrating belief in the oneness of God – they cultivated the Wahhabi 
notion of Islam as striving to achieve tawhid through offensive Jihad.209  This was a 
remarkable development in militant Islamist doctrine, and when coupled with their 
interpretation of takfir and Jihad, demonstrates a Salafi-Jihadist desire for perpetual 
conflict in God’s name.210 
 
Al wala wa-l-bara 
The final intra-Wahhabi doctrinal concept of relevance to the KSA’s strategic culture is 
al-wala wa-l-bara (loyalty to Islam, Muslims, and God and disavowal of everything 
else).211 It has developed in important ways that affect the KSA’s strategic behaviour. 
Indeed, the extent to which it is a critical requirement of the KSA’s ability to lead 
effectively, and the extent to which it necessitates a highly centralised command structure 
is beyond the scope of this chapter but would be a useful area of further study. In Wahhabi 
writings, the term is used to signify the loyalty that all Muslims show to God and Islam, 
and to denote the notion that Muslims should disavow all things considered to be un-
Islamic.212  
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Al-wala wa-l-bara’s interpretation has changed according to the political – not 
necessarily religious - context of the time. The religious scholars at the time of the second 
Saudi state (in the 19th century) realised that the collapse of their union with the Al-Saud 
family during the period 1824-91 deprived them of their power and diminished their 
influence. According to Wagemakers, this realisation was the most significant legacy of 
the second Saudi state for Wahhabi scholars and therefore features prominently within 
the modern KSA.213  
As Wahhabi religious scholars moved away from criticizing their political leaders, they 
avoided the earlier writings of their religious doctrine and stripped al-wala wa-l-bara of 
its political relevance, instead relegating it purely as a social concept applicable for 
interpersonal relations.214 Similarly, with the evolution of the KSA’s response to external 
identity challenges - by Nasserism and subsequently by Political Islamists - the 
interpretation of al-wala wa-l-bara has evolved in response to regional political events, 
to avoid a repeat of the pitfalls of the 19th century civil-war.215 This behavioural change 
allows considerable freedom to the modern rulers of the KSA, a key component of its 
discursive power, and therefore its strategic behaviour, when conducting internal and 
external balancing with non-state ideological actors. In its religious scholarly form, it has 
been used effectively as a component of the KSA’s discursive strategy against pan-
Arabists, Political Islamists, and more recently against Salafi-Jihadists.216 The evolution 
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of the al-wala wa-l-bara - in order to improve the political survivability of the 
Saud/Wahhab alliance – goes a long way to explaining the ‘how’ the KSA is able to 
manipulate the religious doctrines discussed above, and is a significant behavioural tool 
available to the KSA’s leadership, and yet it is totally dependent on the perceived 
legitimacy of the KSA’s leaders in the eyes of those determining such judgements, 
primarily religious actors, audiences, state and non-state stakeholders. 217  
However, the evolution of these doctrines (making them more useful, politically, to the 
KSA’s leaders), is not without its challenges. As this chapter has noted in the evolution 
of Islamist challenges to the KSA’s identity and leadership, Abu Mohammed al-Maqdisi 
helped revive this powerful discourse against the KSA’s rulers in the period between 1991 
and 2003 (the period of the two Gulf Wars against Iraq). Al-Maqdisi revived the specific 
aspects of al-wala wa-l-bara that sought to demonstrate KSA’s departure from the 
embodiment of a Wahhabi Islamic state. Al-Maqdisi sought to weaponise al-wala wa-l-
bara against the KSA’s leadership, an act that led to the re-establishment of the political 
rather than purely social connotations that would become a mainstream concept within 
Salafi Jihadist circles. The KSA’s rulers, including the Wahhabi religious leaders, 
emphasise its role purely as a quietist means of guiding social behaviours, and crucially, 
the need for obedience to the rulers in order to avoid a situation of fitna.218 This aspect of 
Wahhabi doctrine could be argued as serving as a significant constraining factor on the 
KSA’s strategic behaviour, yet the KSA’s leaders’ abilities to continually balance the 
religious and political components of national power demonstrates its behavioural 
 
217 Joas Wagemakers, ‘The Enduring Legacy of the Second Saudi State: Quietist and Radical 
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emphasis, or ‘the how’.  Indeed, the shock of the second Saudi state’s collapse (1824-
1891) and its impact on Wahhabist scholars themselves led to a transformation within 
their religious doctrine, away from a doctrine for the entire umma, that is pan-Islamic, 
because they realised that they needed the protection of a ruler in order to avoid a situation 
of fitna. 219 
 
CONCLUSION 
This chapter has discussed the competition between the radical intra-Sunni stakeholders, 
and how their competition over religious identity presents challenges to the KSA. How 
the KSA responds to these challenges is highly dependent on the political context of the 
time, and the severity of the risk presented.  Indeed, this chapter has demonstrated that 
sometimes, these radical intra-Sunni stakeholders become a cause to champion, and in 
other times they become a cause to guard against. Although this may imply that their 
strategic behaviour is therefore inconsistent, this chapter has started to discover that this 
is not necessarily the case. Indeed, the KSA’s threat perception of cultural factors being 
weaponised against them, causing them identity anxiety, will typically involve a similar 
behavioural response which is to try to delegitimize its opponent, and to re-emphasise its 
own unique identity and religious legitimacy amongst the Umma. 
 
This chapter has also discussed the uniqueness of Islam in creating ideological fitna, 
whereby radical leaders with pan-Islamic ideologies clash with their ideological 
competitors and create a crisis situation that becomes difficult to reverse. Where no 
decisive act is possible to reverse the situation, then fitna will most likely occur.  This 
chapter has demonstrated that the chain of causation towards creating a situation of fitna 
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becomes more likely when these stakeholders are outside the control of the state. 
Therefore, the extent to which the KSA’s leaders will go to limit or influence this chain 
of causation is an important characteristic of its strategic behaviour. This suggests that 
the KSA’s strategic judgements are indeed framed by strategic cultural preferences, that 
are often, but not always (especially in the case of al-wala wa-l-bara) influenced by 
cultural factors. These limits are often reliant on religiously inspired coercion to achieve 
a position of influence.  We will examine in later case studies, specifically regarding 
contemporary conflicts in Syria and Afghanistan, how the KSA secures this coercive 
position of advantage, and the requirements in strategic culture terms that allows it to 
remain discreet and highly centralised.  This might be regarded as the opposite of a 
conventional approach towards strategic behaviour where strategic intent may be 
clear(er), and with its execution, decentralised. 
 
This chapter has also demonstrated the significance of the discursive power of intra-Sunni 
ideological debates. These may have a direct impact on the nature of the KSA’s strategic 
behaviour and their decision-making. The chapter has demonstrated the importance of 
understanding these non-state ideologies, and their subtle intra-stakeholder fissures and 
distinctions. It seeks to offer an explanation in behavioural terms, especially when terms 
are used loosely and widely, for example where Jihadism, Islamism, and Salafism may 
be conflated. Such an understanding obscures important differences, Islamism and 
Salafism, for example, are not the same thing, and in fact are often in competition with 
each other. Indeed, the literature notes that most Islamists are not Jihadists, just as most 
Salafists are not Jihadists. How the KSA utilises these ideologies either through alliance 
formation and alignment, or through conflict, or as their own proxies, are important 
factors to consider within the context of the KSA’s strategic behaviour.  
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This chapter has also demonstrated the KSA’s behavioural flexibility surrounding its 
identity. As regional or domestic events create behavioural anxiety, the KSA has tended 
to reshape or repackage its sense of identity in order to demonstrate its sense of 
uniqueness. This reshaping generally involves the reframing of an opponent’s identity in 
an attempt to demonise or delegitimise it, whilst simultaneously enhancing or 
emphasising the uniqueness of its own. The KSA has shifted its policies around alliance 
formation and alignment, albeit demonstrating consistent behavioural characteristics 
whilst doing so, reinventing specific elements of self-identity with relevant emphasis 
depending on context. This reinventing has continuously evolved, from being initial 
champions of pan-Islamism as a counter to Nasser’s pan-Arabism, from pan-Islamism to 
a more conservative focus on leaders of Sunnism, and from Sunnism to a much more 
specific focus on Wahhabist discourse following the ascendancy of the Muslim 
Brotherhood and other Political Islamists.  
 
Finally, this chapter has demonstrated that cultural similarities that challenge the KSA’s 
unique religious leadership role is a source of anxiety. By analyzing the chronological 
aspects of pan-Arabism, Islamism, and Salafi-Jihadism, this chapter has noted two 
strategic preferences that are influenced by its strategic culture. Both preferences involve 
a desire to retain a distinctive discursive power based on two exclusive identity markers 
which portrayed the KSA initially as the sole legitimate leader of Islam in response to 
pan-Arabism, and then subsequently as sole legitimate leader of conservative Sunni Islam 
in response to Islamism and Salafi-Jihadism. These similarities in identity can often be a 
source of division insofar as the KSA is concerned.   Chapter 4 will now go on to highlight 
another identity-distinction following the 1979 Iranian revolution, and how an Iranian 
regime using religion and religious legitimacy as a powerful tool of identity competed 
with the KSA for the title of ‘leader of the Islamic world’.  
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The policies the KSA has pursued in pursuit of these objectives might imply a 
readjustment of contemporary understanding of sectarian conflict and is potentially an 
area for further study.  That is, predominant explanations for intra-state conflict in the 
Middle East region ordinarily suggest identity differences. Scholarly literature, as we 
have noted so far, demonstrates this to be true in generic terms. However, by examining 
some important trends in the KSA’s strategic behavior, focused specifically on the 
strategic culture that shape its strategic preferences and behaviour, we discover that the 
KSA has a vested interest in maintaining sectarian division, a form of intra-Sunni 
sectarianisation as a distinct objective of its foreign and security policy. These aspects of 
its strategic culture might provide an opportunity for scholars to further develop an 





Chapter 3 discussed the challenges of pan-Arabism and Sunni Islamism to the KSA’s 
legitimacy and how the KSA responded in behavioural terms. It concluded that the KSA 
generally responded by emphasising specific aspects of Sunni religious doctrine in order 
to reaffirm its legitimacy internationally and domestically. These behavioural traits were 
attempts to re-emphasise its religious legitimacy, leadership credentials, and unique 
identity. In so doing, chapter 3 also addressed some of the doctrinal concepts shaping its 
strategic culture - such as Wahhabism, Islamism and Arabism - that influence the KSA’s 
strategic behaviour.  Chapter 3 also briefly discussed the risks associated with the 
employment of these doctrines, specifically the strategic anxiety caused by identity-
proximity, and also the challenges associated with exercising control over the more 
extreme interpretations of these doctrines and strategies.  
 
These deductions are also germane to this chapter. This chapter will analyse the KSA’s 
response to the Iranian revolution of 1979 with specificity on the role of those cultural 
thought-ways associated with identity-anxiety, threat perception, and how they impact 
the KSA’s strategic behaviour. It will follow a similar process to chapter 3, but by 
examining the events of the 1979 Iranian Revolution, the chapter’s focus will be on the 
resulting intra-Islamic competition over identity and leadership over the Muslim world, 
rather than the narrower focus on Sunnism, discussed in chapter 3. This analysis will 
facilitate the understanding of an additional secondary research question: Does this intra-
Islamic competition constrain in any way the KSA’s strategic behaviour – insofar as the 
Wahhabi doctrine of tawhid (monotheism) and takfir (excommunication) are concerned 
– and does the KSA’s apparent requirement to evolve and refine its identity provide an 
additional paradox to the KSA’s security policy? Noting the simultaneity and multitude 
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of events, and the association between actions and consequences with other state actors, 
this chapter will not consider wider relationships beyond Iran-KSA relations, other than 
brief references to Great Power politics. Instead, this chapter will focus on those cultural 
factors that allow for similarity between the Iranian and Saudi leaders, thereby triggering 
anxiety, and strategic behavioural responses. Identifying the extent to which continuity 
in politico-military strategy is directly linked to domestic cultural factors, and the extent 
that these behavioural responses are relatively fixed, or not, specifically contributes to the 
examination of my primary research question viz a vis the utility of strategic culture in 
understanding the KSA’s strategic decision-making and behaviour. 
 
This will allow us to better discover the relationships between the KSA’s strategic culture 
– specifically insofar as religion is concerned - and strategy. As chapter 2 noted, an 
intriguing characteristic of some of the scholarly literature suggests the possibility of 
strategic cultural change over time.  Indeed, this chapter will discover the extent to which 
– as suggested by Berger and Glenn assume - politico-military strategy is directly linked 
to domestic cultural factors, and therefore are relatively fixed and resistant to change, 
principally because “disconfirmable cognitive elements are buffered by the psychological 
phenomenon of consistency seeking. Information that reinforces existing images and 
beliefs is readily assimilated, while inconsistent data tend to be ignored, rejected, or 
distorted in order to make them compatible with prevailing cognitive structures”.220 
Indeed, discovering the parameters of acceptable change for the Saudi leadership, and the 
extent to which some of its cultural thought-ways and norms, specifically those inferred 
by Wahhabism, may actually be pre-determined, or whether they are susceptible to 
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strategic shocks, such as the Iranian revolution of 1979. Specifically, whether the threat 
was perceived along religious lines (that is, a revolutionary Shia ascendency), or 
perceived as an ascendent hostile state. 
 
This secondary research question is important in determining the overall mechanism by 
which the KSA perceives threats, and its behavioural responses. That is, can the strategic 
culture method posited by Glenn, or Berger, or Johnston, demonstrate that the KSA’s 
culture and behaviour is relatively fixed, and therefore its behavioural responses to critical 
junctures be comparable? 
 
The work by Glenn and Berger in particular, generally emphasises that historical memory 
and multilateral commitments – such as, alliances with the US, and with the GCC – shape 
strategic culture, and that therefore they undergo gradual change only over long periods 
of time.221 These scholars acknowledge that strategic cultural models are not necessarily 
static and unresponsive, yet they do require a catalyst for change. Such catalysts – or, 
critical junctures – can come from external events such as civil-wars or revolutions.222 
Such change then requires a reorientation process, involving participation by the society, 
the leadership, and the other stakeholders involved. Therefore, this chapter will examine 
how the KSA responded to the Iranian Revolution, and how the leadership responded by 
crafting a compromise on its traditional foreign policy orientation. 
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To do so, this chapter will examine Iranian foreign policy toward the KSA since 1979, 
and vice versa, and in so doing this chapter will highlight some intriguing common 
interests and similar behavioural ways between both actors. These similarities in desired 
strategic ends, and behavioural ways cause identity-anxiety within both the KSA and Iran 
which in turn have the effect of triggering an emphasis on Iran’s ‘identity-otherness’ in 
the eyes of the KSA’s leaders, and vice-versa.223 It will also allow us to focus specifically 
on intra-Islam’s sectarian224 competition (between Sunni and Shia) relating to identity 
and hegemony.  
 
According to Alaadin, the contemporary origins of sectarianism grew as a consequence 
of authoritarian rule and the emergence of groups drawing their legitimacy and support 
from different ethnic and sectarian communities.225 This sectarianism-question in the 
Gulf region has something of the ‘chicken or egg’ metaphor about it. 226 This chapter will 
examine the available literature regarding this rise of violent sectarianism, and regional 
conflicts via Islamic-justified radicalism, and the extent that they are inevitable, or state-
designed. For the most part this chapter will focus on those aspects of culture that best 
highlight the rivalry between the KSA and Iran. In so doing this chapter hopes to 
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demonstrate the utility of the strategic culture method for analysing and understanding 
seemingly irrational behaviour by (Iranian and) Saudi leaders, at least by Realist 
standards.  
 
Religious Differences and the Other 
Soon after the death of the Prophet Mohammed in 632 CE, a debate emerged within the 
early Muslim community over succession. One group became known as Sunni (people of 
tradition and the consensus of opinion) and argued that the next leader should be chosen 
from the close companions of their prophet, Mohammed.  Another group, who became 
the Shia (from the term Shi’at Ali, or party of Ali), believed that the new leader must be 
a descendant of Prophet Mohammed.  This early dispute concerned the proper function 
of a Muslim leader, and the broader subject of the moral basis of legitimate political and 
religious authority in Islam. Notwithstanding the historical and theological significance 
of this divide, scholarly literature and more generic public discourse, generally points at 
this factor as the biggest contributor to the explosion of sectarian conflicts in the Arab 
Islamic world today. Indeed, attempts to make sense of the turmoil engulfing the Middle 
East today through this seventh-century prism distorts our understanding of statecraft in 
this region. 227  A much smaller body of scholarly literature disagrees that sectarianism is 
the driving cause.228   
 
Insofar as the KSA is concerned, since the 1979 Iranian Revolution, Saudis have regularly 
represented Iran as a source of regional instability and more often than not, have 
 
227 For an excellent summary of this perspective see, Khaled Beydoun, ‘Dar al-Islam Meets Islam 
as Civilization’, UCLA Journal of Islamic and Near Eastern Law, 2015, p. 43. 
228 Hashemi and Postel provide a thorough dissection of this perspective in, Nader Hashemi and 
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emphasized either historical Persian expansionist trends, or its Shia religious 
credentials. 229  Islamic fundamentalism grew exponentially after the 1979 Iranian 
revolution – the deposing of the pro-Western Shah by those inspired by Ayatollah 
Khomeini.  Under the monarchy, the US was a close ally.  Iran even had excellent 
relations with Israel.  In the Arab world, Iran often sided with conservative Sunni 
monarchies such as Saudi Arabia and Jordan, whereas it had a strained relationship with 
the more radical states like Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. 230  Indeed the most common 
explanation for portraying Iran as a threat to the established regional balance of power 
has been consistent with Nasr’s much narrower view of “Sunni-Shia conflict(s) playing 
a large role in defining the Middle East”, an inevitable sectarian divide between Sunni 
and Shia.231 According to Zubaida, sectarian divisions in any religion are mostly peaceful 
and only become conflictual when overlaid with geopolitics.  Therefore, the extent to 
which the KSA’s domestic cultural factors, as the second generation of strategic cultural 
scholars would suggest, constrains or emboldens the KSA’s leaders is an important 
reference point. Of course, what events have demonstrated is that in fact, the greatest 
boon toward what we earlier described as ‘perpetual fitna’, occurred in 1979.232  
 
That being said, there is some scholarly literature that suggests regional insecurity since 
1979 is not solely a result of Iran’s Shia identity, rather that Iran’s predominantly non-
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Arab identity underlies the KSA’s attempts to bandwagon alliances against Iran. 233 The 
KSA’s behavioural relationship with Iran has operated in a context of the KSA as a major 
Arab leader, and the de-facto religious leader in the vanguard of pan-Arab cooperation, 
despite the KSA historic mistrust of pan-Arabism as we noted with Nasserism in chapter 
3, when not functioning on the KSA’s terms.234 
 
Threat Perception 
Relations between the KSA and Iran have been poor since the Iranian Islamic revolution 
of 1979, and its concomitant regional reverberations. The regional wide repercussions 
and geo-political rivalry are unprecedented in that on almost every issue in the region, 
Saudi Arabia and Iran disagree.235  Each is able to challenge the other and they do on 
several fronts. According to Patrick, the KSA’s lesser fighting capacity compounds their 
threat perception and its habit therefore of relying on their agency, exercised by numerous 
witting and unwitting stakeholders, predominantly the use of the Sunni religious 
establishment.236 This division is attributed as the cause of most conflicts far beyond their 
respective borders. According to Gause, they are both capable of wielding unparalleled 
influence among different political, Islamist, nationalist groups, and even Great Powers 
like the US and Russia. 237  Iran has had to be strategically self-reliant and endure 
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economic sanctions since the establishment of the Islamic Republic in 1979. Indeed, Iran 
works hard to authenticate its religious credentials and to have influence beyond its own 
domestic constituency. In turn, the KSA responds to threats to its national security 
interests that involve any Shia Arab or Shia Iranian cultural aspect, by pre-emptively or 
reactively responding, often using its discursive power, emphasising or highlighting the 
opponent’s Shia identity.238  
 
By linking its threat-perception to Iran, the threat becomes an “othered” non-Arab and 
non-Sunni one, and therefore is able to trigger behavioural responses by the KSA to claim 
legitimacy as the defenders of a pan-Arab or pan-Sunni regional order. Indeed, Monier 
notes that in this context the Arabness of Middle East politics remains highly 
influential. 239  In a similar process to the use of takfir (excommunication/heresy) 
discussed in chapter 3, highlighting the non-Arab status of Iranian led Shia activism 
justifies alliance creation in the guise of Arab unity. As chapter 3 noted, one of the most 
significant behavioural ways, a feature of the KSA’s culture, is afforded by takfir. It is a 
concept that serves both the KSA and Iran equally well – the KSA as the guardian of 
Islam’s most holy places for the Sunni faithful, and Iran as the de-facto leader of Shia 
Muslims.  
As this thesis has discovered, once put into practice, takfir takes on a very powerful 
significance, and can very rapidly manifest itself violently. It has the unique ability as 
being a core Islamic tenet and yet it also paves the way for sectarian conflict between 
 
238 For a detailed account of this behaviour, see: Patrick, Saudi Arabian Foreign Policy, p. 111. 
239 Elizabeth Monier, ‘Using Sectarianism to “De-Arabize” and Regionalize Threats to National 
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 87 
Muslims. Indeed, a competition now exists between both nations over what constitutes 
takfir.240  
 
As we’ve already noted, the KSA’s Wahhabist doctrine requires a commandment to 
worship only God and regard those who do not as infidel, applying takfir 
(excommunication) to polytheists. And as we noted in chapter 3, Wahhabism regards Shia 
Muslims as polytheists - because Shia doctrine requires veneration of the Prophet 
Mohammed, his bloodline, and also of Imams – and require their excommunication from 
Islam.241 The resultant escalation between the KSA and Iran amounts to the equivalence 
of a strategic shock. The importance of this discovery is not necessarily that divisions 
within religions can escalate quickly and slowly with the passage of time, but rather that 
uniquely within Islam, the concept of takfir and tawhid act as significant accelerants in 
the hostile ‘otherness’ of the opposition. Put another way, an internal, or sub-state cultural 
doctrine has the ability to trigger significant tension and conflict escalation, and without 
religiously ordained de-escalatory levers. This is a significant discriminator in 
discovering the influences on the KSA’s strategic behaviour. 
 
Anxiety 
Following the 1979 revolution, Iran sought to achieve identity-security by attempting to 
re-establish a combination of previous identities: Persian and Shi’ite.  Some political 
psychologists note that nations with ontological insecurity typically respond to such 
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insecurity to reaffirm one’s self-identity as a way of reducing collective anxiety.242 In 
Iran’s case, this involved recreating a lost sense of ontological security and anxiety, 
reaffirming its religious identity as a result of its more secular constitution up until its 
1979 revolution. As we have already noted, nationalism and religion are both intimately 
linked as powerful identity markers. Indeed, nationalism and religion have been 
demonstrably successful behavioural ways than other identity signifiers, and according 
to Kinnavall, nationalism and religion are such powerful sources of identity, and also 
tools for controlling or reducing anxiety, that they also have a tendency to make 
fundamentalism possible.243 Likewise, according to Giddens, nationalism relies on the 
construction of “the nation-as-this, and the people-as-one” which then guide the cultural, 
social, and political actions of the state.244 When combined with institutionalised religion, 
the umma – be they Iranian influenced or Saudi - are supplied existential answers ‘by 
God’, thus relieving the umma from the responsibility of having to make significant 
choices.245  
 
In providing answers to these questions, Khomeini was able to institutionalise the idea of 
intolerance against those not sharing his belief. In this way, Khomeini’s use of 
nationalism and religion as cultural markers increased Iran’s sense of identity and 
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security.246 However, the securitisation of identity requires ‘others’ to be involved in the 
process. In the case of post-revolutionary Iran, the ‘others’ were the US and the KSA.  
 
In the KSA’s case we will now consider its response to post-revolutionary Iran, how it 
again looked inward, at cultural factors that might compel greater Arab and religious 
unity, acts firmly rooted and provided by cultural factors, not materialism.247 Glenn’s 
positivist definitions of strategic culture fits neatly with the notion of how these cultural 
factors may enable and even empower the KSA’s discursive power. Generally speaking, 
the available literature suggests that Arabs employ discursive power as a social process 
as a means of identifying or conferring state-level capabilities or power.248 That is, there 
may be a direct link between the audience of the KSA’s discursive power - that is, those 
sub-state or non-state actors that can impact the perception of legitimacy of the KSA’s 
narrative, norms and ultimately, its strategic behaviour - and its national security 
behaviour.  
 
Culture as a strategy  
Rather than uniquely aggressive and sectarian, Iran is generally understood as a ‘regional 
middle power’ whose foreign policy has been shaped in the context of the systemic 
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Case Study’, Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 37, No.2, 2014, pp. 41-55. 
247 Ibid. 
248  Thierry Balzacq, ‘The Three Faces of Securitization Theory’, European Journal of 
International Relations, (June 2005), p25-32, discusses the concept of securitization theory in 
great detail, with an emphasis on how the puzzle of everyday events can become transformed into 
matters of national security through ‘discursive power’. 
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insecurity of a regional system penetrated by the West. 249  This has led to an Iranian 
security policy that is intimately intertwined with its espousal of asymmetric strategies of 
opposition to the West and the KSA, which has often taken the form of financial and 
military support for politically responsive stakeholders, most notably co-sectarian 
proxies.250 This manifests in a deliberate strategy, seeking to create the conditions for co-
sectarians to become politically responsive, or the reaction to events deemed exploitable 
given the security and geopolitical context at a specific time.251  
 
Many of the political variables of these stakeholders, such as their desired political ends, 
lie beyond Iran’s control, but the literature suggests that the most consistent variable is 
sectarianism.252 This aspect of its culture affords Iran opportunities. Iran’s revolutionary 
political structure allows its institutions to manage distinct if intimately connected aspects 
of various conflicts. In this way, Iran’s foreign ministry can propose diplomatic initiatives 
calling for political resolutions, while Iranian Revolutionary Guard commanders proceed 
to supervise and orchestrate militias and other proxies waging conflict, managing co-
sectarian ‘assets by weaponised, or state-sponsored sectarianism.’253 This suggests that 
Iran is able to contribute to situations in which regional powers can exploit (or create) 
 
249  See for example, Vali Nasr, The Shia Revival, and Nader Hashemi & Danny Postel, 
Sectarianization, p. 160. 
250 Jeff Colgan, ‘How Sectarianism Shapes Yemen’s War’, The Monkey Cage (Washington Post 
Blog), April 13, 2015, available at www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-
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252 See for example: Hashemi & Postel, Sectarianisation, p. 163.  
253  Afshon Ostovar, ‘Iran Has a Bigger Problem than the West; Its Sunni Neighbours’, The 
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opportunities to increase their power, yet beneath a tipping point or threshold, insofar as 
Great Powers are concerned. Waging this sub-threshold hard and soft power enables them 
to avoid swift or disproportionate reprisal.254 Iran has referred to this as omq-e rahbordi 
(strategic depth), a deliberate strategy that allows it to keep instability and threats at a safe 
distance.  It has also been termed ‘offensive realism’.255 Or, in the words of Mearsheimer, 
“looking for opportunities to alter the balance of power by acquiring additional 
instruments of power at the expense of potential rivals.”256 Distinct from soft power, omq-
e rahbordi requires relationships with militias and other non-state actors and stakeholders 
to form the centrepiece of its strategies of opposition.  These asymmetric strategies in the 
post-1979 era can be best understood as emerging from Iran’s direct identity anxiety and 
resulting competition with the KSA. Sectarianisation therefore, has been described by 
several scholars as a necessary by-product of its confrontation with the KSA.257 It is used 
as a counter to Iran’s role in regional conflicts, by the KSA, and vice versa, to the point 
where victory becomes hard to discern, and perpetual conflict is more likely.258 Iran uses 
these interlocking webs of security dilemmas which emerge in weak states, which can 
 
254 See, for example, Eskandar Sadeghi-Boroujerdi, ‘IRGC Publication: Is the Revolutionary 
Guard After War’, Al Monitor, October 12, 2012, available at http://iranpulse.al-
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engender the conditions for convergence and shared interests between the weak Arab 
state, and the foreign backer, in this instance, Iran. 259  
 
Guardianship of the Jurist versus Wahhabism 
The trajectory of Iranian Shia Islamism is intimately linked to that of the clergy. Its 
clerical sociology institutionalises the ulama (influential clerics) and their role in 
government, a notion vehemently opposed by the KSA and Wahhabists. Within post-
revolutionary Iran, the doctrine of velayat e-feqhi (Guardians of the Islamic Jurists) most 
influenced the manner in which the Shia version of Islamism was conceived. This 
doctrine emphasised that the nation would be directly controlled by the Ayatollah, vested 
with all of the power of the Prophet and imams. This unique distinction allowed, for the 
first time, Shia Islamists to “abolish the frontier between political and religious authority” 
and therefore placed supreme political and religious authority in the hands of the 
Ayatollah and his immediate circle of clerics, the ulama. 260  This is the opposite of al-
wala wal-bara practiced by the KSA, which we discussed in chapter 3. King Fahd’s (the 
ruler of the KSA at the time of the Iranian revolution) response to velayat e-feqhi was to 
further tighten the links between the Saudi ulama and the government.261 
 
259 Indeed, Iran’s asymmetric clients are typically an amalgam of fundamentalists, nationally 
oriented militias, or extremist. According to Norton, the political purposes and goals of these 
clients vary and include: an armed group embedded within a broader social movement and series 
of local networks, which possesses an independent political agenda with self-sustaining revenue, 
such as Lebanese Hezbollah; or, an armed group with access to domestic resources especially 
money by intra-elite bargaining, but receiving military training and support from an external 
power; or, an armed client group funded, organized, and trained exclusively by Iran and serving 
the latter’s goals.  According to: Ostovar, Iran Has a Bigger Problem than the West, pp. 11-15. 
260 Laurence Louer, Sunnis and Shia: A Political History, (Princeton University Press). Accessed 




According to Shia theology and narrative, only one of their infallible imams, the Twelfth 
Imam, is eligible to establish and lead a religiously legitimate government.262 Since his 
absence in the 9th century AD, a Muslim sultan is permitted to rule in his stead. In Iranian 
history, the Safavids (1501-1722) were the first dynasty to establish Shi’ism as the 
nation’s religion, and the first dynasty to appoint a sultan as the ruler.263 The second key 
feature of Shia’s narrative is that of Hussein’s martyrdom which involves the concept of 
Jihad.  It is Hussein’s role as a fighter and martyr (at the battle of Karbala) which has 
been codified within Shi’ism: ‘Jihad in the path of the martyrs’.264  In this narrative, Jihad 
in the path of the martyrs will usher in the re-appearance of the hidden Imam Mahdi, 
either before or on the cusp of the apocalypse.  According to this narrative, activism and 
revolutionary situations are to be encouraged in order to hasten the Mahdi’s return, hence 
the revolutionary Jihad and outlook of Khomeini’s Iran.265  
 
Historically, from the Safavid era onwards, the religious authorities and the ruling 
political dynasty cooperated closely.  Once Khomeini assumed power in 1979, he 
elaborated these two concepts further by introducing a concept called maslaha 
(expediency). The principle of maslaha established that if Islamic law contradicted the 
interests of the regime, then the ruling jurist – the Ayatollah – had the religious authority 
 
262 The Twelfth Imam is a messianic figure within Shia doctrine, known as the Mahdi (Lord of 
the Age) who is believed to be in occultation until Resurrection Day. 
263 Mehdi Khalaji, ‘Iran’s Regime of Religion’, Journal of International Affairs, Vol.65, No.1, 
Inside the Authoritarian State, 2011, pp. 131-147. 
264 Kendall, Twenty-First Century Jihad, p. 148.  
265 Ibid, p. 151.  
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to overrule it.266 The political implications of this are vast, and according to Khalaji, 
equated the Ayatollah as the Supreme Leader.267 These three concepts within velayat e-
feqi - Jihad in the path of the martyrs, the Supreme Leader, and maslaha (expediency) -  
present an ideological and legitimacy challenge to the KSA’s leadership of the Muslim 
world. 268 Their effect has been a transformation of revolutionary convenient religion into 
a symbolic form of identity and legitimacy amongst the indigenous Iranians, and also to 
large numbers of Shia across the wider Middle East. The expansion and monopolisation 
of the Shia religion has allowed Iran to dramatically increase the size of its supporters 
inside and outside Iran. At its most extreme, these concepts underpin the conditions for 
‘ideological fitna’ between Iran and the KSA.269 Indeed, this chapter will now go on to 
demonstrate the behavioural difficulties encountered by the KSA, in that both the KSA 
and Iran have a heavy reliance on their respective religious establishments for the 
legitimacy of their identity. It follows then that neither has much discretion in countering 
the other, and that they must either win, lose, or engage in perpetual Jihad, which might 
be considered both winning and losing. As Zubaida notes, “The sectarian dimension now 
engulfs both internal struggles and rebellions and international relations: ours is becoming 
the era of sectarian Jihads”.270   
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Similarly, with the evolution of the KSA’s response to external identity challenges - by 
Nasserism and subsequently by Political Islamists -  the interpretation of al-wala wa-l-
bara has evolved in response to regional political events, to avoid a repeat of the pitfalls 
of the 19th century civil-war.271 Its collapse caused Wahhabi religious scholars to adopt 
an attitude of quietism to the state and the ruling King, resulting in a strictly social 
interpretation of al-wala wa-l-bara. 272  This behavioural change allows considerable 
freedom to the modern rulers of the KSA, a key component of its discursive power when 
conducting internal and external balancing with non-state ideological actors. In its 
religious scholarly form, it has been used effectively as a component of the KSA’s 
discursive strategy against pan-Arabists, Political Islamists, more recently against Salafi-
Jihadists, and also against post-revolutionary Iran. 273  Indeed, what we discover by 
examining the KSA’s behavioural responses to the Iranian revolution and specific Iranian 
policies is that al-wala wa-l-bara provides the KSA with a cultural ‘fire-break’. That is, 
it allows for a bottom-up method for severing the perpetual radicalization of tawhid and 
takfir. Viewed in this way, the threat perception and conflict escalation between the KSA 
and Iran is very neatly encapsulated by both the second and third generation of strategic 
cultural scholars. It allows for understanding why and how critical junctures as strategic 
shocks can be born of ‘otherness’ and allow for escalation; whilst also encapsulating 
Johnston and other third generation scholars of the strategic culture method advocate that 
it (that is, the method) provides an ideational milieu which consists of … “shared 
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assumptions that impose a degree of order…on group conceptions…whose dominant 
culture emphasizes preserving the status quo”.274 
 
Fixed or Incremental cultural factors: tipping points between status quo and strategic 
shocks. 
Notwithstanding the historical and theological significance of the sectarian divide, the 
KSA’s identity – as the source of its legitimacy – has evolved in order to remain unique 
and incontrovertible to its audience.275 Its claim to be the Guardians of Sunni Islam 
created vulnerability to other evolving models of Islamism as evidenced by its 
behavioural responses to the Muslim Brotherhood’s ascendancy, with Nasser’s pan-
Arabism, and the evolution of Salafi-Jihadism. Post-Revolutionary Iran created an 
additional challenge to the KSA’s uniqueness and distinctiveness. At the macro level, 
Khomeini adopted a pan-Islamic identity marker similar to that of 1970s the KSA. The 
KSA responded by narrowing its own source of distinctive legitimacy by narrowly 
focussing its uniqueness on Wahhabism and conservative interpretations of Sunni Islam 
more broadly. Iran therefore became the ‘Shi’ite other’.276  
 
Khomeini’s idea of the velayat-e feqih, the supremacy of his clerical politics over cultural 
and social aspects of society, and with expediency to flex within the confines of Islam, 
provided ideological legitimacy to a form of Islamic governance that was opposed to 
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Western “usurpation of Islam”.277 In many ways, Khomeini’s revolution as a “fight for 
the liberation of the oppressed” resonated well with Marxist and socialist groups within 
Iran.278  Thus, the revolution’s reach moved beyond its own borders and constructed 
alliances among disenfranchised actors across the region, in traditional Arab (and mostly 
Sunni) lands. 279  One of its principal aims was to eradicate the borders of the Middle East, 
defy the concept of the nation-state, and thereby depose Arab leaders in the process.280 
This would place Iran at the centre of a new regional order providing the Muslims of the 
Middle East, disillusioned with Western ideologies of nationalism and replaced with a 
new socialist pan-Islamic model. 
 
Protecting the revolution was a military and cultural enterprise that went beyond the 
borders of Iran, and the way it was established provided the ways and means for liberation 
groups unaligned to other states “to emancipate themselves from the alien, non-Islamic 
oppression – both in the socio-political and cultural spheres”.281 Establishing alliances 
would therefore be a critical behavioural tool in strengthening velayat e-feqhi outside 
Iran’s borders, and as we have already noted, maslaha (expediency) provides the 
Ayatollah – the Supreme Leader – with behavioural flexibility.  This flexibility allows 
religious identity and beliefs to influence Iran’s approach to foreign relationships, but not 
to necessarily dictate them. And according to Ostovar, religion matters little in Iran’s 
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state-to-state relationships, but it does figure much more prominently in its relationships 
and behaviour with non-state-actors.282  
 
As the region has grown more sectarian (for example, since the 2003 war in Iraq the 2011 
Arab Spring), Iran’s foreign policy behaviour has also become more sectarian, partly a 
response to the rise of the KSA aligned non-state Sunni actors.283 Accordingly, Iranian 
strategic leaders regard the velayat-e-faqih as a divine office whose legitimacy is 
bestowed by the Imam Mahdi. This clerical elitism is diametrically opposite to 
Wahhabism. It causes particular difficulties to the KSA whose state creation was 
significantly reliant on a similar ideological concept - Ibn Saud’s creation and 
mobilisation of the ikhwan which conquered the Arabian Peninsula – in pursuit of 
ideologically different ends, namely the purification of Islam by emphasising Tawhid, the 
Oneness of God.284   
 
 
THE SIMILARITY OF ‘OTHERNESS’: ANOTHER SAUDI PARADOX 
According to some scholars, Khomeini did not necessarily intend for his revolution and 
its subsequent foreign policy behaviour to become framed as a Shia identity.285 Rather, 
his initial vision was for Iran to become the vanguard for other revolutionary groups 
seeking to overthrow oppressive regimes. Yet, the vast majority of Iranians are Shia 
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Muslims compared to the vast majority of Arab nations being Sunni Muslims, and 
therefore Khomeini’s revolutionary ideology – in particular the system of velayat-e faqih 
– does build upon Political Shi’ism.286 His pan-Islamic ideology was framed in binary 
terms: oppressors versus the oppressed. The notion of liberation was therefore a distinctly 
important feature. Khomeini made the distinction between the “true message of Islam” 
against “distorted versions”, rather than Shia interpretation against the Sunni 
interpretation. Indeed, he regarded divisions amongst Muslims as a product of these 
“distorted versions”, a product of a Western designed conspiracy to subjugate Islamic 
nations, to which certain regional actors – especially the KSA – are complicit. 287 
Khomeini therefore places Iran within his idea of ‘true Islam’, and the KSA on the side 
of the US dissenters. Khomeini’s ideology called for unity among Muslims in their 
resistance against foreign domination.288   
 
Initially, Khomeini’s revolutionary ideology did attract some support from non-state 
Sunni actors. However, Iran’s identity as the Arab’s main ‘other’ was emphasized by 
Sunni leaders, and developments in Sunni religious doctrine such as the gradual increase 
of Wahhabi influence from the KSA, resulted in non-state Sunni actors increasingly 
disagreeing with Khomeni’s “distorted versions”, and instead denouncing revolutionary 
Iran as Shia heretics. 289  Khomeini then increasingly framed Iran’s struggle in Shia 
religious symbolism, which had the unintended consequence of again emphasising Iran’s 
otherness to the Arabs, and the KSA in particular.  
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This Iranian discourse is paradoxically reminiscent of post-colonial pan-Arabism which 
we discussed in chapter 3. That is, Iranian foreign and security policy confirm its image 
as an expansionist ‘other’, which evidences Arab distrust. Therefore, Iran’s foreign and 
security policy behaviour to the KSA and other Arab countries supports the perception of 
Iran as a non-Arab other, seeking to take advantage of divisions in Arabia in order to 
expand its influence. 290 The concept of Iranian otherness is an enduring and contested 
issue, specifically regarding its national identity and the relationship between this identity 
and the state.291  
 
Post-revolutionary Iran has developed a distinct identity, generally accepted as being 
dominated by Khomeini’s velayat-e feqhi, but also contested by other national actors, in 
particular the exiled monarchists, and the Green Movement. Iran’s leaders and the exiled 
monarchists insist that their interpretation of national identity is the authentic one. The 
former emphasises religion (Shi’ism) and the latter ethnicity (Persian). So, just as the 
KSA seeks its unique identity and has evolved in response to or in anticipation of events, 
so has post-revolutionary Iran.292 The successful revolution of 1979 has allowed Iran’s 
rulers to control all levers of power. With its noteworthy velayat-e feqhi political system, 
the rulers have constructed an identity that places the supremacy of the state over the 
nation. In fact, when the Islamic Republic was established in 1979, it ended a 250-year 
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identity-emphasis based on Persian ethnicity and identity. It was replaced by Shia 
Islamism, with an emphasis on the “ideal Islamic community of the seventh century”.293 
And therefore directly competing with conservative Sunni leaders. Fearing domestic or 
instability within its own sphere of influence, the KSA responded by highlighting 
differences not only between Sunni and Shia, but also between Arab and Persian. The 
point being that sectarian and ethnic policies seem to generate a cycle of responses that 
can eventually lead to a – desired or undesired – situation of fitna. 294  
 
Significantly insofar as it concerns this chapter’s secondary research question, the KSA-
Iranian behaviour highlights the ‘juxtaposition of the features of cooperation alongside 
persistent conflict’ within the KSA.295  Understanding this source of tension, and its 
impact upon executive power, and the impact non-state identities has – bottom up – on 
the KSA’s decision making, allows us to interpret patterns of strategic behaviour and 
therefore trends in the conduct of conflict or coercion during times of war and peace. 
These areas of strategic culture are of significant importance in the context of 
understanding the factors that determine strategic behaviour in the KSA’s sphere of 
influence. This is an intriguing discovery that suggests the possibility of strategic cultural 
change over time, as posited by Glenn, Berger, et al.   
 
In security terms, the rise of Khomeini’s Islamism presented a significant challenge to 
the KSA. Khomeini sought to discredit the KSA’s leadership credentials, and its own 
religious beliefs. Khomeini also took aim at the KSA’s interpretation of al-wala-wa-l-
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bara doctrine, which we discussed in chapter 3 and earlier in this chapter, specifically the 
division of politics and religion that had been adjusted by the Wahhabi leaders out of 
pragmatism following the demise of the second Saudi state in the nineteenth century. All 
of these circumstances necessitated a behavioural response from the KSA in order to 
separate them from the now generic pan-Islamic rhetoric adopted by Khomeini. 296 
Accordingly, the KSA narrowed its identity further, to a distinctly Sunni approach which 
provided religiously derived doctrinal opportunities over Iran. In so doing, the KSA 
reinvigorated a sectarian discursive power.297 Sectarian language became more explicit 
in the KSA’s discursive behaviour, with accusations of takfir (heresy) levelled at 
Khomeini’s Shia revolution. The KSA framed revolutionary Iran outside of the Sunni 
community and therefore, by extension of being polytheists, they became legitimate 
targets of Jihad. Sectarianism became again useful in highlighting the KSA’s religious 
uniqueness, and therefore since 1979 has strongly featured within its foreign and security 
policy behaviour. The KSA adopted a discourse of exclusion, based on its own pursuit of 
religious legitimacy and uniqueness. Sectarianism became the strategy for re-establishing 
the KSA’s distinctiveness and its leadership. Religious legitimacy once again became the 
primary arm of state for influencing the behaviour of other actors. 298  
 
This evolution of the KSA’s identity – the KSA’s distinctiveness has required 
adjustments to its own self of identity on three occasions as a result of pan-Arabism, 
Sunni Islamism, and now pan-Islamism - is extremely interesting in predicting its 
strategic behaviour. This claim may sound perplexing given the prevailing wisdom by 
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Realist definitions of the KSA’s behaviour as predominantly irrational and unpredictable, 
the exact opposite.299 The available literature does indeed demonstrate that the KSA’s 
behaviour was not the inevitable result of sectarian schisms within Islam, but rather that 
it – sectarianism - is an effective strategic tool weaponised by leaders.300  
 
Others are less cynical yet do concede the inevitability of a sectarian discourse.301 Nasr, 
for example, concluded that formerly dominant concepts used to study the Middle East, 
such as modernity, democracy, fundamentalism, and nationalism were no longer 
sufficient to explain the region’s politics.  Yet he blames the unleashing of intrinsic 
religious factors as being responsible for the recent upsurge in sectarian conflict.302  Other 
scholars suggest that politicians manipulate sectarianism to achieve political goals. 
Sectarianisation in this context is distinctly different to the majority of scholarly literature 
which emphasises sectarianism as a static trans-historical, enduring and immutable 
force.303  This is an important distinction in the KSA’s strategic culture.  Sectarianisation 
requires authoritarianism. Sectarianism, on the other hand, is theological.  This section 
demonstrates how different national leaders – authoritarian or theological – apply 
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sectarianisation as a strategic tool, normally in the guise of identity politics.304  Sectarian 
identities are able to be mobilised because of differences in belief and their historical 
narratives which means that radicalisation can occur because the threshold is already low.  
 
For the KSA, the dominant discovered trend is that its politics is intimately concerned 
with survival strategies. Its leaders are fundamentally concerned with both their staying 
power and political survival. 305  Commonly, social and political cleavages are 
manipulated, providing short term strategic options, albeit often at the expense of long-
term social cohesion.306 Religious intolerances are used to justify the degree of violence 
required to perpetuate the regime’s continued power.307 As Gause has noted, the objective 
is to expand their own regional influence, not to seek a decisive military victory.308  
 
Therefore, while religious identities are more salient in the politics of the Middle East 
today than previously, this thesis’ discovery is the extent to which these identities have 
been politicised by state actors in pursuit of political gain. Cultural factors like takfir and 
tawhid are accelerated, and then other cultural doctrines, specifically al-wala wa-l-bara, 
provide occasionally effective de-escalatory firebreaks.  Moreover, perhaps 
authoritarianism is the key to understanding this problem, as several scholars have 
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demonstrated, the sectarianisation process involves the ‘cultivation of hatred’309 along 
cultural lines. It is a deliberate strategy, and despite its constructed character, 
sectarianisation has the potential to become a self-fulfilling prophecy. Indeed, some of 
the literature suggests it is an unintended consequence unique to the Arab world.310 They 
also identify that there is no ‘trans-historical sectarianism’.311  There are, instead, specific 
sectarian episodes that come about for a number of interrelated ideological, political, 
economic, and cultural reasons. But be that as it may, once ‘securitised’ sectarian 
identities assume a life of their own, permeating identity politics and public discourse, 
and feeding on state weakness and civil wars, with devastating consequences for the 
territorial integrity and national unity of a number of Arab states.312 
 
SUMMARY 
This chapter’s purpose was to analyse the KSA’s response to the Iranian revolution of 
1979 with specificity on the role of those cultural thought-ways associated with identity-
anxiety and threat perception. This would allow a better understand of the relationship 
between intra-Islamic competition and the KSA’s strategic behaviour. This chapter has 
discovered that the relationships between the KSA’s strategic culture – specifically 
insofar as religion is concerned - and strategy is not fixed or resistant to change. Indeed, 
an intriguing discovery suggests the possibility of strategic cultural change over time, 
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whereby norms and narratives can be adjusted incrementally, eventually accumulating 
‘critical juncture’ status.  Indeed, this chapter has discovered the extent to which – as 
suggested by Berger and Glenn assume - politico-military strategy is directly linked to 
domestic cultural factors to a considerable degree.   
 
This chapter has also noted that this behaviour is not resistant to change. Specifically, 
takfir and tawhid are significant cultural doctrines that accelerate a process of escalation, 
given certain context and circumstances. Indeed, this chapter has discovered the 
parameters of acceptable change for the Saudi leadership, and the extent to which some 
of its cultural thought-ways and norms, specifically those inferred by Wahhabism, may 
actually be pre-determined, albeit they remain susceptible to incrementalism or strategic 
shocks.  
 
In general terms, this chapter has concluded that the KSA-Iranian, and therefore Sunni-
Shia tensions are not necessarily ancient or deep-rooted.  Indeed, both Saudi and Iranian 
regimes heighten or downplay them as the need arises, strategically. The KSA has no 
historical anti-Shia policy per se, but they do have anti-opposition policies.  
 
A paradox has emerged in understanding how sectarianism is employed and controlled 
by those employing it as a strategic behavioural tool, and the difficulty posed in pursuing 
a less-violent political reality. The literature demonstrates that sectarianism may exist 
practically along each conflict fault-line in the Middle East, carefully and consistently 
constructed along regional, national, and local political realities.  This construction is a 
by-product of post-Revolutionary Iran’s velayat e-feqhi, with its doctrinal emphasis on 
Jihad, maslaha (expediency), and the role of the Supreme Leader over politics and 
religion. This doctrine creates identity anxiety to the KSA on a number of levels, but in 
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particular that of its own cultural levers: Wahhabism and its broader leadership role within 
Sunni Islam. 
 
Pronunciations of takfir against each other result in the radicalisation of ideologues, 
militias, proxies – depending on their geography and cultural affinity with Iran – which 
become the KSA’s behavioural ways. These behavioural responses have similarities to 
other external identity challenges discussed in earlier chapters - by Nasserism, Political 
Islamists, Salafi-Jihadists, and now by Iranian concepts and doctrine. The KSA has 
evolved its own cultural thought-ways, in particular the reinterpretation of religious 
concepts and doctrine in response. The interpretation and evolution of al-wala wa-l-bara, 
for example, in response to regional political events and to avoid a repeat of the pitfalls 
of the 19th century civil-war that led to the collapse of the second Saudi state, is a clear 
and simple demonstration of this.  
 
This behavioural flexibility allows some freedom to the modern rulers of the KSA, a key 
component of its discursive power when conducting internal and external balancing with 
non-state ideological actors. In its religious scholarly form, Wahhabism has been used 
effectively as a component of the KSA’s discursive strategy.313 The extent to which this 
implies a strategic culture which prioritises anti-opposition policies over ‘defence of the 
Sunni faithful’ policies will be considered next, in chapter 5’s case studies. For example, 
as al-Yassini notes, “excluding external factors, the survival of the royal family depends 
on its ability to convert tensions into balances and to maintain control over the religious 
and secular establishments”.314  
 
313  Timothy D Sisk, Between Terror and Tolerance: Religious Leaders, Conflict, and 
Peacemaking, (Georgetown University Press), 2011. 
314 Ayman Al-Yassini, Religion and State in the KSA, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1985), p. 23. 
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Given the importance of Islam to both states as tools of legitimacy it is easy to see how 
moves by either Iran or the KSA can have ramifications for the other.  This directly shapes 
the behaviour of those sub-state stakeholders acting along ideological lines.  This 
behaviour can be either soft, or as we have seen in Yemen, Lebanon, Syria and Iraq, 
increasingly hard.  This sub-state soft and hard power encapsulates the security dilemma 
confronting both the KSA and Iran.  The mosaic of these threats presents unique 
challenges to the KSA’s rulers, both internally and externally.  The location and nature 
of a particular threat will determine the response, and more often than not, this response 
will impact upon a different stakeholder altogether.  Some of these stakeholders, as we 
have already noted, have trans-state agendas that therefore can impact somewhere 
seemingly unconnected.  Furthermore, the challenges posed by the various sub-state 
groups demonstrate how the KSA is susceptible to the actions of others.  When these sub-
state stakeholders are of a sectarian disposition – such as the IRGC analysed briefly in 
this chapter - the threats and conflicts that subsequently ensue can become perpetual and 
intractable.   
 
The final deduction of interest to the research question relates to the inevitability or not 
of sectarian conflict within the Middle East. The research has demonstrated that 
sectarianism is not an inherent historical quality of the Arabs in general, or the KSA in 
particular. Rather, sectarian entrepreneurs continue to flourish and benefit from this 
narrative.  Or in other words, sectarianism is a modern phenomenon exploited by those 
that equate autocracy with security: avoiding a Hobbesian fitna (which we also discussed 
in chapter 3). Of particular interest to this thesis is how Iran’s strategic ways (ideological, 
sectarian, hegemonic, and revolutionary) create a security dilemma for the KSA and also 
for itself.   
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Indeed, how this security dilemma can have unintended consequences born of a 
complicated chain of causation.  Central to these unintended consequences are the 
stakeholders themselves, that do not behave as unitary or unified actors. This chapter has 
demonstrated that the sub-state or non-state actors are often responsible for this chain of 
causation and therefore have a direct impact on the creation of a security dilemma.  In 
particular the plethora of identities and ideologies existing within the region often create 
internal security dilemmas for Iran and Saudi Arabia that complicate escalation dynamics 
between them. Whilst the literature demonstrates a willingness to avoid conventional 
conflict by the KSA and Iran, their willingness to become decisively engaged with other 
actors is a significant security dilemma that has not yet constrained the KSA’s strategic 
behaviour. That is, the literature demonstrates that the risk posed by continued 
radicalisation and empowerment of non-state actors aligned to the KSA’s cause, is 
outweighed by their threat-perception of Iran, and in particular, post-revolutionary Iran’s 
identity-proximity to the KSA. This dilemma is significant. It could give new meaning to 
the hackneyed expression of proxy warfare perpetrated by the KSA insofar as assuming 
that proxy warfare along ideological, sectarian or tribal lines is always state controlled. 
 
Likewise, this chapter has noted the ambiguity of ‘state control’ over non-state 
stakeholders, and the implications of these forces being unleashed as a tool of statecraft. 
For example, retaining a physical and ideological buffer against accusations of takfir 
defines a nation’s willingness to become overtly engaged beyond anything other than 
‘strategically aligned and engaged by proxy’.  Chapter 5 will now go on to explore some 
of these deductions further, by examining two case studies: contemporary Syria, and 






The previous chapters have examined the strategic culture of the Saudi state, so far by 
exploring the link between identity, threat perception, alliance formation and behaviour. 
In so doing, these chapters have recurringly noted the importance of ideologically aligned 
non-state actors and other stakeholders in the execution of Saudi policy. This chapter will 
examine the trends in this causal link – in terms of strategic culture – between the KSA 
and non-state actors, in particular by focusing on the scholarly literature surrounding 
sectarian non-state actors. As noted by Klein, since culture need not solely apply to states, 
neither must strategic culture remain the preserve of states. 315  Indeed, according to 
Longhurst and Macmillan, any actor able to employ violence may have strategic culture 
so long as they are strategic actors.316  
 
Therefore, the chapter’s sole research question is: to what extent does the KSA’s state-
sponsored sectarianism and sectarianisation (which we discussed in chapters 3 and 4) 
seek to align itself with - or coercively create the conditions for alignment with - non-
state actors and stakeholders, with their own culture, in pursuit of its own behavioural 
outcomes? It is a particularly important aspect in determining the link between the KSA’s 
strategic culture and its strategic behaviour. Whilst this chapter is primarily focused on 
the behavioural impacts connected to the security aspects of the KSA’s grand strategy, 
chapters 1 and 2 of this thesis noted how the KSA’s utility of a coercive form of discursive 
 
315 Bradley S Klein, Hegemony and strategic culture: American power projection and alliance 
defence politics, (Review of International Studies 14:02), pp. 133-148; and Edward Last, 
Strategic Culture and Violent Non-State Actors, (Routledge, 2021). 
316 Longhurst and Macmillan, Strategic Culture and British Grand Strategy, (Department of 
International Politics, University of Wales, Aberystwyth, 1996). 
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power present it with a paradox in attempting to balance those relationships and alliances 
it deems vital to its own survival, and its regional position, in grand strategic terms. 
 
This chapter will briefly examine two critical junctures in the KSA’s history: the role of 
the KSA in supporting the mujahedeen against the Soviets in Afghanistan during the 
1980s; and the role of the KSA in the Arab Spring and its fallout. These case studies will 
focus specifically on the links between those cultural factors that influence the KSA’s 
foreign and security policy – for example, identity proximity and threat perception – and 
the KSA’s strategic choices in empowering sectarian aligned non-state actors as its 
behavioural ways. Of interest to this thesis is what Klein refers to as a non-state actors’ 
“accumulated strategic traditions”, enacted and discursive, that enable or constrain 
strategic violence.317 In particular the interaction between the KSA’s strategic narrative – 
its discursive power – and cultural practices.  
 
As we outlined in chapter 2, and according to Neumann and Heikka, studies of strategic 
culture have tended to focus primarily on the ideational aspects and neglect the role of 
human agency in determining the actual link between culture and behaviour.318 In chapter 
2 we noted that much of the literature posits that strategic culture emerges during 
formative periods and is thus slow to change. For example, we noted that Johnston’s 
“ideational milieu” incorporates a combination of variables which allow for a positivist 
and measurable approach to strategic culture. 319  Johnston is attempting to separate 
 
317 Bradley S Klein, ‘Hegemony and strategic culture: American power projection and alliance 
defence politics’, Review of International Studies 14:02, pp. 133-148. 
318 Neumann Iver, and Heikka Henrikki, ‘Grand Strategy, Strategic Culture, Practice: The Social 
Roots of Nordic Defence’, Cooperation and Conflict 40:1, pp. 5-23. 
319 Alastair Johnson, ‘Thinking About Strategic Culture’, International Security 19:4, pp. 32-64. 
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strategic culture from other factors in order to demonstrate a ranking of choices from 
which behaviour can be predicted.  The extent to which Johnson’s approach undervalues 
the role of influential human activity in the reshaping of narratives, and equally of 
strategic shocks and events in the reconstruction or acceleration of change, will be 
examined in this chapter. This latter factor is particularly acute for non-state actors. We 
will explore the extent to which the link between the KSA’s state narrative, and seeking 
to control non-state actors or proxies, and the relative success or failure of their overall 
strategy.  Last considers the stronger the correlation between narrative and behaviour 
suggests that narrative is a more dominant element of strategic culture.320 The extent to 
which the KSA has elevated religious patronage at the expense of the more traditional 
tribal patronage in pursuit of its dominant narrative, able to influence the behaviour of 
others in a preferable manner, becomes more evident throughout the case studies, as we 
will see. 
 
In weak states, politics concerns survival strategies. State leaders are fundamentally 
concerned with both their staying power and political survival. Commonly, social and 
political cleavages are manipulated, providing short term strategic options, albeit often at 
the expense of long-term social cohesion, and often executed via non-state actors.321 
Weak states, as we noted in earlier chapters, are more prone to sectarianisation because 
manipulating identity is a dominant feature of their politics. That is, ethnical religious 
intolerances are used to justify the degree of violence required to perpetuate power.322  
For example, Yemen, Iraq, and Lebanon are the battlegrounds in the Iranian-Saudi rivalry 
 
320 Edward Last, Strategic Culture and Violent Non-State Actors, (Routledge, 2021), p. 8. 
321 Vali Nasr, The Shia Revival, p. 30. 
322 David Little, Religion, Nationalism and Intolerance, pp. 10-30. 
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in recent years however the conflict in Syria has become the ground zero. 323  Both 
countries are heavily invested in the Syrian civil-war.  The political stakes and 
consequences are high, depending on which side prevails.324 This helps to explain why 
the civil war continues now into its seventh year with “omnidirectional sectarianism”325: 
state and socially generated, fuelled by regional forces. We will explore this in more detail 
shortly. 
 
Likewise, in 1980’s Afghanistan, the Soviet invasion in 1979 led the transnational Islamic 
organisations (the MWL and OIC) to issue calls for Jihad against Afghanistan’s 
occupation.326  This gave the conflict a religious dimension that would mobilise colossal 
levels of state and non-state resources from the KSA especially.  With its involvement in 
Afghanistan, the KSA moved from passive and financial support to a militant approach 
towards pan-Islamism, an evolution from its traditionally more hands-off approach.  
These two cases will situate political violence in its proper cultural and behavioural 
context. They will demonstrate that the behaviour of sectarian-motivated non-state actors 
was, in these instances, “culturally predicated”, and how these norms shaped their aims 
and ultimately their behaviour. 327  Therefore, the extent to which it is the frame of 
reference within which sectarian-motivated non-state actors develop and employ their 
 
323 Yusri Hazran, ‘The Shiite Community in Lebanon: From Marginalization to Ascendency’, 
Middle East brief, 2009, p. 39. 
324 Justin Gengler, Group Conflict and Political Mobilisation, (Indiana University Press, 2014), 
p. 57. 
325 Paulo Pinto, Ethnographies of Islam, (Edinburgh University Press, 2016), p. 16. 
326 Bruce Riedel, What We Won, (Brookings Institution Press, 2014).  
327  Godson and Shultz in Edward Last, Strategic Culture and Violent Non-State Actors, 
(Routledge, 2021), p. 28. 
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own behavioural strategies is important in judging the utility of strategic culture as a 
model for understanding, and even predicting KSA’s strategic behaviour.     
 
CASE STUDY 1: KSA IN AFGHANISTAN - MUTATION OR CONTROL OF THE 
NARRATIVE 
In December 1979, Soviet military forces intervened in Afghanistan, at the request of 
Kabul’s communist and vassal government. Over the next ten years, thousands of Saudi 
nationals, and other Arabs, joined the calls for Jihad alongside Afghan Muslims resisting 
the Soviets. The KSA’s rulers – both the political and religious establishments – played 
a critical role, in coordination with the US and Pakistan – in sponsoring and enabling the 
passage of these volunteers to Afghanistan. Though the military contribution of these 
Saudi nationals was judged to be minimal in terms of tactical impact against the Soviets, 
the links between narrative, state control over non-state actors, and subsequent behaviour 
of these actors is profound.328 Indeed, the linkage between strategic culture, strategic 
behaviour, and the mutation of the cultural narrative surrounding identity viz-a-vis 
doctrinal concepts such as Jihad, is extremely informative. 
 
The existing literature on the subject of the strategic culture of the ‘Arab Afghans’ is 
relatively sparse. Two notable exceptions are Hegghammer and Sela.329 Hegghammer’s 
focus is primarily on the role the Saudi state played in orchestrating pan-Islamic charities 
to enable logistical and financial needs of the individuals, while Sela has written 
 
328 Avraham Sela, Nonstate actors in Intrastate Conflicts, (University of Pennsylvania Press, 
2014), pp. 56-58. 
329 For example, see: Thomas Hegghammer, ‘Jihadi Culture’, 2010; Avraham Sela, State, Society, 
and Transnational Networks: The Arab Volunteers in the Afghan War, (University of 
Pennsylvania Press), 2014. 
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extensively on the KSA’s role in promoting a new Jihadist ideology, the frame of 
reference for the volunteers themselves.330 These scholars generally conclude that the 
KSA’s eagerness to support the United States’ anti-Soviet campaign was possible because 
of a rare alignment in desired strategic ends by the US, the KSA, and the social needs of 
other actors. This coalescence was a result of common ideological recognition that the 
highly valued fard ayn (Islamic duty to protect fellow Muslims) against the Soviets 
provided substantial political and social benefits. Hegghammer and Sela both note how 
the floating boundaries between deeply meshed cultural relationships allow paradoxical 
conditions, which shift according to circumstances and interest-based calculations.  
These flexible relationships between ‘sponsor’ and ‘executor’ can become antagonistic 
and hostile, but they can also be mutually constitutive and cooperative. 331  The 
competition between the Saudi state and other social actors manifests itself in a repeatedly 
shifting alliance, where the actors, including the Saudi state, maximise their respective 
interests.332  
 
Non-state actors such as the Muslim World League and Organisation of Islamic 
Conference on the one hand, and Salafi-Jihadi groups on the other, commonly assert 
themselves through dynamic interactions locally and regionally. By design, the KSA’s 
sponsorship of non-state actors requires them to operate in an internationalised arena, in 
order to support the KSA’s pursuit of identity-hegemony – noting that the scope and 
precise definition of its identity has altered following critical junctures in its history, some 




332 Joel Migdal, Strong Societies and Weak States, (Princeton University Press, 1988), pp. 27-28. 
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revolutionary, fundamentalist, ideological or other politico-religious objectives, and are 
therefore highly likely to foster alternative ideologies that compete with the KSA’s 
identity.  
 
In many instances, the Saudi state cannot sufficiently placate those who demand a more 
extreme interpretation of the state’s identity, especially when this identity is so heavily 
contested by other outside powers (for example, those discussed in chapters 3 and 4). This 
contested model underlines the gaps between the self-image of the KSA as the legitimate 
and unitary leader, and its actual character as a state required to balance several non-state 
actors with multifaceted interests, in particular the competing narratives, practices and 
norms associated with the Salaf, as we noted in chapter 3.333 Much of the available 
literature notes how the Saudi state established and cultivated separate relationships with 
individual Islamist stakeholders. Thus, despite their claim to be trans-national actors, 
these different stakeholders had political or diplomatic leverage with the KSA. 334 During 
this Afghan Jihad, this linkage helped to bind the behaviour of non-state actors to the 
strategic culture of the KSA. Yet inevitably this link became fraught with risk which we 
will now explore.   
 
Saudi support for the Afghan resistance did not reach significant proportions until the 
mid-1980s, and notably, in an attempt to avoid blowback, the KSA ensured that the vast 
majority of official Saudi support to the ‘defensive Jihad’ went to the Afghans, via the 
regionally aligned experts, the Pakistani ISI. However, the key point is that the political 
opportunities for mobilising willing volunteers were excellent, and the state ensured that 
 
333 Shiraz Maher, Salafi-Jihadism, (Hurst, 2016), p. 156. 
334 Roy, Hegghammer, Last, Sela, Maher all conclude similarly. 
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volunteers could travel unimpeded via the OIC and MWL. That the resistance to the 
Soviets became so effective encouraged the KSA to expand the state’s enthusiasm for 
Arab volunteers to travel to Afghanistan.  The Kingdom’s pan-Islamic offensive, thus, 
gave the regime a further legitimacy boost as champion of Muslim causes and liberator 
of Muslim lands.  So, a documented foreign policy success, and a successful enterprise 
in further cementing state religious legitimacy, domestically and internationally. 335  
Hegghammer notes the enthusiasm for waging covert proxy war, along ideological lines 
could be more successful without the risk of becoming decisively engaged and committed 
publicly to a specific strategic course of action, if waging a conventional conflict.336  
 
According to Keppel, for most Saudis that went to Afghanistan in the 1980s, Jihad was 
about fard ayn - repelling infidels in cases of territorial invasion and occupation.337  Yet, 
this strategic vision was not shared by all.  The reasons why this vision was not shared by 
all is of profound importance to the KSA’s leaders.  Groups like al Qaeda were 
ideologically divided.  When Abdulla Azzam and Osama bin Laden created al Qaeda, 
they were united by the Afghan Jihad. Still, their evolution away from defensive to 
offensive Jihad and the formation of al Qaeda created disagreement with their former 
sponsors as to their strategic utility and purpose.  Some al Qaeda groupings, especially 
those from the Maghreb, retained a socio-revolutionary view much closer to that of their 
original ‘founders’, the Muslim Brotherhood and the ideology of Sayyid Qutb.  These 
Jihadists wanted al Qaeda to topple illegitimate Arab governments conceived by them as 
their ‘near’ enemy.  This disagreement did not produce a schism within the early al Qaeda 
 
335 Thomas Hegghammer, Jihad in Saudi Arabia, (Cambridge, 2010), p. 40. 
336 Ibid. 
337 Giles Keppel, Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam, (IB Tauris, 2006), p. 90. 
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movement, but it did leave the question somewhat unresolved which would be re-
examined by another generation of al Qaeda leaders following the 2003 US-led 
intervention in Iraq.338  Yet, insofar as the issue remained unclear in terms of global Jihad 
utility and purpose as a tool of KSA’s statecraft, it had a bearing on the foreign policy of 
KSA’s leaders.339   
 
Abdullah Azzam’s doctrine was controversial, because it advocated universal private 
military participation in territorial disputes between Muslims and non-Muslims, rather 
than leaving it to the populations most concerned by the struggle.  It also represented a 
shift from the socio-revolutionaries towards something more global than local.  
According to Riedel, perhaps one of his greatest achievements was in the creation of his 
Afghanistan Services Bureau in Peshawar, which successfully blurred the lines between 
humanitarian, charitable and militant support to the Afghans.  His achievement was the 
successful evolution of classical Jihadist doctrine and the blurring of the distinction 
between humanitarian and military assistance.  This also has important ‘narrative’ 
connotations.340  According to Hegghammer, 1987 seems to represent the high-water 
mark of the mobilisation of Saudis, by which time recruitment had transcended personal 
social networks and reached all aspects of society.  By 1987 Saudi Jihadism had become 
a social movement, actively encouraged by the KSA’s leaders.341  The Afghan Jihad 
produced a discourse, mythology and symbolic universe which shaped militant Islamist 
activism at that time.  The most crucial factor behind the success of the mobilisation of 
 
338 Keppel, Al Qaeda in its own words, p. 23. 
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340 Riedel, What We Won. 
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 119 
thousands of Arabs to Afghanistan was the articulation, in the early 1980s, of Abdullah 
Azzam’s doctrine of classical Jihad, which offered new and very powerful ideological 
justification for individual involvement in the struggles of other Muslims.  This narrative 
became totemic.342  And because times of war act as a great accelerant, we would see this 
pattern repeated by the 2003 Western intervention into Iraq, and then again with the 
evolution of DAESH amidst the chaos of contemporary Syria and Iraq.   
The chain of causation is clear to see: Qutb, Azzam, bin Laden, Zarqawi, al-Baghdadi.  
Each with a discourse more apocalyptic than his predecessor, and with some literature 
now linking these behavioural and cultural trends with ‘future-casting’.343  This can no 
longer be regarded as an ‘unintended consequence’ of decentralised strategic behaviour, 
decoupled from a sure-footed identity and narrative.344 
 
Many Islamic scholars, including the top religious officials within the KSA, endorsed 
Azzam’s ideology and doctrine around Jihad. The KSA continued to encourage 
volunteers to support the Afghan resistance. The literature suggests this was a cynical 
attempt at deflecting internal troublemakers away from undermining the Saudi Royal 
Family and wider domestic policies; but also, a legitimate attempt to retain control of the 
narrative of defending Islam against infidels. 345  Indeed, the broadly supported 
transformation from defensive to offensive Jihad was successful, and the role of Saudi 
politico-religious figures in enabling this is now considered as being vital. However, 
according to all of the available literature, the KSA’s support for Azzam’s revised 
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ideology of Jihad reflects another paradoxical instance of the KSA appropriating the 
culture of the radical Islamists as a means of strategic containment or coercion.346  
The case of the Saudi volunteers in the Afghan war highlights the multi-faceted 
relationship between culture and behaviour, between the state as a political institution, 
and non-state and state social movements. In this shifting environment, the KSA and non-
state actors alternate between being complicit, being allies, tolerating, cooperating, and 
fighting each other. 
 
MUTATION  
However, the degree to which proxies are able to commandeer narratives and trigger a 
spiral of violence in tandem with a gradual ideological shift to extremism and nihilism 
became defined during this period.  Indeed, as we now know, an unintended consequence 
of the mobilisation in support of the Afghans (against the Soviets) was their shift toward 
extreme pan-Islamism, which would become a potent tool in waging offensive Jihad 
against the Saudi regime themselves. Global Jihad, and its ideological roots, would now 
feature as an existential threat to the Saudis with three strategic responses (generally): 
rehabilitation; counterterrorism; and coercion of Jihadist organisations.347   This final 
factor helps to explain why strategy, and often including the execution of strategy, is 
highly centralised, precisely so as to have greater control over the actions, effects and 
outcomes against non-state actors, audiences, and adversaries. 
 
Indeed, by 1990, only three years after the US’ covert military support to the ‘Arab 
Afghans’ ended, Salafist-Jihadist perspective had shifted, and the idea of Jihad against 
 
346 Last, Violent Non-State Actors. 
347 Hegghammer, Jihadi Culture. 
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the US helped retain unity throughout the organisation. According to Riedel, this shift 
was probably the thread on which the non-state Salafi-Jihadist movements all could agree, 
and crucially, could implement their strategy in accordance with their own narrative.348 
This narrative allowed a disaggregated strategy to be pursued by al Qaeda, and devoid of 
relying on the KSA’s politico-religious leaders to determine, or legitimise it.349  Indeed 
they would now be in competition. To KSA’s strategists, conducting their aggressive 
foreign, security and domestic policies relied heavily on avoiding unwanted backlash and 
a deviation from the narrative now being pursued by al Qaeda.  However, al Qaeda’s 
strategic unity and disaggregation still contained strong calls to focus on their ‘near 
enemies’.  This has led many regional strategists to conclude that al Qaeda’s focus on the 
‘far enemy’ effectively made them revolutionaries in disguise, and their divergence from 
the KSA’s ideological narrative viz-a-vis fard ayn.350   
 
This point raises an important issue in relation to an important norm. That is, to what 
extent does this particular element of Salafi-Jihadist doctrine actually have a 
revolutionary focus versus pan-Islamic ideology? In other words, Azzam’s ideology 
relegates fard ayn in importance. As we have discussed al Qaeda was both a pan-Islamist 
and an intra-Sunni revolutionary organisation, and the tension between these two 
objectives shaped its behaviour, and the behaviour of the KSA’s strategists towards them.  
The pan-Islamist dimension was arguably more important because al Qaeda’s success 
depended on its recruitment and mobilisation of the Umma, which itself relied more on 
anti-Americanism than on fighting their own Arab leaders.  It was necessary for bin Laden 
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and Zawahiri to conceal their long-term plans vis-à-vis the ‘near enemy’, because they 
knew that revolutionary discourse would not mobilise sufficient followers from within 
the KSA.  KSA’s response to al Qaeda, therefore, couldn’t use ‘hard power’ alone, and 
according to Keppel their use of force was relatively measured and targeted and not at all 
‘conventional’ 351 .  Saudi Arabia ran a vast and highly sophisticated propaganda 
campaign, which emphasised al Qaeda’s revolutionary fervour, rather than its anti-
Americanism.  
 
Nevertheless, insofar as it impacts on national or regional security for their strategists, the 
distinction between nationalist and socio-revolutionary ideologies within Arabia suggests 
there is a difference between conflict dynamics based on religion on the one hand and 
those based on socio-revolutionary phenomena (such as the ‘Arab spring’) on the other 
hand. This cultural and ideological schism within the KSA’s narrative became the new 
point of contention between KSA’s narrative and its behaviour when this behaviour is 
‘decentralised’.352 
This had a normative impact on bloody sectarian conflicts and the narratives and 
discourse of violent non-state actors (such as al Qaeda), and transformed sectarian 
groupings into paramilitary ones, serving a higher (ideological) purpose.  What was 
regarded as rare in Afghanistan during the 1980s had now become common-place across 
the wider Middle East region.353 That it failed to achieve any of its objectives is also very 
illustrative in explaining the chain of causation that would ultimately conclude with the 
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creation of more militant Salafi-Jihadist phenomenon.354 That said, it was also this period 
that demonstrated the Jihadist’ movements inability to seriously threaten the KSA 
regime.   
Domestically, the KSA was ruthlessly effective at disrupting and pursuing extremist 
Jihadist networks, but ideologically, al Qaeda’s new interpretation of Jihad combined 
Qutb’s defensive Jihad with Azzam’s neoclassical concept of Jihad in the defence of 
Muslim lands, which then evolved into offensive Jihad against the West. This mutation 
only occurred following their strategic failure at home, against Saudi’s rulers, which we 
noted in earlier chapters. In terms of strategic culture this is extremely interesting, 
especially the linking of narrative and threat perception, with the behaviour of non-state 
actors. Those who conform remained within the protection and general orbit of KSA, 
whilst those that did not conform would become ideologically isolated. It suggests that 
Globalized Islamic Jihad should be viewed as the result of the strength of the strategic 
freedom of manoeuvre afforded by la-wala w-la-bara to the Saudi state, its narrative, and 
its ability to coerce non-state actors. In the case of the Afghan war of the 1980s, the KSA 
successfully contained domestic Islamist and Jihadist organisations, neutralized active 
extremists by exporting them, harshly neutralizing those that subsequently returned to the 
country and by externalizing any remaining identity-competition by contending that 
Azzam’s followers were anti-state, imbued with a radical ideology, and with a broader 
anarchic global (and crucially, not solely anti-KSA) agenda.355 
 
CASE STUDY 2. SYRIA. PROXIES: STATE CONTROL MECHANISMS  
 
354 Maher, Salafi-Jihadism, (Hurst, 2016). 
355 John Burke, Honest Broker, (Texas A&M University Press, April 2009), p. 25. 
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The previous case study demonstrated the relative ease, even predictably so, in which the 
link between narrative, identity and threat perception can become paradoxically 
misaligned when strategy is decentralised in behavioural terms and how this compounds 
the KSA’s threat perception, narrative and behavioural responses. The previous case 
study also highlighted some emerging academic work linking strategic culture with an 
ability to predict patterns in (future) state behaviour. 
 
Since 2015 the KSA-Iran strategic rivalry has intensified to the extent that even if they 
do not stumble into direct military confrontation, the intensity of their competition risks 
an escalation in the levels from perpetual simmering conflict toward something more akin 
to turmoil. The use of the term competition is increasingly utilised by scholars to highlight 
their perpetual quest for pre-eminence and legitimacy.356  This next case study briefly 
examines another critical juncture, the Arab Spring with emphasis on the ongoing 
situation within Syria, in order to identify the behavioural role of Iranian non-state actors 
and the concomitant response by the KSA. Specifically, we will look at its identity 
formation within contemporary Syria, its threat perception and its strategic discourse in 
order to bring to life the Iranian behavioural ways discussed in chapter 4. The case study 
will conclude, importantly, by observing the KSA’s strategic responses. 
 
The Iranian’s strategic behavioural approach had a two-fold effect across the KSA’s 
sphere of influence: attempting to delegitimise the Saudi leaders and also seeking to 
unsettle Shia communities across Arabia.357 Their targeted stakeholders were therefore: 
 
356 John Calabrese, The Saudi-Iran Strategic Rivalry, Shocks and Rivalries in the Middle East and 
North Africa, (Georgetown University Press, 2020), p. 59.  
357 Anoushiravan Ehteshami and Raymond Hinnebusch, ‘The Foreign Policies of Middle East 
States’, Lynne Rienner Firm, July 2014. 
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influential, powerful and religious Shia figures, nation states that had a majority or 
powerful Shia population, and ‘revolutionary movements’, regardless of religious 
confession.358  Of particular interest to this thesis is how these Iranian behavioural ways 
create security dilemmas, and how these security dilemmas are able to cause unintended 
consequences.  It is not appropriate to consider these two behavioural ways being 
executed by a coherent nation state, or by unitary and unified actors.  
 
This thesis has already noted the role of sub-state or non-state actors in the scale of 
unintended consequences. Between KSA and Iran, this case study will demonstrate the 
literature’s conclusions regarding the vital role of non-state actors as often being 
responsible for this chain of causation. 359 Intended by the sponsor or otherwise, their 
indirect role in the creation of a security dilemma is significant, especially when 
considering behavioural response options by opposing nation states, and specifically in 
the case of the KSA. The literature suggests this is especially the case when this sub-state 
activity is often aligned with a specific ideological framework. 360  This dilemma is 
significant and it could also give new meaning to the expression of ‘proxy warfare’ 
insofar as assuming that ‘proxy warfare’ along ideological, sectarian or tribal lines is 
always state sponsored. 361  
 
 
358 Matthew Levitt, Hezbollah: The Global Footprint of Lebanon’s Party of God, (Washington: 
Georgetown University Press, 2013). 
359 John Calabrese, The Saudi-Iran Strategic Rivalry, Shocks and Rivalries in the Middle East and 
North Africa, (Georgetown University Press, 2020). 
360 Last, Violent Non-State Actors, pp. 51-90. 
361 Mark Lynch, The Arab Uprising, (PublicAffairs, January 2013); and Christopher Davidson, 
Power and Politics, (C Hurst & Co Publishers Ltd, 2011). 
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NATIONAL SECURITY: CULTURE AND BEHAVIOURAL CONTROL 
In stark contrast to the behavioural method employed by the KSA (which we discussed 
in the previous case study), one of the new institutions that the Iranian revolution created 
was the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps, established with the task of safeguarding 
the revolution.  Initially a coercive force – similar in scope to the KSA’s Ikhwan of the 
1920s - it has remained an ideological motivated revolutionary force since the 1979 
revolution.362 According to Huntingdon and Halliday, revolutionary states are normally 
confronted with an immediate problem: develop their militaries into counter-
revolutionary organisations, or oriented against foreign enemies, whilst simultaneously 
remaining subordinate to the revolutionary leadership.  The literature normally 
categorises political-civil-military relations as either ‘professional’ or ‘praetorian’.363  
The Iranian revolution was unique in that the IRGC became both. A revolutionary army 
protecting against internal threats to revolutionary gains and externally, pursuing political 
revolutionary goals on behalf of the political class.364  The IRGC’s relationship with its 
initial leader – Khomeini – was affirmed in their commitment to the velayat-e faqih and 
their resolve to fulfil his orders.  Included in its initial congress in 1981 the IRGC was 
charged with “…export[ing] the revolution in every condition until the fluctuation of the 
flag of Islam in the high castles of the world”.365  And because the first principle of the 
IRGC’s ideological outlook is the protection and expansion of velayat e-feqhi, its 
‘hezboalli’ networks across Arabia pose a legitimacy challenge to the KSA.  And since 
 
362 Kenneth Katzman, ‘The Warriors of Islam: Iran’s Revolutionary Guard’, (Westview Press, 
1993), p. 207. 
363  Samuel Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory of Civil-Military Relations, 
(Boston: Harvard University Press, 1957), p. 21; Fred Halliday, Revolution and World Politics. 
364 Bayram Sinkaya, Revolutionary Guards in Iranian Politics, (Routledge, 2016), p. 21.  
365 Bayram Sinkaya, Revolutionary Guards in Iranian Politics, (Routledge, 2016), p. 27. 
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the core of the IRGC is motivated by religious principles and its perception of post-
revolutionary Iran’s culture, the ‘perpetual ideological conflict’ implies that their 
ideological values were an end of itself.   
 
According to Zabih, it is no coincidence that Khomeini declared the third day of Shaban 
(the eighth month of the Islamic calendar) and the birth date of Imam Hussein, to be 
‘IRGC day’ in Iran so that “the philosophy of freedom-seeking and oppression-fighting 
of those who fought in the battle of Karbala would be the model and guiding principle [of 
the IRGC].”366 According to Sinkaya this has two important deductions: the blending of 
revolutionary ideals with a culture of Jihad, martyrdom and sacrifice on the one hand; 
and, the sanctification of the IRGC as the principal guardians of the revolution and of 
Imam Hussein’s legacy and actions.   
 
Strategic behaviour: Exerting Tighter Control Between Narrative and Norms? 
Since the contemporary struggle inside Syria is between non-state actors, aligned to 
different ideologies, and occasionally as aligned proxies of regional (and even global) 
powers, is “semiotic” and “military” (which we discovered in chapter 2), this chapter 
evidences the utility of the strategic cultural concept adopted by Lock and others (which 
we also discovered in chapter 2) as the interaction of norms, narratives and practices.367 
It more specifically links the norms and narratives with actual behaviours, whereas 
Johnston’s use of the concept generally tries to separate the two. That said, the KSA’s 
ability to oscillate and re-emphasise its norms and narratives, sometimes despite its 
behaviour, as we have witnessed with the promotion of violent Jihad in Afghanistan and 
 
366 Sepher Zabih, The Iranian Military in Revolution and War, (Routledge, 1988), p. 111. 
367 Last, Violent Non-State Actors.  
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within contemporary Syria, demonstrate the KSA’s preference to separate norms and 
narrative from its actual behaviour. This dichotomy is discovered throughout this thesis. 
Therefore, rather than being a cause to dismiss Johnston’s conception of strategic culture, 
especially his claims of its predictive utility, on the contrary, the KSA’s behaviour is 
demonstrably predictable but in ways that are inconsistent with its use of narrative and 
norms.  
 
As we have discovered, this is a behavioural characteristic of its requirement to omni-
balance. The case studies involving proxies ideologically aligned to the KSA have shown 
that the strategic culture of the non-state actors is subject to change, normally as the result 
of a strategic shock or a critical juncture. This is consistent with the writings of the second 
generation of scholars. The consistency of this adaptation demonstrates the concept’s 
utility. Berger and Glenn assume that politico-military strategy is directly linked to 
domestic cultural factors, and therefore are relatively fixed and resistant to change, 
principally because “disconfirmable cognitive elements are buffered by the psychological 
phenomenon of consistency seeking. Information that reinforces existing images and 
beliefs is readily assimilated, while inconsistent data tend to be ignored, rejected, or 
distorted in order to make them compatible with prevailing cognitive structures”.368 
Indeed, this chapter  discovers that the parameters of acceptable change for the Saudi 
leadership, and the extent to which ideologies – for example Pan-Arabism and religion – 
may actually be pre-determined because they feature prominently in influencing the 
KSA’s behaviour.  
 
 
368  Thomas Berger, ‘From Sword to Chrysanthemum: Japan’s Culture of Antimilitarism’, 
International Security 17, No.4, 1993, p119-150; John Glenn, ‘Realism versus Strategic Culture: 
Competition and Collaboration?’ International Studies Review, Vol.11, No.3, (2009).  
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In the case of state sponsored proxies, in particular violent non-state actors, their 
narratives, norms and behaviours are more disposed to change over time, because they 
lack formal structures, they are prone to factionalism, and because they ordinarily are 
dominated by powerful and charismatic leaders possessing an ability to coerce and 
persuade. Indeed, the case studies throughout this thesis have discovered both similarities 
and differences in the KSA’s strategic behaviour, especially insofar as it relates to the 
employment of proxies.  
 
The case studies have demonstrated that, despite their ability to diverge in terms of 
interests, their narratives and norms are founded on the same core beliefs. We have 
discovered that their main divergence is in the interpretation of critical junctures, and 
their perceptions of the threat at these junctures. The framing and interpretation of these 
junctures oscillates, and the KSA will often omni-balance and bandwagon with their 
ideologically aligned proxies despite a variance in their subsequent strategic behaviours. 
Indeed, what the Afghanistan case study demonstrates is the disconnect between the 
KSA’s narrative and its practices, the latter of which reflect omni-balancing in its 
execution. The nested nature of al-Qaeda’s identity, including its militant forerunners 
which we explored in chapter 3, imitates and diverges from that of its core sponsor during 
the Afghan Jihad of the 1980s – the KSA.  
 
This idea of a nested identity and culture recognises the duality of the KSA’s behaviour, 
as it omni-balances, and therefore displays characteristics reminiscent of an idiosyncratic 
strategic culture, conforming to both the second and third generation of strategic culture 
concepts. Going further, we have discovered that these requirement to omni-balance are 
heavily influenced by the KSA’s need to have narratives with a degree of hybridity, 
characterising their antagonists, divided into non-Arab ‘other’, ‘infidel Shia’, and 
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‘faithless Sunni’ (in the case of Political Islamists that are not Wahhabists). This inherent 
narrative flexibility allows the KSA considerable freedom of action, providing – insofar 
as cultural norms are concerned – the concept of al-wala wa-l-bara is interpreted and 
promulgated by Wahhabist clerics as conferring legitimacy on the political status-quo. 
 
Likewise, examining the Arab Spring allows this thesis to discover the complexity in 
pursuing sectarianism, with the inherent contradiction as to whether it is or is not the real 
driver of state policy. The response of Sunni autocrats in the Middle East laid this bare.  
Turkey and Qatar backed Muslim Brotherhood electoral victories in Tunisia and Egypt, 
while Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates opposed them and strongly backed the 
counter-revolutions that sought to overturn these political gains.369 Similarly, in Libya, 
different Sunni regimes backed different rebel groups in conflict with each other.370 “If 
this is a sectarian fight, the Sunnis have not had their act together”.371 Since the Arab 
Spring, the region has become a theatre for Saudi-Iranian confrontation fought not 
through classical state-to-state military battles, but rather through domestic and 
transnational actors.  As Gause has noted, the objective is to expand their own regional 
influence, not to seek a decisive military victory. 372  Therefore, while it is true that 
religious identities are more salient as behavioural tools in the politics of the Middle East 
 
369 Mark Lynch, ‘Why Saudi Arabia Escalated the Middle East’s Sectarian Conflict’, The Monkey 
Cage (Washington Post Blog), January 8, 2016, available at 
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today than previously, it is also true that these identities have been politicised by state 
actors in pursuit of political gain.  Authoritarianism is the key to understanding this 
problem.   
As chapter 4 noted, the literature on post-1979 KSA-Iranian relations depict it as being 
strategic, positional, and persistent/enduring in that each identifies the other as being its 
primary threat. It is positional, as opposed to spatial, in that the rivalry is rooted in a 
contest over relative status rather than exclusive control of territory. And it is enduring in 
those repeated conflicts have persisted for an extended period of time.  
 
According to Diehl and Goertz, the initial political shock of the 1979 revolution would 
ordinarily be enough to set the stage for rapid changes in relationships which become 
very hard to dislodge or improve. 373  They note that in the case of KSA-Iran, the 
evolutionary approach towards identity competition encompasses a narrative of “a history 
of hostility”.374 They also note that rivalries are neither predetermined nor irreversible, 
and that in some situations, circumstances might allow for the termination or de-
escalation of a rivalry. However, given the preponderance to ‘outsource’ its strategic 
behaviour, or put another way, the outsourcing of the tactical execution of its strategic 
narrative, often to violent non-state actors (in KSA’s case) and violent state and non-state 
actors (in Iran’s case), the complexity in pursuing de-escalation is evident. 
 
To achieve this, KSA’s strategic decision makers opted for a strategy that would remain 
beneath the ‘tipping point’ or threshold of state-on-state conflict. Rather, they 
sectarianized the geopolitical contest using both domestic and external actors, state and 
 
373 Jean-Pierre Filiu, From Deep State to Islamic State: The Arab Counter-Revolution and its 
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non-state.375  The securitisaztion of vertical cleavages that have long coexisted with other 
class, ideological, and regional divisions ruptured the country along sectarian, religious, 
and ethnic lines.  Saudi Arabia funded and supported local Salafi groups fighting in Syria 
to achieve its political objectives.376 Saudi Arabia’s national-security strategists created 
an umbrella organisation called Jaysh-al Islam (Army of Islam) which by 2013 became 
the KSA’s primary boots on the ground. The sectarianization of rebel forces ensured that 
the non-violent local opposition were side-lined, and the uprisings would become 
transformed into a sectarian military confrontation.377   
 
For its part, Iran countered by investing heavily in support of Assad’s regime. They 
managed to keep the regime afloat financially in the face of Arab League campaigns 
orchestrated by the KSA. 378 The IRGC became Iran’s key instrument in exporting the 
revolution, its role written within IRGC law as “a permanent struggle for realizing divine 
principles and expanding the rule of diving order…the range of our duty is not limited to 
our land and we have extra-border missions as well.”379  The IRGC were able to establish 
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connections across the Middle East and provide technical, financial or logistical support 
to them, with association between Iran and Hezbollah the most apparent and enduring of 
this.  Jay Solomon describes the IRGC as “…a CIA, Pentagon, and State Department all 
rolled into one”.380  It had for decades, often in collaboration with Syria, manipulated 
extremist groups and militias.  Even ‘Sunni’ extremists like Hamas would align 
themselves as proxies and willing to subordinate themselves to the IRGC when the 
objective, primarily anti-Israeli in their case was considered to be worth it.381  
 
Which Sunni non-state actors? 
For Iran, their deliberate behavioural strategy, executed by the IRGC with a narrow 
spectrum of ideologically aligned non-state actors makes the link between strategic 
culture and execution easier to understand, and predict. For the KSA the link is much 
more difficult to discern, primarily because the intra-Sunni competition surrounding 
narrative is more congested, as chapter 3 has already outlined. In the case of Syria, there 
were broadly three different strands of Sunni-opposition stakeholders: moderate (such as 
the Syrian National Congress and the Free Syrian Army), Islamist (such as Ahrar as-Sham 
and the Syrian Islamic Front who did rely on calls to defensive Jihad but whose goals 
were therefore constrained within Syria), and Salafi Jihadist (such as Jabhat al-Nusra and 
DAESH who relied on offensive Jihad and therefore had trans-national objectives). 382    
Saudi Arabia who would work and empower only those with whom the Saudis understood 
and approved, which excluded the Muslim Brotherhood383.  The coordination of proxies 
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by their different sponsors therefore, in the case of Syria (as is the case within Libya at 
2015) makes the formation of ‘sub-state alliances’, aligned in pursuit of a common 
objective a distinct feature of the KSA way in warfare, even despite there being no 
guarantee that stakeholders will even remain aligned with their sponsors, and there is no 
guarantee that stakeholders will not mutate.  In fact, once execution became decentralised, 
rival stakeholders will often compete rather than unify, especially in the quest for more 
resources.  Within Syria the unchecked radicalism of different networks would eventually 
create an environment in which Salafi Jihadists would thrive at the expense of their 
nationalist or Islamist competitors. 384   The extent to which regional powers backed 
different stakeholders at the expense of unity because of the lack of a unified narrative 
implies a recognition of their unwillingness to be decisive.   
 
SUMMARY 
The KSA’s reaction to the opportunity of Afghanistan in the 1980s, and the KSA’s 
response to the situation in contemporary Syria, a microcosm of the Arab Spring and its 
fallout, are very informative in seeking to identify trends in the KSA’s strategic 
behaviour. It has identified, that insofar as these case studies are concerned, the KSA 
deliberately seeks to influence the norms of religiously aligned non-state actors in an 
attempt to influence the non-state actor’s behaviour. Indeed, these case studies have 
demonstrated that the KSA will even coercively influence these norms. 
 
If the middle of March 2011 marked a pivotal turning point – when the contagious 
awakenings in Yemen, Bahrain, Syria and Lebanon turned violent – then the KSA’s 
reaction is profound and informative.  To paraphrase Clausewitz’ aphorism about war 
 
384 Peter Gay, The Cultivation of Hatred, WW Norton & Company, 1993, p. 21. 
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being the continuation of politics by another means, this chapter demonstrated that 
sectarian conflict in the Middle East today is the perpetuation of political rule via identity 
mobilization.  The speed and alacrity of the KSA’s response to Iranian actions (that is, 
the Iranian empowerment of non-state and state actors) is also informative as it highlights 
a predetermined assessment of tolerance for change and defined strategic and regional 
spheres of influence, by the KSA.385  
 
This predetermined assessment was heavily informed and influenced by critical junctures 
discussed in this chapter. Likewise, the two case studies discussed in this chapter are two 
of many critical junctures, for example, one could also have included others such as 
Nasserism, the confluence of events in 1979, the US intervention into Iraq in 1991, the 
US intervention into Iraq in 2003, or the ongoing civil wars in Libya and Yemen. These 
would be interesting areas of further scholarly study. 
 
This chapter has also explored the utility of strategic culture in predicting strategic 
behaviour, which as we noted in chapter 2, remains contested. Previous chapters have 
concluded that strategic culture can be dynamic, shaped by shocks and events, and is not 
necessarily static. We have noted that the link between strategy and behaviour is cyclical 
and that it operates at three levels, which this chapter’s case studies have helped to 
illuminate: narrative, which is shaped by identity and threat perception; which feed into 
strategic behaviour; which in turn influences the evolution of the narrative. This chapter 
has emphasised the link between narrative and behaviour, by emphasising the frequency 
 
385 For example, Qatar abandoned its former pragmatic foreign policy and band-wagoned with 
the Muslim Brotherhood and its affiliated Islamists (both Political and Militant) in a bid to bolster 
its geopolitical weight. Qatar played a proactive role in regime change in Egypt, Libya and Syria. 
It led a campaign to isolate Syria from the Arab League.  And it successfully engineered Hamas’ 
exit from the Iranian-Syrian alliance (by becoming their sponsor in their stead 
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that behaviour is decentralized and conducted by non-state actors, but with an element of 
centralized control or influence over the non-state actor’s ‘norms’, afforded by religious 
aspects of the KSA’s strategic culture.  
 
These case studies have also demonstrated that the link between discursive power (the 
narrative) and behaviour changes as new strategies and tactics are innovated. As such, the 
KSA’s strategic culture seemingly does evolve, in part because of its reliance on non-
state actors and other stakeholders, themselves being reliant on human agency brought 
on by radicalisation or deradicalization, leadership changes, and secession. We have 
noted that norms, identity and perceptions of threat are slower to change for the KSA in 
particular, but that these things are more prone to faster change for non-state actors. This 
can create a perception of a dominant cultural concept – in this instance, Wahhabism 
specifically and Sunniism in general – out of step with those claiming to execute its 
behaviour in its name. 
 
This rise of pan-Islamism in the 1980s and early 1990s created a very beneficial political 
opportunity for the KSA to encourage activism abroad.  Classical Jihadism became 
socially acceptable, not as a specific result of the state’s Wahhabist doctrine per se, but 
actually as a response to an ever increasingly complicated regional security environment.  
As this chapter noted, militarised pan-Islamism became a tool of foreign and security 
policy for the KSA.  It afforded the national and regional leadership considerable freedom 
of manoeuvre.  In time, the negative connotations and consequences of empowering non-
state actors would become apparent, and therein lies a security paradox for the KSA.  
Ambiguous relationships with proxies would generate unwelcome international 
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accusations of passive sponsorship of terrorism.386  So, the ideal strategic choices would 
involve proxy warfare, with all of its attendant strategic advantages, yet sufficiently 
controlled to avoid subsequent blowback…a strategist’s nirvana. Controlling that link 
between narrative and behaviour seemingly requires highly centralised decision making, 




386 Shiraz Maher, Salafi-Jihadism, Hurst, 2016, p. 37. 
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CHAPTER 6 - CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
The primary research question of this thesis has been: To what extent can strategic culture 
help us understand the KSA’s strategic decision-making behaviour with regard to its 
foreign and security policy? 
 
The thesis followed a chronological method, examining the dominant cultural factors and 
critical junctures which affected the KSA’s decision making. These included the KSA’s 
state-creation in 1932, the period colloquially known as Nasserism during the 1950/60s, 
the period following the 1979 Iranian Revolution. The thesis included case studies that 
examined the KSA’s behaviour during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan during the 
1980s and during the civil and proxy war carried out in Syria following the events of the 
Arab Spring in 2011. In addition to the primary research question, these historical periods 
allowed me to explore several secondary research questions to better support my use of 
the strategic culture method to understand the KSA’s strategic decision-making 
behaviours.  
 
Chapter 2 examined the scholarly literature surrounding the concept of strategic culture 
in order to better understand its utility and appropriateness compared to other concepts. 
Chapter 3 examined those dominant cultural factors influencing the KSA’s decision 
making behaviours in response to Nasserism, specifically by examining intra-Sunni 
competition dynamics over identity and leadership. This chapter also examined the extent 
to which intra-Sunni religious doctrine – specifically Wahhabism – influenced the KSA’s 
strategic decision-making behaviours in relation to some of the key geopolitical 
challenges it has faced over the last several decades.  
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Chapter 4 examined the events of the 1979 Iranian Revolution, and the resulting intra-
Islamic competition over identity and leadership that has played out in the Middle East. 
This analysis facilitated the answering an additional secondary research question which 
sought to explorethe extent to which this intra-Islamic competition has constrained the 
KSA’s strategic behaviour – insofar as the Wahhabi doctrine of tawhid (monotheism) and 
takfir (excommunication) are concerned – and the extent to which the KSA’s evolution 
of its identity provides an additional paradox in understanding the KSA’s strategic 
behaviour   
 
Chapter 5 helped to complement our understanding of the KSA’s foreign and security 
policy behaviour by identifying behavioural patterns within two critical junctures or 
trends that can be explained by the KSA’s strategic culture. Specifically, these critical 
junctures highlighted the KSA’s strategic preferences for utilising ideologically-aligned 
proxies in pursuit of the KSA’s strategic objectives. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
This thesis has proven the demonstrable utility of the concept strategic culture in helping 
us understand the KSA’s threat perceptions and the strategic behaviour undertaken to deal 
with them.  Many of the critical junctures that have affected the history of the KSA have 
originated from sub-state actors and factors, supra-state ideologies, and non-state actors. 
The threat perceptions that the KSA’s ruling elites experienced during these critical 
junctures  influenced behavioural responses that balanced the often competing demands 
on the Saudi state) or requirements by these actors. Indeed, the strategic culture method 
has allowed this thesis to analyse the linkage between cultural aspects internal to the KSA 
and its strategic choices and behaviours in relation to its foreign and security policies, 
primarily by analysing the construction of the KSA’s different identities. Specifically, the 
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norms associated with being the Custodians of the Two Holy Mosques, the de-facto head 
of the Wahhabi school of Sunnism, and its doctrinal hostility to Political Islamist and pan-
Arabist doctrines, have demonstrated behavioural trends, or rather a strategic approach 
which is highly centralized in order to omni-balance against these (often) competing, 
paradoxical and contradictory strategic challenges.  
 
In addition, this thesis has demonstrated that the strategic culture concept can be a useful 
tool to interpret patterns of Saudi behaviour. Studying the KSA’s strategic behaviour 
along its critical junctures has allowed us to understand its cultural thought-ways, and to 
ascertain a set of shared assumptions and decision-rules which allow us to separate the 
constants and the constraints of its strategic behaviour.  The strategic culture concept, in 
particular Johnson’s ‘ideational milieu’ approach, may even enable a modicum of 
predictability insofar as it applies to the KSA’s strategic behaviour.   
 
Key findings 
Germane to the primary research question is the issue of identity and legitimacy. A 
recurring assumption throughout this thesis has been how state-based alliances and sub-
state alliances compete over the ideological question of ‘which identity’ provides their 
legitimacy. This often frames their threat perceptions and their behavioural responses 
accordingly. Furthermore, this thesis has noted that conflict in the KSA’s sphere of 
influence has many sources; and it has identified reasons other than anarchy for why 
states and non-state actors constitute a threat to the KSA. For example, in the case of the 
norms underpinning Arabism and Islamism, these norms provide instruction or guidance 
on how the Saudi leaders ought to behave. And yet, even regarding norms, much (but not 
all) of the existing literature frames these norms as having impacts only between states, 
and only when they are ideologically non-aligned.  
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Rather, by applying the strategic culture concept, this thesis has demonstrated the extent 
to which these consequences constrain or shape the KSA’s behaviour regardless of the 
KSA’s ideological alignment with other states. That is to say, the KSA’s history is replete 
with examples of hostility to states that are demonstrably Sunni Arab, such as Nasser’s 
Egypt and Qadaffi’s Libya, and even towards those Sunni Arab states with which the 
KSA has a formal political and military alliance, such as Thani’s Qatar. This is a powerful 
indicator of how cultural factors, such as norms, as opposed to military capabilities have 
greater primacy in helping us understand inter-Arab politics, intra-Islamic politics, and in 
relation to Iran. Strategic culture provides a framework for analysing the consequences 
of violating the State’s norms through different lenses, especially those norms that have 
a direct bearing on the legitimacy of the Saudi state.  Therefore, the KSA’s strategic 
behaviour operates first and foremost in what Gerges describes as “a sub-environment”, 
using its “discursive power” beneath a recognisable – yet changeable and different 
threshold according to the specific contexts of these critical junctures - international 
political threshold that doesn’t trigger outside interference, unless that interference is 
actually desired.387  
 
This thesis examined the competition between radical intra-Sunni stakeholders, and how 
their competition over religious identity and legitimacy presents challenges to the KSA. 
How the KSA responds to these challenges is highly dependent on the political context 
of the time and the severity of the risk to its own identity and legitimacy presented.  
Indeed, this thesis has demonstrated that sometimes, these radical intra-Sunni 
stakeholders become a cause to champion, and in other times they become a cause to 
 
387 Fawaz Gerges, The New Middle East, pp. 270-73. 
 142 
guard against. Although this may imply that the KSA’s strategic behaviour is therefore 
inconsistent, this thesis has attempted to demonstrate that this is not necessarily the case. 
Indeed, its threat perception of cultural factors being weaponised against the Saudi 
regime, which has engendered amongst its leadership identity anxiety, will typically 
involve a similar behavioural response that attempts to delegitimize the regime’s 
opponents and to emphasise its own unique identity and religious legitimacy amongst the 
Umma. This behavioural pattern has been remarkably consistent across the critical 
junctures examined. 
 
The critical junctures discussed in this thesis identify and highlight the common 
intractable nature of conflict, usually conducted on ideological lines, and usually 
involving great animosity and vicious cycles of violence between opposing parties. 
Despite occasional periods of peace, the period since Nasserism has witnessed perpetual 
sub-state conflict fought along ostensibly sectarian lines, but more often because of 
identity proximity and anxiety.  The perpetual and seemingly intractable ideological and 
sectarian challenge is more keenly conducted at the sub-state level, and as we have 
discussed, often by weaponizing apocalyptic cultural concepts and doctrines.   
 
This thesis has also noted the uniqueness of Islam in creating ideological fitna, whereby 
radical leaders with pan-Islamic ideologies clash with their ideological competitors and 
create a crisis situation that can become difficult to reverse. Where no decisive act is 
possible to reverse the deteriorating situation, then fitna will most likely occur.  This 
thesis has demonstrated that the chain of causation towards creating a situation of fitna 
becomes more likely (but not exclusively) when these stakeholders are outside the control 
of the state. Therefore, the extent to which the KSA’s leaders will go to limit or influence 
this chain of causation is an important characteristic of its strategic behaviour. This 
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suggests that the KSA’s strategic judgements are indeed framed by strategic preferences, 
that are often, but not always (especially in the case of al-wala wa-l-bara) influenced by 
cultural factors. These limits are often reliant on religiously inspired coercion to achieve 
a position of influence.  We examined (specifically regarding contemporary conflicts in 
Syria and Afghanistan) how the KSA secures this coercive position of advantage, and the 
requirements in strategic culture terms that allow it to remain discreet and highly 
centralised.  This might be regarded as the opposite of a conventional approach 
underpinning strategic behaviour where strategic intent may be clear(er), and with its 
execution being decentralised. 
 
This thesis has also noted the significance of the KSA’s discursive power within intra-
Sunni ideological debates. This power may have a disproportionate impact on the nature 
of the KSA’s preferred strategic behaviour and decision-making. For example, the thesis 
has demonstrated the span and importance of these ideologies and doctrines, the subtle 
intra-stakeholder fissures and distinctions underpinning such ideologies and doctrines, 
and the lengths the KSA will go to retain primacy or control over them. The thesis has 
offered an explanation in normative terms. Such an understanding obscures important 
differences, Islamism and Salafism, for example, are not the same thing, and in fact are 
often in competition with each other. Indeed, the literature notes that most Islamists are 
not Jihadists, just as most Salafists are not Jihadists. Using the strategic culture concept, 
this thesis has demonstrated how the KSA utilises these ideologies either through alliance 
formation, alignment, conflict, or as their own proxies. These ideologies are important 
components within the context of the KSA’s strategic behaviour.  
This behavioural flexibility provides the KSA’s modern rules some freedom of 
manoeuvre. The frequency of this behaviour implies it is a key component of its 
discursive power when conducting internal and external balancing with non-state 
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ideological actors. In its religious scholarly form, Wahhabism has been used effectively 
as a component of the KSA’s discursive strategy. The extent to which this implies a 
strategic culture which prioritises anti-opposition policies over ‘defence of the Sunni 
faithful’ policies was consistently observed throughout the thesis.   
 
This thesis has also noted the KSA’s behavioural flexibility surrounding its identity. As 
regional or domestic events have created behavioural anxiety, the KSA has tended to 
reshape or repackage its sense of identity in order to demonstrate its sense of uniqueness. 
This reshaping generally involves the reframing of an opponent’s identity to demonise or 
delegitimise it, whilst simultaneously enhancing or emphasising the uniqueness of its 
own. The KSA has shifted its policies around alliance formation and alignment, albeit 
demonstrating consistent behavioural characteristics whilst doing so, reinventing specific 
elements of its self-identity depending on context. This reinventing has continuously 
evolved, for example, from the KSA touting itself initially as being champions of pan-
Islamism as a counter to Nasser’s pan-Arabism, to championing pan-Islamism into a more 
conservative focus on Sunnism, and from championing Sunnism to a much more specific 
focus on Wahhabist discourse following the ascendancy of the Muslim Brotherhood and 
other Political Islamist activists.  
 
By using the strategic culture concept, this thesis has also demonstrated that cultural 
similarities – within Islam and inter-Arab - which challenge the KSA’s unique religious 
leadership role within the Middle East become a source of anxiety. By analyzing the 
chronological aspects of pan-Arabism, Islamism, and Salafi-Jihadism, this thesis has 
noted two strategic preferences that are influenced by its strategic culture. Both 
preferences involve a desire to retain a distinctive discursive power based on two 
exclusive identity markers which portrayed the KSA, initially, as the sole legitimate 
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leader of Islam in response to pan-Arabism, and then subsequently as sole legitimate 
leader of conservative Sunni Islam in response to Islamism and Salafi-Jihadism. These 
similarities in identity – that is, similarity with other stakeholders – can often be a source 
of division insofar as the KSA is concerned.   Indeed, chapter 4 highlighted another 
identity-distinction following the 1979 Iranian revolution, and that the Iranian regime’s 
use of religious legitimacy as its own identity marker, led to a competition with the KSA 
for the title of ‘leader of the Islamic world’.  
 
The KSA’s behavioural responses along its critical junctures also have similarities and 
consistency. For example, denunciations of takfir against non-aligned actors are common, 
often resulting in the radicalisation of ideologues, militias, and proxies. These 
denunciations initiate a wave of behaviour by aligned (and even non-aligned) non-state 
actors which become the KSA’s behavioural ways, either directly or indirectly. These 
behavioural responses have similarities to other external identity challenges discussed 
throughout the thesis – by Nasserism, Political Islamists, Salafi-Jihadists, and by Iranian 
revolutionary concepts and doctrine. The KSA has evolved its own cultural thought-ways, 
in particular those related to the reinterpretation of religious concepts and doctrine in 
response to perceived threats and pronouncements. For example, the interpretation and 
evolution of al-wala wa-l-bara, in response to regional political events and to avoid a 
repeat of the pitfalls of the 19th century civil-war that led to the collapse of the second 
Saudi state, is a clear and simple demonstration of this.  
 
FURTHER STUDY 
In pursuing these ‘legitimising policies’, this thesis has noted how the KSA’s behaviour 
might require a readjustment of understanding around sectarian conflict, in that it is not 
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solely a continuation of a rupture that occurred shortly after the demise of the Righteously 
Guided Caliphs. Indeed, this thesis has noted how at critical junctures throughout its 
history, the KSA has sought to tweak religious doctrines and concepts, which has had a 
concomitant impact on the behaviour and strategies of other actors, including non-state 
actors. The predominant explanations for intra-state conflict in the Middle East region is 
potentially an area for further study. Scholarly literature, as we have noted throughout the 
thesis, demonstrates that identity to be a significant cause in general.  
 
However, by examining some important trends in the KSA’s strategic behavior, by 
focusing specifically on the strategic culture that shapes its strategic preferences and 
behaviour, the literature also demonstrates that the KSA has a vested interest in 
maintaining sectarian division in the form of intra-Sunni sectarianisation as a distinct 
objective of its foreign and security policy. These aspects of its strategic culture might 
provide an opportunity for scholars to further develop an explanatory framework when 
assessing the KSA’s strategic behaviour, perhaps even in a predictive fashion. 
 
The utility of the strategic culture method has highlighted paradoxes which would also 
be of interest for further study. For example, a paradox has emerged in exploring how 
sectarianism is employed and controlled by those wielding it as a strategic behavioural 
tool, and the difficulty posed in pursuing a less-violent political reality whilst wielding 
such a tool. The literature demonstrates that sectarianism may exist practically along each 
conflict fault-line in the Middle East, carefully and consistently constructed along 
regional, national, and local political realities.   
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In the case of the KSA’s competition with Iran, for example, this construction is a by-
product of post-Revolutionary Iran’s velayat e-feqhi, with its doctrinal emphasis on Jihad, 
maslaha (expediency), and the supremacy of the Supreme Leader over politics and 
religion. This doctrine creates identity anxiety with the KSA’s leadership on several 
levels, but in particular with that of its own cultural levers: Wahhabism and its broader 
leadership role within Sunni Islam.  Indeed, both the Saudi and Iranian regimes have 
heightened or downplayed Islamic doctrine as the need arose, strategically. The KSA has 
no deeply visceral and historical anti-Shia policy per se, but they enacted anti-velayat e-
feqhi policies, as the thesis has discovered.  
 
Given the importance of Islam to both states as a legitimising tool it is easy to see how 
moves by either Iran or the KSA can have ramifications for the other.  This directly shapes 
the behaviour of those sub-state stakeholders acting along ideological lines.  This 
behaviour can be either soft, or as we have seen in Yemen, Lebanon, Syria and Iraq, 
increasingly hard.  This sub-state soft and hard power encapsulates the security dilemma 
confronting both the KSA (and Iran).  The mosaic of these threats presents unique 
challenges to the KSA’s rulers, both internally and externally.  The location and nature 
of a particular threat will determine the response, and often, this response will impact 
upon a different stakeholder altogether.  Some of these stakeholders, as we have already 
noted, have trans-state agendas that therefore can impact somewhere seemingly 
unconnected to the original site of conflict/tension.  Furthermore, the challenges posed 
by the various sub-state groups demonstrate how the KSA is susceptible to the actions of 
others.  When these sub-state stakeholders are of a sectarian disposition – such as DAESH 
or the IRGC, both of which were looked at briefly in earlier chapters – the threats and 
conflicts that subsequently ensue from such sectarianism can become perpetual and 
intractable.   
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The final deduction of interest to the research question relates to the inevitability or not 
of sectarian conflict within the Middle East. The research has demonstrated that 
sectarianism is not an inherent historical quality of the KSA. Rather, sectarian 
entrepreneurs continue to flourish and benefit from this narrative.  Or in other words, 
sectarianism is a modern phenomenon exploited by those that equate autocracy with 
security: avoiding a Hobbesian fitna (which was also discussed in chapter 3). Of particular 
interest to this thesis is how the strategic ways of other actors (ideological, sectarian, 
hegemonic, and revolutionary) create a security dilemma for the KSA and for these 
actors.   
 
Indeed, this thesis has noted how this security dilemma can have unintended 
consequences born out of a complicated chain of causation.  Central to these unintended 
consequences are the actors and stakeholders themselves, who do not necessarily behave 
as unitary or unified actors. This thesis has demonstrated that sub-state or non-state actors 
are often responsible for this chain of causation and therefore have a direct impact on the 
creation of a state’s security dilemma.  In particular the plethora of identities and 
ideologies existing within the region often create internal security dilemmas for these 
actors, including for the KSA, that complicate escalation dynamics between them.  
 
Whilst the literature demonstrates a willingness to avoid conventional conflict by these 
stakeholders, particularly in the case of KSA and Iran, their willingness to become 
decisively engaged with other actors is a significant security dilemma that has not yet 
constrained the KSA’s strategic behaviour. That is, the literature demonstrates that the 
risk posed by the continued radicalisation and empowerment of non-state actors aligned 
to the KSA’s cause is outweighed by their threat-perception of powerful state-actors, for 
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example Nasser’s Egypt and post-revolutionary Iran. This is particularly the case when 
identity-proximity causes anxiety to the KSA.  
 
This dilemma is significant. It could give new meaning to the hackneyed expression of 
proxy warfare perpetrated by the KSA insofar as assuming that proxy warfare along 
ideological, sectarian or tribal lines is always state controlled, which could be a useful 
area of further scholarly study. Ideological fitna, therefore, provides us with some 
interesting points of reference when considering the KSA’s strategic behaviour.  For 
instance, we have discussed that the two most significant tools surrounding ideological 
fitna are narrative, especially ideological narrative, and the willingness of stakeholders, 
in particular radical sectarian groups, to wage Jihad in pursuit of their cause.   
 
Significantly, this thesis has noted the ambiguity of the KSA’s control, or not, over non-
state stakeholders, and the implications of these forces being unleashed as a tool of the 
KSA’s statecraft. For example, chapters 3 and 4 demonstrated how retaining a physical 
and ideological buffer against accusations of takfir defines the KSA’s willingness to 
become overtly engaged beyond anything other than strategically aligned via its proxies.  
Chapter 5 explored some of these deductions further, by examining two case studies: 
contemporary Syria and Afghanistan in the 1980s. Specifically, chapter 5 discussed how 
the KSA’s discursive power either directly or indirectly influences the strategy and 
behaviours of non-state actors in the pursuit of their own (the KSA) ends, and the extent 
to which state-sponsored sectarianism and sectarianisation policies encourage an 
alignment with non-state actors. These actors have their own culture, which is particularly 
important in determining the link between KSA’s strategic culture and the strategic 
behaviour of these non-state actors.  
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The KSA’s reaction to the opportunity of Afghanistan in the 1980s, and the KSA’s 
response to the situation in contemporary Syria, a microcosm of the Arab Spring and its 
fallout, are very informative in seeking to identify trends in the KSA’s strategic 
behaviour. The thesis identified that insofar as these case studies are concerned, the KSA 
deliberately sought to influence the norms of religiously aligned non-state actors in an 
attempt to influence the non-state actors’ behaviour. Indeed, these case studies have 
demonstrated that the KSA will even coercively influence these norms. 
 
If the middle of March 2011 marked a pivotal turning point – when the contagious 
awakenings in Yemen, Bahrain, Syria and Lebanon turned violent – then the KSA’s 
reaction is profound and informative.  To paraphrase Clausewitz’ aphorism about war 
being the continuation of politics by another means, this thesis demonstrated that 
sectarian conflict in the Middle East today is the perpetuation of political influence via 
identity mobilization.  The speed and alacrity of the KSA’s response to Iranian actions 
(that is, the Iranian empowerment of non-state and state actors) is also informative as it 
highlights a predetermined assessment of tolerance for change and defined strategic and 
regional spheres of influence, by the KSA. This predetermined assessment was heavily 
informed and influenced by critical junctures discussed throughout this thesis.  
 
This thesis has also explored the utility of strategic culture in predicting strategic 
behaviour, which as we noted in chapter 2, remains contested. This thesis has concluded 
that strategic culture can be dynamic, shaped by shocks and events, and is not necessarily 
static. The thesis noted that the link between strategy and behaviour is cyclical and that it 
operates at three levels, which the case studies have helped to illuminate: (1) narrative, 
(2) which is shaped by identity and threat perception, (3) which feeds into strategic 
behaviour, and in turn influences the evolution of the narrative. The thesis has emphasised 
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the link between narrative and behaviour, in particular by emphasising the frequency by 
which the execution of KSA’s policies is conducted by non-state actors. Where possible, 
the KSA seeks to retain some centralized control or influence over the non-state actor’s 
norms, afforded by religious aspects of the KSA’s strategic culture, in particular the 
KSA’s ability to influence Wahhabi doctrine. This link between its discursive power and 
its behaviour provides perhaps the KSA’s most significant source of strategic flexibility 
and freedom of manoeuvre. Indeed, the thesis has demonstrated that the KSA is able to 
create a perception that it is upholding the norms associated with a dominant cultural 
concept – Wahhabism specifically and Sunniism in general – rather than as strategic users 
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